OpenSTV can't do this automatically, but since the ballots are available here: http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGJTHHww you can do it manually: (1) edit the ballots to keep only the top 3 and do AV to get the nominations. (2) use the unedited ballots, withdraw candidates who didn't get nominated, and count with IRV.
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 9:03 AM, David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> wrote: > I was wondering if Jeff O'Neill could illustrate the IRV3/AV3 approach by > counting only people's top 3 rankings of PR methods and treating the > rankings as approval votes in a first stage to get three finalists and then > doing IRV in the second stage? > > I voted closed list PR as my 1st, but I want to clarify that I think the > valuation of election rules should be contextual. I value the use of > 3-seat LR Hare in "more local" elections that don't typically command very > much voter interest. In a 3-seat LR Hare, election, there's fewer > candidates since there's only one per party, so there's fewer voices vying > for voter attention. And if folks are less likely to do their homework to > get reasonable rankings of the candidates then it'd be better to give them > only one vote. > > dlw > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.one...@openstv.org> > To: election-methods-electorama....@electorama.com > Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500 > Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system > > The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15 people > voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were counted > using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count. > Instant Runoff Voting > > Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a > solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM > STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality > of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the > simplicity of WIGM more important. > > Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had > Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't > read much into this though. > Condorcet > > All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it > surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since > these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are > also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it > does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large > voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one > ballot. > Borda Count > > The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm > surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I > don't find the differences between the two that significant. > Summary > > This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to > consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular > system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally > believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many > situations, and many others seem to agree. > > Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own > polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls. > ------------------------------ > > Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting. > > R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other > |Approv|Exhaus > |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted > | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing | > | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | | > | | | | | |g | |TV) | | | > =============================================================================== > 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| > 0 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count of first choices. > =============================================================================== > 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| > 0 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and > | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all > | candidates without any votes are eliminated. > =============================================================================== > 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| > 0 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. Candidates > | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other > | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate. > | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly. > =============================================================================== > 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| > 0 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates > Closed > | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when > | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by > | breaking the tie randomly. > =============================================================================== > 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | > 1 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Candidates > | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when > | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by > | breaking the tie randomly. > =============================================================================== > 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | > 1 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates > | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates to > | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie > | randomly. > =============================================================================== > 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | > 2 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes. > =============================================================================== > 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | > 3 > > |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate > Meek > | STV is elected. > > Winner is Meek STV. > > > ------------------------------ > > Counting votes using Condorcet Voting. > > Pairwise Comparison Matrix: > > |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr > ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- > Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13 > Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8 > Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10 > Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8 > Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4 > Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0 > Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11 > WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12 > Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12 > Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0 > > Smith Set: Meek STV > > No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate. > Winner is Meek STV. > > > ------------------------------ > > Counting votes using Approval Voting. > > Candidate | Count > =================================== > Open list PR | 13 > Closed list PR | 10 > Mixed member PR | 12 > Cumulative voting | 10 > Limited voting | 9 > Plurality at-large voting | 6 > Meek STV | 11 > WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12 > Other STV | 12 > Approval voting | 9 > Exhausted | 0 > > Count of all approvals. > > Winner is Open list PR. > > > ------------------------------ > > Counting votes using Borda Count. > > Candidate | Count > =================================== > Open list PR | 85 > Closed list PR | 46 > Mixed member PR | 59 > Cumulative voting | 35 > Limited voting | 21 > Plurality at-large voting | 1 > Meek STV | 90 > WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89 > Other STV | 85 > Approval voting | 34 > Exhausted | 130 > > Borda count totals. > > Winner is Meek STV. > > > > _________________________________________________________ > OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting > OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting > http://www.OpenSTV.org <http://www.openstv.org/> > http://www.OpaVote.org <http://www.opavote.org/> > > On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 11:43 PM, < > election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > >> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. (MIKE OSSIPOFF) >> 2. Refinements to definition of voting x over y (MIKE OSSIPOFF) >> 3. Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system >> (Jeffrey O'Neill) >> 4. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (C.Benham) >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkk...@hotmail.com> >> To: <election-meth...@electorama.com> >> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 20:57:52 +0000 >> Subject: [EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. >> Markus: >> >> You wrote: >> >> The Schulze method is currently used by more than >> 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in >> total. >> >> [endquote] >> >> Organizations aren't the general public. Certainly the fancier Condorcet >> methods have been adopted by some organizations (and rejected by others >> due to complexity). That doesn't mean that the person on the streetcorner >> accepts them. >> >> The requirements for a public proposal are entirely different than for >> some organizations. >> >> Also, it depends on whether a particular country's "public" is already >> familiar with >> electoral systems more complicated than Plurality. >> >> You continued: >> >> Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed, >> the Schulze method is that method that has the best >> chances of getting adopted. >> >> [endquote] >> >> Methods that meet Condorcet's Criterion fail FBC. >> >> I've told why FBC is necessary for the U.S. >> >> Aside from that, for the above-stated reasons, Beatpath has far less >> chance of adoption in the U.S >> than MTA or Approval. >> >> ...Or even ABucklin. Bucklin was adopted, and used to be used, by some >> U.S. cities or counties. >> >> Mike Ossipoff >> >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkk...