Hi Juho, --- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu <juho4...@yahoo.co.uk> a écrit : > If there is a set of voters that form a > majority and they all prefer all candidates > of set A to all candidates of set B then > candidates of set B should not win. > > This helps A (as requested) by at least > eliminating some of the candidates from > competing with A. > > This criterion may also eliminate all > candidates. In such situations the rule of > course will not apply. > > I haven't really thought what implications > there are. Any comments?
I would say you're close to inventing again either MDD or beatpath GMC / CDTT. All you've essentially said is that if A has a majority over B, B can't win. Because, each candidate could make up their own set. Having multiple candidates in a set doesn't make any difference. Under MDD the candidates of set B cannot be elected unless all candidates can be placed in a set B. This is inherently not cloneproof. Under beatpath GMC / CDTT the candidates of set B cannot be elected unless they have a majority-strength beatpath to all the candidates of set A. However, lacking this, the candidates of set B can also be disqualified when the candidates of set A merely have a majority-strength beatpath to the candidates of set B. A few years ago I considered a set where it wouldn't be enough for set A to merely have a beatpath to set B, in order to disqualify those candidates. But from what I remember, there were monotonicity problems. I guess there are probably clone problems also. Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info