At 06:44 PM 9/11/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I thought about this a bit. Consider this election:
49 A
24 B>E
27 C>D>B>E
C has 3 wins, and is the only Copeland winner.
Let's look at this. C is not just the Copeland winner, C is the
Condorcet winner, because in all the pairwise elections, A has 49
votes, and *all the other candidates* have 51 votes, because all the
other candidates' voters ranked A last by truncating. Eliminate A,
and C obviously has more votes than B.
So exactly who would Mr. Venzke have win this election? Looks to me
like the electorate is (1) polarized very badly, and no election
method is going to produce really good results with such an
electorate, and (2) A majority of voters preferred "anybody but A."
If it is not A, then who should it be? Obviously, C.
As to violated criteria, I will note that "election criteria" are
typically characteristics of elections that, on the face, usually
seem to be sensible and necessary. This can be incorrect.... This is
why such criteria should be considered carefully. The only methods
that I have seen that don't violate *some* criterion incorporate a
deliberative process and thus don't fully qualify as "election
methods" which normally are expected to mechanically produce a winner
from the votes.
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