On Dec 30, 2007, at 2:00 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Rob,
>
> --- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> Approval is simple only if you find it convenient to ignore such
>> questions
>> as "how should a voter vote to best
>> pursue his interests?" If you happen to include such things in the
>> equation, Approval mind-blowingly complex.
>
> I can't think of any (serious) method with more straight-forward
> strategy
> than Approval.
>
> This weekend I'm trying to design a simulation to examine strategy
> under
> two-round runoff methods and am finding it very tricky.
>
> Kevin Venzke
What if we look at Condorcet at the same level of recommending a
strategy that works well in most cases. The recommended strategy
could be: "list the candidates in the order of preference". That is
quite simple and understandable and works in most situations for the
benefit of the voter.
So, is Condorcet strategy more straight forward than Approval
strategy? Approval strategy (e.g. "vote one of the frontrunners and
candidates that are better") requires the voters to estimate the
opinions of other voters while the described Condorcet strategy does
not.
Juho
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