Forest, This is an interesting idea.
I was trying to do some examples with it, but I'm not sure how to create the four matrices. These are the ballots I was trying to use: 12: A at 10 (fill 8 and 2 circles) 11: B at 7 (fill 4, 2, 1) I'm also not sure how the winner on the finest matrix might not be the winner of the method. I'm picturing something analogous to the voter having four divider lines to place at will. Do you think that is similar? Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > These dyadic CR ballots are used to create four > pairwise matrices, from > crude to fine depending on how many of the binary > places are ignored. > > The crudest is the matrix based only on the 8 > column. This is the > "approval" matrix. In other words, on the CR scale > from zero to fifteen, > the approval cutoff is between seven and eight. > > The finest matrix is based on all four columns. > > How could we do something like Ranked Pairs with > these four matrices? > > First set in place all of the wins common to all > four matrices. > > Then set into place all of the wins common to the > three finest matrices, > strongest to weakest, as long as they don't > contradict previously frozen > wins. > > Then do the same with the two finest matrices, and > finally with the finest > only. > > The resulting order establishes the winner. > > > > The idea is that these matrices represent an > hierarchy of strengths of > preference. > ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
