On 14 Apr 2005 at 19:53 UTC-0700, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > Strictly speaking, DMC meets SDSC. But it meets it in a weaker sense > than do the single-mode methods SD, SSD, BeatpathWinner/CSSD, MAM, & > RP. > > For comparing methods that use mixed balloting modes to single-mode > methods, one could define "thorough" versions of the criteria, in > which "vote(s) X over Y" is replaced with "thoroughly vote(s) X over > Y"
I like "strongly prefer(s) X over y", though it uses an overloaded term. > > Informally, a voter thoroughly votes X over Y if s/he votes X over Y > with respect to each balloting mode that that the method in use uses > to choose its winner. > > Probably a precise definition could be written. Maybe later, by me, > or maybe by someone else. > > DMC doesn't meet SFC. DMC doesn't meet your *new* *special* definition of SFC. But that definition isn't SFC. You could create a new criterion, SFC-multi-mode if you want. DMC does satisfy SFC if viewed as a Condorcet method. Approval is used as the defeat strength and is measured directly instead of being inferred as in RP(wv) or CSSD(wv). > > DMC, being a pairwise-count method, can benefit from ATLO, to avoid > the co-operation/defection dilemma that James spoke of. Most of the time ATLO is unnecessary with DMC's approval cutoff, and no recount is required. Have you found a way to make ATLO summable? Otherwise ATLO/AERLO add expense to an election. > > Somone pointed out to me that James' co-operation/defection dilemma, > the bad-example of Approval, is not as bad as the > co-operation/defection dilemma known as the "prisoner's dilemma". > > We've been hearing a lot about wv not meeting LNH (Later No Harm). As I've > many times pointed out on EM, the way that IRV protects your favorite from > being harmed by votes for your lower choices is, by elimnating your favorite > before it lets you help anyone else. I call that electoral euthanasia. > > But LNH does have one use: It's one way of avoiding James' > co-operation/defection dilemma. But that problem can also be well > dealt-with via ATLO, and so there's no justification for giving up > what needs to be given up in order to get LNH, as a way of avoiding > the co-operation/defection dilemma. Ted -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info