On Dec 30, 2007 2:05 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > My point is that, whatever Approval can do, the other methods are also > capable of doing.
what kind of totally meaningless statement is that? any voting method is "capable" of electing anyone. but it will react to the way the voters actually vote. > > if you and i both prefer X>Y>Z, but i like Y more > > than the average of X and Z, and you like Y less than the average of X > > and Z, then i'll vote for both X and Y, and you'll just vote for X. > > it's what is called "revealed preference" in ecenomics - we are forced > > to say something about the relative intensity of our support for Y, > > even though we have the same ordered preferences. > That might reveal a bit, though even that not clearly. well of course it's clear. one additional vote for Y is as clear as day. > BUT, assuming I want to indicate preference of X and Y over Z, Approval > can show my less liking for Z, but cannot, in the same vote, indicate my > relative preference as to X vs Y. approval allows you to make fewer statements about your _order_ of preference, but causes you to say more about your _intensity_ of preference. so if you look at its social utility efficiency - it's _real_ expressiveness, with strategy, revealed preference, etc. taken into account - it is better than most of the other commonly discussed methods. > I am getting dizzy. With 4 candidates, how do you come up with more than > 6 pairs to even consider comparing? ah, you're correct. i should have said it is "n choose 2", which is actually n!/2*(n-2)! = n(n-1)/2 > "RCV (with 3 candidates allowed)"? Is this from some definition I have > not seen, or something that seemed to make sense in the above statement? ranked-choice voting is just a name for irv as it has been implemented in places like san francisco, where you rank just 3 candidates. it's a stupid name. CLAY ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info