Adam Tarr wrote: > It suggests to me that _natural_ cycles are very rare. This does > not automatically mean that cycles can never be a problem. The > important thing is to pick a Condorcet method where, when a > Condorcet winner exists in sincere preference, it is extremely > rare than any faction has a tactic where they can cause a > favorable cycle. (I am referring, of course, to winning votes.)
Any such cycle-creating strategy that exists under a margins method also exists under the equivalent winning-votes method. If the margins strategy includes no equal ranking, the strategies are the same. If it includes equal ranking, such as changing sincere 20:A>B>C>D ballots to 20:A=B>D>C ballots, an equally successful winning-votes strategy would be 10:A>B>D>C 10:B>A>D>C So such situations are no rarer under winning-votes than under margins. If anything, it seems to me that winning-votes might provide more such opportunities to the strategic voter since equal ranking has no effective equivalent under margins. (But it's usually more effective just to order-reverse anyway.) It is for this reason and the fact that winning-votes encourages equal ranks near the top of the ballot and full ranking near the bottom even when insincere (and even in the zero-info case!) that I prefer margins to winning-votes. -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info