Jobst wrote: > Dear Raphfrk,? > it did not think through all you wrote yet, but one point troubles me:? > > Also, it is majority compliant. If a majority support a candidate first > choice (i.e. first choice and nominate him), then he cannot lose.? > If that is true, your method cannot be a solution to the given problem, since any majoritarian method will elect A in the situation I described -- remember that voters are strategic!? > Yours, Jobst
Right, under the assumption of perfect strategy.? However, only a small number of voters need to nominate C as compromise for C to win. Are you assuming that the 51% block of voters knows that they have the majority ? In the case you give 51: A>C>B 49: B>C>A It seems to me that the voters, will not be sure which of the main candidates have a chance. Assuming the odds are 50/50 and considering a voter in the 51 block and how they cast their nominate vote: Nominate C This will either have no effect or cause C to win. A->C shift: -48 B->C shift: +52 expected utility: +2 Nominate A or B This will either have no effect or shift away from C C->A shift: +48 C->B shift: -52 expected utility: -2 Thus, it is worth it for A and B supporters to nominate C instead of A. Only, 3% of them need to actually do it to elect C. Btw, I think your original proposal is pretty cool too.? I wonder what the effects of putting a threshold would be on the strategic effects. For example, if a candidate represents more than 90% of the balls in the urn, they are declared the winner without drawing any. Raphfrk -------------------- Interesting site "what if anyone could modify the laws" www.wikocracy.com ________________________________________________________________________ AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now.
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