Strictly speaking, DMC meets SDSC. But it meets it in a weaker sense than do the single-mode methods SD, SSD, BeatpathWinner/CSSD, MAM, & RP.
For comparing methods that use mixed balloting modes to single-mode methods, one could define "thorough" versions of the criteria, in which "vote(s) X over Y" is replaced with "thoroughly vote(s) X over Y"
Informally, a voter thoroughly votes X over Y if s/he votes X over with with respect to each balloting mode that that the method in use uses to choose its winner.
Probably a precise definition could be written. Maybe later, by me, or maybe by someone else.
DMC doesn't meet SFC.
DMC, being a pairwise-count method, can benefit from ATLO, to avoid the co-operation/defection dilemma that James spoke of.
Somone pointed out to me that James' co-operation/defection dilemma, the bad-example of Approval, is not as bad as the co-operation/defection dilemma known as the "prisoner's dilemma".
We've been hearing a lot about wv not meeting LNH (Later No Harm). As I've many times pointed out on EM, the way that IRV protects your favorite from being harmed by votes for your lower choices is, by elimnating your favorite before it lets you help anyone else. I call that electoral euthanasia.
But LNH does have one use: It's one way of avoiding James' co-operation/defection dilemma. But that problem can also be well dealt-with via ATLO, and so there's no justification for giving up what needs to be given up in order to get LNH, as a way of avoiding the co-operation/defection dilemma.
Mike Ossipoff
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