This is getting too deep in some ways. I buy Terry's collective and
think of the rope in a tug of war. We had an election in my village
last month.
We do Plurality and have local parties (involving national parties
would distract from considering local issues - also, few consider
themselves members of these local parties) and 800 voters:
I, the ins, would like to continue.
C would like to "throw all the bums out". There has been much
controversy this past year.
4 trustee positions: C won each by a dozen votes. Agreement
that I had failed to do well.
Mayor (I) reelected by a dozen votes. Agreement, though weak,
that he was not to blame for what had happened.
Certainly no single voter decided the election, but they did know that
a very few, together, staying home or getting out and voting, could
have affected which way the rope went.
I do not see social above - people are affected by, and care about,
how well the village board attends to their needs.
When I read of "rational irrationality" below, I wonder if the real
topic may be deciding how to measure and add up conflicting needs and
desires.
Dave Ketchum.
On Apr 17, 2010, at 6:52 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Terry Bouricius wrote:
Perhaps most voters are fundamentally not behaving AS INDIVIDUALS,
but as a part of a collective ...in solidarity with a team of fellow
citizens (or party members, members of an ethnic group, or
whatever). Analysis that focuses on the choices of individuals can
miss the social aspect of voting, which may be more fundamental.
(I suspect the fundamental reasons must be social. There's a
satisfying symmetry to it then, because the higher purpose of voting
is definitely social.)
Some voters may, however, participate as individuals simply because
it gives them a feeling of satisfaction. In Bryan Caplan's book,
_The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad
Policies_, he presents a theory of "rational irrationality." He
argues that voters rationally choose to vote irrationally (in terms
of policy), because the psychological satisfaction of voting in line
with one's (erroneous) beliefs outweighs the risk of negative
outcomes from that action (since each vote has virtually zero impact
on the outcome.)
Another perspective: consider other modes of rationality aside from
instrumental reason. Instrumental reason posits yan objective world
that is to be manipulated (pulling levers as it were). But social
theory also allows for other worlds, including a subjective (inner)
world, and an inter-subjective (social) world. These can have their
own particular rationalities (none the less "rational" or "reasonable"
for that).
This is a fascinating topic, that makes the debates about methods, or
ordinal vs. cardinal voting seem a bit lacking.
I agree, it could open doors. Why vote? Consider a linguistic
perspective. Voting can be viewed as a form of self-expression,
essentially a form of speech. Why speak? Phrased this way, the
question leads into language-based social theory, which might be made
serviceable for voting.
Practical angle: If voting is a form of speech, then maybe it ought to
be as free, easy and ubiquitous as the natural forms "I agree", or a
simple nod of the head directed at an interlocutor. So we could make
the *form* of the vote flexible enough to contain the rational
*substance* (the particular "why") without distorting it. Then the
sum of all these high-fidelity votes might amount, in the end, to a
substansive democracy.
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, +1 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/
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