Ok, that relaxed version of mutual majority degraded faster to basic majority than I expected. Need to think more if there is something to conclude from the "B>A" votes.
Juho --- On Mon, 12/1/09, Kevin Venzke <step...@yahoo.fr> wrote: > From: Kevin Venzke <step...@yahoo.fr> > Subject: Re: [EM] "Beatpath GMC" compliance a mistaken standard? JL > To: election-meth...@electorama.com > Date: Monday, 12 January, 2009, 12:20 AM > Hi Juho, > > --- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu > <juho4...@yahoo.co.uk> a écrit : > > If there is a set of voters that form a > > majority and they all prefer all candidates > > of set A to all candidates of set B then > > candidates of set B should not win. > > > > This helps A (as requested) by at least > > eliminating some of the candidates from > > competing with A. > > > > This criterion may also eliminate all > > candidates. In such situations the rule of > > course will not apply. > > > > I haven't really thought what implications > > there are. Any comments? > > I would say you're close to inventing again either MDD > or beatpath > GMC / CDTT. All you've essentially said is that if A > has a majority > over B, B can't win. Because, each candidate could make > up their own set. > Having multiple candidates in a set doesn't make any > difference. > > Under MDD the candidates of set B cannot be elected unless > all candidates > can be placed in a set B. This is inherently not > cloneproof. > > Under beatpath GMC / CDTT the candidates of set B cannot be > elected > unless they have a majority-strength beatpath to all the > candidates of > set A. However, lacking this, the candidates of set B can > also be > disqualified when the candidates of set A merely have a > majority-strength > beatpath to the candidates of set B. > > A few years ago I considered a set where it wouldn't be > enough for set A > to merely have a beatpath to set B, in order to disqualify > those > candidates. But from what I remember, there were > monotonicity problems. > I guess there are probably clone problems also. > > Kevin Venzke > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
