Rob, --- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > As Abd alluded to in at least one email, it's possible to have a revised > version of Copeland that works differently. For example, it could be > possible to not credit a candidate with a victory if they don't receive > majority support (called "Copeland Majority" for purposes of this mail). > We'll say one point for a win, no points for a loss, tie, or > "draw" (where neither candidate gets a majority). > > It's something to think about. Myself, I'm not inclined to advocate > Copeland Majority in absence of serious analysis, and I'm not inclined > to work on that analysis at this time. I suspect it actually has some > nice properties when combined with a good tiebreaker, but don't have > anything provable to back up my hunch.
I think if we go in this direction we'll arrive at the CDTT, which I discussed a lot earlier this year, and which I prefer to Smith. A candidate is a CDTT winner if he has a majority-strength beatpath to every candidate who has a majority-strength beatpath to him. In this scenario: 49 A 24 B 27 C>B The CDTT winners are B and C. Any method which elects from the CDTT (such as Schulze(wv)) already satisfies minimal defense. The CDTT can be used with plurality, IRV, DSC, and MMPO and satisfy three-candidate Later-no-harm. However, this fails the plurality criterion: Any of those combination methods results in C winning in the above scenario. Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info