Hi Greg, --- En date de : Mer 15.10.08, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > On the topic of whether there is a method that > satisfies both > Condorcet and FBC.
There is not. I believe I have demonstrated this in the past, by modifying a Woodall proof that shows Condorcet to be incompatible with LNHarm. > http://osdir.com/ml/politics.election-methods/2002-11/msg00020.html > claims > that any majority method will violate FBC. Note the term *strong* FBC. When FBC is mentioned usually only the weak form is discussed because the strong form is almost impossible to satisfy. > Think of it this > way, any > majority method without equal rankings will always > encourage betrayal so > that a compromise candidate will get the majoirty thereby > sparing you > potenial loss. Yes. > Anything with equal rankings cannot be a > majority method b/c > simultaneous majorities will form and only one will win, > hence allowing a > candidate with a "majority" to in fact lose. This is avoided by defining the majority criterion to refer to strict first preferences. Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info