Rob, --- Rob LeGrand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > and the fact that winning-votes encourages equal ranks > near the top of the ballot and full ranking near the bottom even > when insincere (and even in the zero-info case!) that I prefer > margins to winning-votes.
I think it's truer that WV encourages full ranking near the bottom *mainly* in the zero-info case. If you rank lower than your needed compromises in WV, you enable others to use burying strategy against you. The way I see it is that margins and IRV are more strategy-free in the zero-info case, while WV and approval are more strategy-free when you do have information. For example, in simulations I ran, Schulze(margins) offered a certain faction favorite betrayal incentive 20 times more often than Schulze(wv) did. This is useless when the elections are zero-info, but it could be undesirable if margins were used in an election where voters possess some information. Approval, of course, nevers offer favorite betrayal incentive. Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info