On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 8:02 PM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ok now the actual criticism. I know that FAWRB is nondeterministic. > Here is why that is bad. > > Factions (both unwilling to compromise): > > A 55% > B 45% > > you view A as gaining a "55% chance of victory". > > This reasoning is flawed. Instead of viewing A as getting .55 victory > units, think of it as a random choice between two possible worlds: > > A-world and B-world > > A-world is 10% more likely to occur, however they share remarkable > similarities. > > In both worlds >=45% of the people had no say whatsoever.
The trick with his method is that neither A-world or B-world is likely to actually occur. It creates an incentive to find a compromise, called say, AB-world. If all voters vote reasonably, then the result is a high probability that the AB option will be picked. The utlities might be ..... A-AB-B 55: 100-70-0 45: 0-70-100 In effect, each A supporter agrees to switch his probability to AB in exchange for a B supporter switching to AB. So, the initial probabilities would be A: 55% AB: 0% B: 45% Expected utility 55: 55 45: 45 Total: 100 However, after the negotiation stage, the results might be A: 10% AB: 90% B: 0% Expected utility 55: 10% of 100 and 90% of 70 = 73 45: 90% of 70 = 63 Total: 136 I don't 100% remember the method (and it could do with a web description :p ), but that is what it is attempting to do. The idea is not that it is random. The idea is that it says "OK, if you can't all agree on a compromise, then we will pick a winner at random". The threat that a random winner will be picked is what allows the negotiation. If a majority can just impose its will, then there is no point in compromising. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info