Trees by Proxy starts at the bottom, such as village, but then extends upward to town, county, and state, as practice works toward perfection.
Below registering of candidates is mentioned - makes sense for, even though filing a proxy is easy, such should not elect someone with no interest. Abd and I have similar goals in different worlds. Perhaps our having separate threads will clarify for readers. DWK On Wed, 28 Mar 2007 14:02:01 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > In discussions here under the thread "Trees by Proxy," a proxy > legislature was under consideration. As part of this discussion, the > question of practicality came up, i.e., of this or that provision, > which might possibly, as representing a greater change, prevent > implementation. > > It occurred to me to outline a possible path from here to there. > > It begins with Asset Voting. Asset Voting preserves secret ballot at > the first stage but effectively becomes delegable proxy for the > purpose of electing the assembly. The basic concept of Asset is that > voters choose one or more candidates to receive their votes, called > Assets. If more than one is chosen, in the original version by Warren > Smith, voters could assign any three-place decimal fraction in the > range of 0 to 1 to the candidates. There are other implementations > which are simpler for voters, including what I called Fractional > Approval Asset Voting, FAAV. It is approval because the voter may > vote for more than one. It is fractional because if the voter votes > for more than one, the vote is divided among them. As a practical > matter, it is possible that a voter could get, say, 10 votes and > could destribute them as desired. In that, it is like cumulative voting. > > However, FAAV is Asset Voting because the votes then received by the > candidates are disposable by the candidates in order to elect > winners. We are here assuming a multiwinner election, and in > particular, of a legislature with a single district, state-wide. A > quota of votes is required for election to the legislature. So if a > candidate receives the quota or more, directly, that candidate -- at > his or her option -- is immediately elected. In any case, votes not > used up to elect a winner remain disposable, at the discretion of the > candidate holding them. This is essentially proxy or delegable proxy > (and I recommend it be delegable proxy because it makes it more > practical for votes to be assigned in relatively small numbers and > still concentrate rapidly). > > Asset Voting converts the private, secret votes of individual voters > into public electors, who then determine, as the proxies of those who > voted for them, the winner(s). Because they can bargain and use > deliberative process, the results are not predictable. I will note, > however, that if write-in votes are allowed, anyone can serve as an > elector, including the voter himself or herself. There are, in some > contexts, security considerations that might require secret > reassignment of voters where the voter-candidate holds less than a > certain number of votes. Beyond that number it becomes practical for > the society to protect the electors. > > Perhaps for this discussion it would be better to assume, from the > outset, that candidates must be registered as such; if the > registration requirements are simple, and if a means is provided to > clearly specify from a large number of candidates on the ballot, this > may be very little loss of democratic power. > > I have elsewhere described that Asset may be used to elect a > legislature that is *mostly* district-based, with the districts being > defined on-the-fly by the electors. If votes are reassigned in > precinct blocks, it becomes, then, possible to create winners whose > votes come from specific areas as shown in the voting records. It is > likely, then, that most voters would have a local representative, > with a district including their location; districts, of course, will > overlap, and there might be a few legislators with a district that > includes the entire state. This provides maximum representation to > minorities, without needing to define them. They are defined by how > they amalgamate their votes. > > Okay, so now we have a fully-proportional, *chosen* legislature. > > The next step is obvious. The electors remain, and may reassign their > votes at any time. Again, the simplest way to do this is probably > through delegable proxy, where every elector assigns a proxy to > another; every elector may directly change their proxy assignment, > effective immediately; and this propagates up the hierarchy it > creates until it actually changes the vote assignments of legislators. > > (Some worry about proxy loops. Loops are inevitable at the highest > levels, if everyone assigns a proxy; the only problem with loops is > when they take place at a low level. And there is an extremely simple > solution: if a loop leaves someone unrepresented, that elector is > notified and if any elector in a loop changes their proxy assignment > to someone outside the loop, the loop is broken and connected to a > larger group.) > > I have considered it possible that schemes could be set up whereby a > peer legislature is maintained. But it is far more flexible if the > voting power of legislators varies with their current proxy assignments. > > As long as the secret ballot assignment of votes to electors is > maintained, direct voting on the part of citizens remains impossible, > for there is no way to reconcile these votes with the votes cast by > the legislator-proxies. However, direct voting *could* be implemented > for electors, since their vote assignments are known. Votes in the > legislature then become continuously representative of the electors, > who either vote directly or by proxy. > > What, then, does it mean to be "elected"? It means that the > legislator gains "floor rights." This is the right, subject to > assembly rules, to speak in the assembly and to enter motions. It has > been pointed out that some level of uncertainty and practical > disturbance would exist if floor rights depended continuously on > proxy counts. But I see no reason why these have to be rigidly > connected. There is little harm if a legislator maintains floor > rights beyond the time when he or she holds a quota of proxies. All > that changes is the number of votes cast. And when a new legislator > gains floor rights, the proxy of that legislator remains active until > the legislator takes his or her seat -- and even beyond then, because > I assume that legislators, even though having floor rights, may still > vote by proxy. So the implementation of actual floor rights may under > some circumstances be delayed a time. All this would be a matter of > assembly rules, and if direct voting is maintained by electors, the > electors can control those rules, effectively excluding some of > themselves in the name of legislative efficiency, but never thereby > losing voting power. > > The largest step here is Asset Voting. > > Oddly enough, when I first heard of Single Transferable Vote, and it > was before I knew of Smith's Asset Voting, I thought that this was > what it meant: that the candidates receiving votes could transfer > them.... It must not be such a terribly strange idea..... > > The problem, of course, with STV and similar schemes is that it is > not flexible, it rigidly determines outcomes at the time of the > election can has no power to adjust to ongoing circumstances. STV for > a large-district many-winner legislature could produce similar > initial composition of the legislature, though Asset has the > potential of making expensive campaigning a fish bicycle; with Asset > no votes are wasted, even those cast for someone who gets very few. > (None at all would be the result if not for security concerns; if I > want to coerce your vote, I could require you to vote for yourself. > And then, from that point on, I know exactly how you vote.... And I > know if you did not vote for yourself as well....) > > (Of course, some votes could be wasted: a holder of votes could > refuse to use them to create winners; but if direct voting is > allowed, even then there is little harm, since the voting power remains.) > > Proposals for direct democracy are typically rejected, even by > progressives, because of the problem of scale. But the problem of > scale is a problem of deliberation, not of voting power. This may be > one of the most important realizations to come out of these > discussions. There is a solution to the problem of scale in > democracy. Delegable Proxy. With appropriate assembly rules, it > creates a deliberative body of manageable size, while leaving the > voting power in the hands of the public, but, normally, exercised > through proxies who can become informed regarding the business of the > assembly. The everyday citizen is not required to follow all this, > except to the extent that he or she is specifically interested; the > important choice that citizens may make is: whom do you trust? > > All forms of representative democracy involve such a delegation of > trust. What is new is the idea of using this to elect > representatives, rather than only for deliberation in a representative body. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. 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