Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Kristofer
[The following relates to the corruption of elected officials after they
take office.]
re: "... make the system so competitive that the pressure to be
honest is greater than that to become corrupt. I don't think
it can be done by the latter, at least not alone ..."
I agree. Our ultimate goal must be a system that harnesses our
predilection for pursuing our own interest. In doing so, we must
recognize and respect the power of that inclination.
It is an asset during selection when the value of being (perceived as)
honest exceeds the value of being corrupt, but the pressure to maintain
a mantle of probity diminishes when the competition ends. After that
point, the pursuit of self-interest can become a threat. Indeed, there
is a self-justifying argument that, having exercised restraint before
achieving office, one is entitled to the rewards the office makes possible.
Stated more simply, Practical Democracy harnesses our natural tendency
to pursue own interest, but that vital characteristic of the method
disappears when the selection process ends. Thereafter, we must find
other means to restrain the adverse effects of the excessive pursuit of
self-interest.
We could thus divide Practical Democracy into two phases: the selection
phase, and the continuation phase. The first involves the triads (or
larger groups, as I have suggested with PR variants). The second
involves the parliament (or other body), and the support architecture of
the "shadow pyramids" (that message bubble up along, and that handle
referenda and recalls).
If what you're saying is correct, does that mean that the first phase of
Practical Democracy has the same effect (or nearly so) in the long run
limit case as does a very competitive traditional election method? I'm
wondering about that because you say that the problem of keeping the
elected/selected candidates honest is one that applies to both Practical
Democracy and more traditional solutions.
re: "Perhaps representatives should have strict limits as to what
they can accept, so that overt bribery is weakened ..."
This approach is not usually successful. As I mentioned last week in
relation to the attempt to curtail 'Pay to Play' in New Jersey, the laws
intended to impose 'strict limits' are enacted with loopholes that limit
their effectiveness. Protecting a valuable resource by surrounding it
with thieves is not the best way to ensure a satisfactory result.
Instead, we need a structural change that limits incipient corruption.
Perhaps the approach could be strengthened by an approach similar to
that of Congressional wage structure setting: the law only applies to
those who follow you. If that limit was set, then representatives (as
long as they are closer to the people than to their own "class") could
improve the law without being in the conflict of interest position that
these improvements would cut off their own advantages. Then, on the
other hand, maybe not; if candidates are only parts of a party, then the
party could prevent them from doing so, and in any case, the corrupting
influence of lobbyists would still be present.
re: "This [limiting what representatives can accept] might be
difficult in the United States, though, because of court
decisions setting spending as free speech (more or less;
I'm not familiar with the details)."
This issue is loaded! It is worthy of careful examination in its own
right, but I shall only make a few comments about it.
* The notion that the rights of humans extend to non-human
entities is fundamentally flawed. It sets the stage for a
plethora of anti-human abuses.
* By definition, the idea that one may use their 'money as free
speech' gives the loudest voice to those with the most money.
That is no less perverse than restricting the right to vote to
land-owners.
* Laws implementing the 'money as free speech' concept make a
distinction between 'hard money' (money given directly to
individuals, which carries limits) and 'soft money' (money
given to political parties, which is virtually unlimited ...
and makes parties the conduits of corruption that plague us.)
That sounds very strange. If money is free speech, then it should be
consistent - there's no such thing, for ordinary speech, as "hard
speech" and "soft speech". Also, I agree with your first point, but the
precedent seems to go all the way back to 1886.
re: "If lobbyists are used (ideally) as a shortcut to the
opinions of those that have different positions in the
community, maybe this could be formalized."
It is formalized (in the U. S.) in the sense that legislatures schedule
hearings during which lobbyists present the positions of the community.
The flaw in the formal system is that there are no restraints on the
access lobbyists have to legislators outside the hearing rooms. As a
result, the lobbyists suborn legislators, sub rosa, out of the public
eye. The only way to stop this is to implement a structural change that
denies those with an interest in legislation access to those who
deliberate on and enact legislation, except in public hearings held for
the purpose of informing the legislators. All other contact between
lobbyists and legislators must be prevented.
How would you group people as lobbyists if you're to prevent contact
between lobyists and legislators? It seems possible to me that the
lobbyists would merely get a "hidden branch" that would deal with the
legislators, taking the "out of the public eye" nature further.
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