I like this version, and would sign on to it, as I would with all the
other versions which have been discussed.
2011/8/23 Richard Fobes <electionmeth...@votefair.org
<mailto:electionmeth...@votefair.org>>
I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to
write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the
election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just
providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take
advantage of this opportunity to ...
* ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and
frustrated voters to take action, and ...
Yes. I believe that it is worth pointing out specific advantages for
different groups, including centrist and extremist voters and major
party and insurgent politicians. It may sound contradictory, but reform,
by helping cause a healthier dialogue, can benefit all of these groups;
the customary zero-sum model does not apply.
* ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as
ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.
To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new
wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as
a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex
technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing
marketing materials.
This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already
discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.
Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long.
Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other
version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's
what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra
words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most
people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed
purposes.
Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies
our real areas of agreement.
I like your explicit repetition and variations on "we agree". It works.
My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version
with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign
with much more enthusiasm.
----- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -----
We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in
which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we
offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will
reliably produce much fairer results.
We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks
associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In
fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results
will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the
benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced
government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from
self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on
electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that
waste money), dramatically increased voter turnout because of having
meaningful choices, increased compliance with laws including
taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread economic
prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world).
We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used
counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on
the ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted,
and the candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner.
In some nations this method is called "First Past The Post" (and
abbreviated FPTP). Although this election method produces fair
results when there are only two candidates, the results are often
dramatically unfair when this approach is used in elections with
three or more candidates.
In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is
predominantly used in most elections in most democratic nations
around the world, with Australia and New Zealand being notable
exceptions. It is also the preferred election method in nations that
pretend to be democracies, yet lack the freedoms and economic
benefits of democracy.
Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality
voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its
deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information
from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most
popular candidate when there are more than two candidates.
Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that
collect enough preference information to always, or almost always,
correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and
descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order:
* Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the
voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the
candidates who are not acceptable
* Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a
first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and
optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels
* Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each
candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to
rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from
1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used
The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an
academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can
be used to refer to this primitive ballot type.
Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known?
Single-mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the
actual preferences of voters in elections that have three or more
reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference
information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear
proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results.
Adopting any of the three better ballot types would provide the
information that is needed for fair results. In addition, for
comparison purposes, the preferences on the three better ballot
types can be interpreted to reveal who would have won the election
if plurality counting had been used. Such comparisons will quickly
reveal the dramatic unfairness of plurality voting in elections
involving three or more candidates.
These three better ballot types can be counted in different ways to
produce different results. As election-method experts we have both
developed and analyzed many counting methods, and we now agree that
there are several counting methods that are worth adopting in
governmental elections.
Four of the counting methods that we agree would produce
significantly better results compared to plurality voting are, in
alphabetical order:
* Approval voting, which uses approval ballots and identifies the
candidate with the most approval marks as the winner.
* Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially
counts only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and
identifies a winner only if that candidate receives a majority of
votes, and which successively adds consideration for lower-ranked
candidates until a majority outcome is reached.
I think that the majority judgment procedure might not be the best
median-style system, but it is certainly the most clearly-defined modern
Bucklin version. (Using just the word "Bucklin" is asking for confusion
between the many similar Progressive-era systems which were called
that). And MJ doesn't work by "sliding threshold" but by finding medians.
* Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting
to compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with
the winner being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each
and every other candidate. In some elections none of the candidates
will win all of their pairwise comparisons, so there are variations
that resolve these cases. These variations, in alphabetical order,
are named the Condorcet-Kemeny method (or "VoteFair popularity
ranking"), the Condorcet-Schulze (or "beatpath") method, and the
Condorcet-Tideman (or "ranked pairs") method. (The word Condorcet is
a French name that is pronounced "kon-dor-say".)
* Range voting (also known as score voting), which uses score
ballots, and adds together the scores assigned to each candidate,
and identifies the winner as the candidate who receives the highest
total score.
