Hare I am going artificial - three dedicated incompatible positions (Red/Green/Blue), and a neutral compromise candidate, Yellow. Thus we get, with Condorcet:
33 R>Y>G=B 34 G>Y>B=R 35 B>Y>R=G
With the above intentions, voters can get the same result by each ranking just the first two.
I see Y as CW - 33R>Y 69Y>R
34G>Y 68Y>G
35B>Y 67Y>B
33R>G 34G>R
34G>B 35B>G
35B>R 33R>B
Yellow, with zero first preferences, would be welcomed if R/G/B hold
indicated equal strengths. These voters feel they MUST back their position
with their first preference. Then they all back Yellow as an acceptable
compromise with their second preference - tHey will be MOST HAPPY if Yellow
gets elected rather than either of the enemy candidates.
On Wed, 24 Dec 2008 12:58:31 -0500 Per [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
It would be disastrous if something other than what the voters actually said. With Condorcet they could and did express this as their desires.At 05:18 AM 12/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first preferences" candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be disastrous.
I see no reason for rejecting what the voters have said - that all consider M acceptable, and liked best, better than D or R.The two situations I had in mind were: Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R; "centrist" candidate MElection 1 35% D>M; 33% R>M; 32% M Election 2 48% D>M; 47% R>M; 5% MM is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political consequences of the two results would be very different.
Worse can and do get adopted. Seems that Condorcet deserves better understanding.You are standing in a relatively isolated position, James. Robert's Rules of Order considers this failure to find a compromise winner a serious argument against sequential elimination ranked methods.My own viewis that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the result of the second election would be unacceptable to the electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored completely!).Actually, partisan politicians voiced strong objections to preferential voting systems when they "won" the first preference vote, but lost when voluntary additional preferences were added in (Bucklin) or were substituted in (IRV).The electorate, however, was undisturbed, except for minorities supporting those politicians. Thus in Ann Arbor, MI, the Republicans arranged a repeal of IRV, scheduled when many of the students who supported the Human Rights Party and Democratic candidate were out of town. They won, with low participation in the repeal.There is no substitute for the majority being organized! Which organization must reach across party lines.If such an outcome is possible with aparticular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system will not be adopted for public elections.
Someone has written here against Condorcet that a candidate ranked "next to last" by all voters could win. True for special cases such as only two candidates ranked, but not really useful.
When compared with each other candidate the CW wins more than half of these comparisons. For example, with 5 serious contenders the CW has to average above third rank.
If a cycle, each member has to qualify as a CW relative to each candidate outside the cycle.
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