Kevin, > Yes. He means that if you do not approve B, the strength of the B>C win will > be inadequate to prevent C from winning. ... > Because in the scenario, A can't win. So you are trying to reverse or weaken > the A>B pairwise win in order to move the win from C to B. ... > If you don't place B above the cutoff, then B>C is too weak to keep C from > winning. > If you place A above the cutoff, then A>B is too strong to allow B to win. ... > If you have both of these pressures simultaneously, you are forced to rank > B strictly above A.
Perhaps I'm blind, but I just don't see how this all should be the case at the same time. Could you please give a concrete example of such a situation? Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info