There is another voting method that is supported by some, but not
most, of the undersigned election-method experts. It is called
"instant-runoff voting" (or "IRV" or "the alternative vote"), and it
uses ranked ballots. The counting method begins by considering each
voter's highest-ranked choice, and eliminating the candidate with
the fewest votes, and then shifting the affected ballots to the
next-most preferred candidate, and repeating this process until a
candidate receives a majority of votes.
Instant-runoff voting is used in some governmental elections
throughout the world, and most of us agree that usually the results
are an improvement over plurality voting. However, many of us either
regard the degree of improvement as not being significant enough to
justify adopting this method, or are concerned that its
not-always-fair results will be associated with ranked ballots
rather than with the instant-runoff counting method.
Significantly some of the places that have adopted instant-runoff
voting have later rejected the method and returned to plurality
voting. These places include Aspen Colorado and Burlington Vermont
in the United States. The rejections occurred because the method
produced clearly unfair results, in which the winner would not have
been the winner if any of the Condorcet methods had been used.
In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also
support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of
the Condorcet method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is
pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there
is no Condorcet winner, we support using either instant-runoff
voting (IRV) or approval voting to resolve the ambiguity and
identify a single winner.
In the list of signatures we indicate which voting method each
signer most strongly prefers.
Yet most of us also agree that we will support the adoption of any
of the supported methods, namely, in alphabetical order:
* Approval voting
* Bucklin voting
* Any of the Condorcet methods, which are, in alphabetical order:
* Condorcet-Approval
* Condorcet-IRV
* Condorcet-Kemeny
* Condorcet-Schulze
* Condorcet-Tideman
* Range voting
(The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is
needed.)
The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed
descriptions and characteristics of these methods. In fact, many of
us signing this statement edit these Wikipedia articles to keep them
accurate and unbiased. (The academic names for these methods differ
from the simplified names given here, so the Wikipedia "Voting
system" article is a good starting article.)
If you have specific questions about election methods, many of us
participate in the "Election-Methods" forum (at
http://lists.electorama.com/__listinfo.cgi/election-methods-__electorama.com
<http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com>),
and we would be happy to answer your questions about any of these
methods. [Note: Can we set up a "redirect" to simplify this URL to
something like www.electorama.com/election-__methods
<http://www.electorama.com/election-methods>?]
So far, all of the above recommendations apply to filling an
executive (non-legislative) position such as a mayor or governor,
where there is a single "seat" to be filled.
Different considerations apply if an election fills a legislative
seat, such as a seat in a legislature, parliament, or U.S. Congress.
In Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the typical
method for filling a legislative seat is to define a district or
riding in which plurality voting is used to elect one person who is
expected to represent the citizens in that district or riding.
All of us signing this declaration agree that plurality voting is
not acceptable as an election method for filling a single
district-based or riding-based legislative seat.
One way to improve legislative elections is to replace plurality
voting with one of the above-supported election methods, and most of
us support making this improvement.
Most of us agree that a better choice would be to adopt an election
method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who
wins another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall
composition of the legislature at least roughly matches the
preferences of the voters, especially in terms of political-party
preferences. However, we disagree about which election method best
serves this purpose.
Most European nations (but not the United Kingdom) use "proportional
representation" to match legislative representatives with the
political-party preferences of the voters. Specifically, when
electing members of parliament (MPs) by this method, voters not only
vote for a candidate, but they also indicate their favorite
political party. Proportional representation then makes adjustments
to ensure that the percentage of legislative seats filled by members
of each party roughly matches the percentage of voters who support
each party. In other words, if 15% of the voters mark the Green
Party as their favorite, then approximately 15% of the parliamentary
seats are filled by Green Party politicians.
Proportional representation methods typically use either "open
lists" or "closed lists" to determine which politicians are selected
to fill the seats that are "won" by a party. The open-list approach
allows voters to express preferences about which candidates they
prefer for filling their party's seats. In the closed-list approach,
the political party creates the ordered list from which their
party's seats are filled, and voters do not participate in
influencing the closed list.
Almost all of us agree that where proportional representation is
used, the open-list approach should be used. We oppose the
closed-list approach because it transfers power to people who are
not elected, and who cannot easily be removed from their position of
power.
