Warren, Jameson and Kristofer, > > For my part, I argue that Nash can *never* be applied within the > > context of voting. The reality as evidenced by the empirical data > > (in vivo) invalidates the basic assumptions of Nash. Individual > > voters are *not* attempting to affect the outcome of elections. > > As this reality contradicts Nash, we cannot turn around and look > > back at it through the lenses of Nash.
Warren Smith wrote: > ... I think you are pretty much right... But I think there is a > deeper truth.... First of all, as I said in the ESF thread quoting > Selten, it is interesting to consider the consequences of > maximally-rational behavior, even if humans aren't it. Second, > there is the also-interesting issue of what humans actually do. And > hopefully there is some relation between them. Precisely that hope is without foundation. There can be no useful relation between a model that assumes a maximum of purposive rationality and a reality that demonstrates none. No voter ever attempts to improve her standing in the electoral "game", because no single vote ever affects the outcome of a typical election. Nash's model may still be useful for analyzing current voting methods, as you suggest, but I believe those methods are (in a deeper sense) wrong. In this sense, it is not the voter's behaviour that is irrational, but rather our electoral practices. (more below) Jameson Quinn wrote: > I agree with your premises, but not your conclusions. Voters are not > purposive-rational, it's true. But that doesn't invalidate the > conclusions of a Nash analysis, it just makes them tentative. Voters > DO think of themselves as being purposive, even when they clearly > aren't... I'm not so sure. Imagine a voter saying: "It's a good thing I voted today, or the other side would have won the election!" > > More generally (I argue) purposive-rational models of ego-centric > > behaviour are unlikely to be made serviceable for voting theory... Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Whether or not that is the case for individual voters, one could > still use purposive-rational models for political parties. This > would be useful in considering what sort of "how to vote" > instructions a party might provide to their voters in order to > strategize on a wide scale... Right. When it comes to elections, a party is naturally self-seeking and goal-oriented. If we model the party as a human player, it definitely "wants" to win. Usually it also has the means of affecting the outcome. But I think that individual voters must also have a place in any overall theory of voting. Consider two facts (a,c) that such a theory (b) must explain: a) The institutional fact of current electoral practices, procedures, voting methods, and so forth. b) Theory to explain the rationality of both (a) and (c), and how they interrelate. Why do we have *these* particular electoral practices? Why does the voter participate in them? c) The behavioural fact of the individual's voting to no selfish end, in pursuit of no personal interest. Both (a) and (c) are facts of considerable weight and relevance. If (b) is to be useful as a theory, then we might expect it to explain both. Warren and Raph suggested the Nash model (for sake of a), but it is contradicted by (c). You suggest retargetting the model such that individual parties (not voters) are the players in the electoral game. This may be valid as far as it goes, but it still leaves (c) unexplained. Maybe no single theory can explain both facts? The only way forward, then, would be to reject one of the facts as being (in some sense) wrong. If we accept (a) current practice and (b) the body of mostly purposive-rational theory that informs it, then a question mark is left hanging over the individual votes. Every vote cast in a mass election is difficult to explain, and apparently irrational. On the other hand, if we accept (c) voting for non-instrumental and social reasons in the light of (b) a theory that can explain such forms of rationality (Habermas for example), then doubt shifts to our current electoral practices. Something in our elections or voting methods is wrong, or something is missing, because from the perspective of the socially motivated voter, they are extremely anti-social. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info