@hotmail.com> >> To: <election-meth...@electorama.com> >> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:47:07 +0000 >> Subject: [EM] Refinements to definition of voting x over y >> >> >> My definition of voting one x over y was: >> >> You're voting x over y if switching x and y on your ballot is more likely >> to change the winnner from x to y than from y to x. >> >> [end of definition of voting x over y] >> >> >> I should add the clause "...if there is no information about other >> voters' ballots." >> >> Of course that isn't a problem if "more likely" is defined or replaced by >> "consistent with more possible configurations >> of other voters' ballots". >> >> If there's any question of what "switching x and y on your ballot" means, >> it could be changed to "switching the _names >> of_ x and y on your ballot", or "voting x exactly as you were voting y, >> and voting y exactly as you were votinlg x". >> >> Mike Ossipoff >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.one...@openstv.org> >> To: election-methods-electorama....@electorama.com >> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500 >> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system >> >> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15 >> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were >> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count. >> Instant Runoff Voting >> >> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a >> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM >> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality >> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the >> simplicity of WIGM more important. >> >> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had >> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't >> read much into this though. >> Condorcet >> >> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it >> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since >> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are >> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it >> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large >> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one >> ballot. >> Borda Count >> >> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm >> surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I >> don't find the differences between the two that significant. >> Summary >> >> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to >> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular >> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally >> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many >> situations, and many others seem to agree. >> >> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own >> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls. >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting. >> >> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other >> |Approv|Exhaus >> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted >> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing | >> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | | >> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | | >> =============================================================================== >> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count of first choices. >> =============================================================================== >> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and >> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all >> | candidates without any votes are eliminated. >> =============================================================================== >> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. >> Candidates >> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other >> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate. >> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates >> Closed >> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when >> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by >> | breaking the tie randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | >> 1 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. >> Candidates >> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when >> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by >> | breaking the tie randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | >> 1 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates >> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates >> to >> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie >> | randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | >> 2 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes. >> =============================================================================== >> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | >> 3 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate >> Meek >> | STV is elected. >> >> Winner is Meek STV. >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting. >> >> Pairwise Comparison Matrix: >> >> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr >> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- >> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13 >> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8 >> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10 >> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8 >> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4 >> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0 >> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11 >> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12 >> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12 >> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0 >> >> Smith Set: Meek STV >> >> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate. >> Winner is Meek STV. >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Approval Voting. >> >> Candidate | Count >> =================================== >> Open list PR | 13 >> Closed list PR | 10 >> Mixed member PR | 12 >> Cumulative voting | 10 >> Limited voting | 9 >> Plurality at-large voting | 6 >> Meek STV | 11 >> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12 >> Other STV | 12 >> Approval voting | 9 >> Exhausted | 0 >> >> Count of all approvals. >> >> Winner is Open list PR. >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Borda Count. >> >> Candidate | Count >> =================================== >> Open list PR | 85 >> Closed list PR | 46 >> Mixed member PR | 59 >> Cumulative voting | 35 >> Limited voting | 21 >> Plurality at-large voting | 1 >> Meek STV | 90 >> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89 >> Other STV | 85 >> Approval voting | 34 >> Exhausted | 130 >> >> Borda count totals. >> >> Winner is Meek STV. >> >> >> >> _________________________________________________________ >> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting >> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting >> http://www.OpenSTV.org >> http://www.OpaVote.org >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: "C.Benham" <cbenha...@yahoo.com.au> >> To: em <election-meth...@electorama.com> >> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:13:22 +1030 >> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) >> >> Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the >> "Approval >> Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by >> >> 49: C (sincere) >> 27: A>B (sincere) >> 24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A). >> >> He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal >> Criterion (FBC) and >> also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded for >> their "defection" >> from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that meets >> both the Plurality >> and Minimal Defense criteria). >> >> I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special >> "Tied-at-the-Top" >> pairwise rule. >> >> http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_**the_top<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top> >> >> *Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom >> signifying least preferred, >> Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle. >> >> According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X beats >> candidate Y >> if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y >> *plus the number of >> ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number >> of ballots on >> which Y is given a higher rating than X. >> >> (And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates X >> and Y that some >> ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other). >> >> If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP beaten >> by Y and is >> not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y is >> disqualified. >> >> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is rated Top on the highest >> number of ballots.* >> >> I think and hope this meets the FBC. If it can be shown not to then I >> will withdraw my >> support for it. It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria. >> >> In the above example election no candidate is disqualified and C wins. If >> the B supporters >> vote sincerely then C will be disqualified and A will win. >> >> My suggested name for this method "Tied at Top Pairwise >> Disqualification, Top Ratings" >> (TTPD,TR) is currently tentative and unenthusiastic, so if it is agreed >> that it meets the FBC >> then I'm open to other suggestions. >> >> Chris Benham >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Election-Methods mailing list >> Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> >
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