In governments where a single legislative representative is elected
from each district or riding, a political manipulation named
"gerrymandering" is used to influence the positions of district or
riding boundaries. Such boundary manipulations affect which
political party is favored to win the elections in each district or
riding, and in turn this affects the legislative balance of power
between political parties. It also reduces voter turnout because the
election results are so difficult to change through voting.
Unanimously we agree that gerrymandering is unfair. Almost
unanimously we agree that either better voting methods can be used
to make the boundary positions much less influential in the balance
of power between political parties, or that there are fair and
impartial ways to choose the boundaries. However, we do not agree on
which such methods are best, so we are not recommending a specific
solution to the gerrymandering problem.
Overall our highest priority is to stop the use of plurality voting
in elections that involve three or more choices, and to replace
plurality voting with one of the alternative election methods
recommended here.
We, as election-method experts, have spent the last decade
developing online resources about election methods, developing
software for numerous election methods, and participating in online
discussions to identify which election methods are worth adopting as
replacements for plurality voting. Now we are sharing our
recommendations. We also offer to share our deep understanding of
election methods with policymakers and politically active citizens
of any nation, state, province, municipality, or political party.
We realize that election-method reforms are unlikely to start with
people in positions of great power because they have made many
sacrifices to achieve their power, and they do not want their
efforts to be undermined.
Therefore we address this statement to you as someone who is aware
of the benefits that election-method reforms will bring.
If you are a policymaker, we strongly urge you to introduce
legislation that would adopt one of the election methods we support.
If you are active in a political party that uses plurality voting,
we strongly urge you to encourage the use of a better voting method
to choose your party's candidates, or to choose your party's
internally elected delegates or representatives. If you are
politically active, we strongly urge you to tell others about the
unfairness of plurality voting, and to bring attention to the fairer
election methods supported in this declaration. If you are a
frustrated voter, we strongly urge you to learn about one or more of
the election methods we support, and then tell others what you have
learned. And if you are a member of an organization that elects
officers using plurality voting, we strongly urge you to advocate
using one of the recommended election methods when an election
involves more than two candidates.
We, the following election-method experts, agree with the statements
made in this declaration.
----- End of draft -----
Clarification: I did not use the academic name "preferential ballot"
to refer to ranked ballots because the term "preferential ballot"
deserves to win a prize as the most redundant two-word phrase. (The
whole point of a ballot is to collect preferences!) The alternate
name of "1-2-3 ballot" comes from a Canadian who is promoting
election-method reform.
Clarification: I did not include the SODA method because it has not
yet been fully peer reviewed, it is not explained in Wikipedia
(which provides further peer reviewing), and it has not been
successfully tested in actual voting situations. Remember that we
hope to get this declaration signed by election-method experts who
do not participate in the Election-Methods forum, and we are
recommending these methods for use in governmental elections where
the risk of "trying something new" is not acceptable.
I understand your concerns. One good compromise would be to mention it
as a method that merits further study. I believe that this is justified.
It is clearly a young method, but it is one which has favorably
impressed several knowledgeable people who are not particularly inclined
to agree with each other.
I also note that you included Bucklin but not Majority Judgment. If I
had to choose one of these, it would be MJ. I don't think that it's
necessarily the best median-based method, but the differences in results
between such methods are trivial, and MJ is a good representative member
of the class. Also, it is probably the most clearly-defined
class-member; it is discussed in the academic literature and has a
pretty good Wikipedia article.
Perspective: As a reminder, recall that this Election Method forum
started as a spin-off from a general-purpose Elections forum because
these discussions use too much jargon and mathematics for mainstream
participation. By including clear, plain-English explanations of
fundamental election-method concepts in our declaration, we can
re-connect with those people. Also we can connect with the many
other people who advocate election-method reform, but who lack our
election-method expertise. They can use our signed declaration as
ammunition in their battles against plurality voting.
Finally I'll close with a suggested format for signatures (where the
third portion indicates affiliation):
Richard Fobes; Portland, Oregon, USA; VoteFair.org; prefers
Condorcet-Kemeny method
