On Sun, 20 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think thatan "ideal" election method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal information, and the cardinal information should be simple approval (yes/no for each candidate).
I would even go so far to claim that the ideal election should also give special relevance to a third kind of information: "direct" support.
For example by using Random Ballot to choose from a small set of most acceptable candidates such as Forest's P.
Or, a new idea, if you find randomization inacceptable, by electing the member of P with the most direct support!
How about using IRV to pick from P ?
This would be a compromise between Approval, Condorcet, and IRV that makes use of the three kinds of information ... cardinal, ordinal, and direct support.
Forest ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
