a las, I had trouble accessing the vote outcomes. I need to purchase the software, right?
dlw On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 8:11 AM, Jeffrey O'Neill <jeff.one...@openstv.org>wrote: > OpenSTV can't do this automatically, but since the ballots are available > here: > http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGJTHHww > you can do it manually: > (1) edit the ballots to keep only the top 3 and do AV to get the > nominations. > (2) use the unedited ballots, withdraw candidates who didn't get > nominated, and count with IRV. > > > On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 9:03 AM, David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com>wrote: > >> I was wondering if Jeff O'Neill could illustrate the IRV3/AV3 approach by >> counting only people's top 3 rankings of PR methods and treating the >> rankings as approval votes in a first stage to get three finalists and then >> doing IRV in the second stage? >> >> I voted closed list PR as my 1st, but I want to clarify that I think the >> valuation of election rules should be contextual. I value the use of >> 3-seat LR Hare in "more local" elections that don't typically command very >> much voter interest. In a 3-seat LR Hare, election, there's fewer >> candidates since there's only one per party, so there's fewer voices vying >> for voter attention. And if folks are less likely to do their homework to >> get reasonable rankings of the candidates then it'd be better to give them >> only one vote. >> >> dlw >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.one...@openstv.org> >> To: election-methods-electorama....@electorama.com >> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500 >> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system >> >> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15 >> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were >> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count. >> Instant Runoff Voting >> >> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a >> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM >> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality >> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the >> simplicity of WIGM more important. >> >> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had >> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't >> read much into this though. >> Condorcet >> >> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it >> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since >> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are >> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it >> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large >> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one >> ballot. >> Borda Count >> >> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. I'm >> surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I >> don't find the differences between the two that significant. >> Summary >> >> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to >> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular >> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally >> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many >> situations, and many others seem to agree. >> >> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own >> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future polls. >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting. >> >> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other >> |Approv|Exhaus >> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted >> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing | >> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | | >> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | | >> =============================================================================== >> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count of first choices. >> =============================================================================== >> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and >> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all >> | candidates without any votes are eliminated. >> =============================================================================== >> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. >> Candidates >> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other >> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to eliminate. >> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| >> 0 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates >> Closed >> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied when >> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by >> | breaking the tie randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | >> 1 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. >> Candidates >> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when >> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen by >> | breaking the tie randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | >> 1 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. Candidates >> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates >> to >> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie >> | randomly. >> =============================================================================== >> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | >> 2 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes. >> =============================================================================== >> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | >> 3 >> >> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate >> Meek >> | STV is elected. >> >> Winner is Meek STV. >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting. >> >> Pairwise Comparison Matrix: >> >> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr >> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- >> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13 >> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8 >> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10 >> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8 >> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4 >> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0 >> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11 >> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12 >> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12 >> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0 >> >> Smith Set: Meek STV >> >> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate. >> Winner is Meek STV. >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Approval Voting. >> >> Candidate | Count >> =================================== >> Open list PR | 13 >> Closed list PR | 10 >> Mixed member PR | 12 >> Cumulative voting | 10 >> Limited voting | 9 >> Plurality at-large voting | 6 >> Meek STV | 11 >> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12 >> Other STV | 12 >> Approval voting | 9 >> Exhausted | 0 >> >> Count of all approvals. >> >> Winner is Open list PR. >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Counting votes using Borda Count. >> >> Candidate | Count >> =================================== >> Open list PR | 85 >> Closed list PR | 46 >> Mixed member PR | 59 >> Cumulative voting | 35 >> Limited voting | 21 >> Plurality at-large voting | 1 >> Meek STV | 90 >> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89 >> Other STV | 85 >> Approval voting | 34 >> Exhausted | 130 >> >> Borda count totals. >> >> Winner is Meek STV. >> >> >> >> _________________________________________________________ >> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting >> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting >> http://www.OpenSTV.org <http://www.openstv.org/> >> http://www.OpaVote.org <http://www.opavote.org/> >> >> On Sun, Nov 20, 2011 at 11:43 PM, < >> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >> >>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>> >>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>> >>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>> election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>> >>> Today's Topics: >>> >>> 1. Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. (MIKE OSSIPOFF) >>> 2. Refinements to definition of voting x over y (MIKE OSSIPOFF) >>> 3. Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system >>> (Jeffrey O'Neill) >>> 4. TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) (C.Benham) >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkk...@hotmail.com> >>> To: <election-meth...@electorama.com> >>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 20:57:52 +0000 >>> Subject: [EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S. >>> Markus: >>> >>> You wrote: >>> >>> The Schulze method is currently used by more than >>> 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in >>> total. >>> >>> [endquote] >>> >>> Organizations aren't the general public. Certainly the fancier Condorcet >>> methods have been adopted by some organizations (and rejected by others >>> due to complexity). That doesn't mean that the person on the streetcorner >>> accepts them. >>> >>> The requirements for a public proposal are entirely different than for >>> some organizations. >>> >>> Also, it depends on whether a particular country's "public" is already >>> familiar with >>> electoral systems more complicated than Plurality. >>> >>> You continued: >>> >>> Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed, >>> the Schulze method is that method that has the best >>> chances of getting adopted. >>> >>> [endquote] >>> >>> Methods that meet Condorcet's Criterion fail FBC. >>> >>> I've told why FBC is necessary for the U.S. >>> >>> Aside from that, for the above-stated reasons, Beatpath has far less >>> chance of adoption in the U.S >>> than MTA or Approval. >>> >>> ...Or even ABucklin. Bucklin was adopted, and used to be used, by some >>> U.S. cities or counties. >>> >>> Mike Ossipoff >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkk...@hotmail.com> >>> To: <election-meth...@electorama.com> >>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:47:07 +0000 >>> Subject: [EM] Refinements to definition of voting x over y >>> >>> >>> My definition of voting one x over y was: >>> >>> You're voting x over y if switching x and y on your ballot is more >>> likely to change the winnner from x to y than from y to x. >>> >>> [end of definition of voting x over y] >>> >>> >>> I should add the clause "...if there is no information about other >>> voters' ballots." >>> >>> Of course that isn't a problem if "more likely" is defined or replaced >>> by "consistent with more possible configurations >>> of other voters' ballots". >>> >>> If there's any question of what "switching x and y on your ballot" >>> means, it could be changed to "switching the _names >>> of_ x and y on your ballot", or "voting x exactly as you were voting y, >>> and voting y exactly as you were votinlg x". >>> >>> Mike Ossipoff >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: "Jeffrey O'Neill" <jeff.one...@openstv.org> >>> To: election-methods-electorama....@electorama.com >>> Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2011 21:13:57 -0500 >>> Subject: [EM] Results of poll for favorite multi-winner voting system >>> >>> The results for the multi-winner voting system poll are in. Only 15 >>> people voted, but the results are interesting nonetheless. The votes were >>> counted using instant runoff voting, Condorcet, and the Borda count. >>> Instant Runoff Voting >>> >>> Not surprisingly, Meek STV was the runaway winner, and WIGM STV was a >>> solid second place. I do find it interesting that some people prefer WIGM >>> STV to Meek STV. Meek is clearly better than WIGM in terms of the quality >>> of the proportional representation, but apparently some people find the >>> simplicity of WIGM more important. >>> >>> Open list PR was in third although the one voter for closed list PR had >>> Meek as the next choice. Because of the small number of voters we can't >>> read much into this though. >>> Condorcet >>> >>> All three STV candidates did well as did open list PR. I find it >>> surprising that cumulative voting and limited voting did so poorly since >>> these two methods provide reasonable proportional representation and are >>> also very easy to count. Approval voting did not do well, likely because it >>> does not provide good proportional representation. Plurality at-large >>> voting was last on every ballot except that it beat mixed member on one >>> ballot. >>> Borda Count >>> >>> The three STV candidates again did very well as well as open list PR. >>> I'm surprised that open list PR did so much better than closed list PR as I >>> don't find the differences between the two that significant. >>> Summary >>> >>> This was a more difficult poll to run since there are many factors to >>> consider in selecting a multi-winner voting system and any particular >>> system may be good in some situations but not in others. I personally >>> believe that STV, and especially Meek STV, is a good choice in many >>> situations, and many others seem to agree. >>> >>> Thank you for participating in these polls, and feel free to do your own >>> polls at opavote.org or to contact me with suggestions for future >>> polls. >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting. >>> >>> R|Open l|Closed|Mixed |Cumula|Limite|Plural|Meek S|WIGM S|Other >>> |Approv|Exhaus >>> |ist PR| list |member|tive v|d voti|ity at|TV |TV (eg|STV |al vot|ted >>> | |PR | PR |oting |ng |-large| |, Scot| |ing | >>> | | | | | | votin| |tish S| | | >>> | | | | | |g | |TV) | | | >>> =============================================================================== >>> 1| 1| 1| 1| 1| 0| 0| 6| 3| 1| 1| >>> 0 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count of first choices. >>> =============================================================================== >>> 2| 1| 1| 1| 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| >>> 0 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count after eliminating Limited voting and Plurality at-large voting and >>> | transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination round, all >>> | candidates without any votes are eliminated. >>> =============================================================================== >>> 3| 2| 1| | 1| | | 6| 3| 1| 1| >>> 0 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count after eliminating Mixed member PR and transferring votes. >>> Candidates >>> | Open list PR, Closed list PR, Mixed member PR, Cumulative voting, Other >>> | STV, and Approval voting were tied when choosing candidates to >>> eliminate. >>> | Candidate Mixed member PR was chosen by breaking the tie randomly. >>> =============================================================================== >>> 4| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | 1| >>> 0 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count after eliminating Other STV and transferring votes. Candidates >>> Closed >>> | list PR, Cumulative voting, Other STV, and Approval voting were tied >>> when >>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Other STV was chosen by >>> | breaking the tie randomly. >>> =============================================================================== >>> 5| 2| 1| | 1| | | 7| 3| | | >>> 1 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. >>> Candidates >>> | Closed list PR, Cumulative voting, and Approval voting were tied when >>> | choosing candidates to eliminate. Candidate Approval voting was chosen >>> by >>> | breaking the tie randomly. >>> =============================================================================== >>> 6| 2| | | 1| | | 8| 3| | | >>> 1 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count after eliminating Closed list PR and transferring votes. >>> Candidates >>> | Closed list PR and Cumulative voting were tied when choosing candidates >>> to >>> | eliminate. Candidate Closed list PR was chosen by breaking the tie >>> | randomly. >>> =============================================================================== >>> 7| 2| | | | | | 8| 3| | | >>> 2 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count after eliminating Cumulative voting and transferring votes. >>> =============================================================================== >>> 8| | | | | | | 9| 3| | | >>> 3 >>> >>> |---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> | Count after eliminating Open list PR and transferring votes. Candidate >>> Meek >>> | STV is elected. >>> >>> Winner is Meek STV. >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> Counting votes using Condorcet Voting. >>> >>> Pairwise Comparison Matrix: >>> >>> |Open|Clos|Mixe|Cumu|Limi|Plur|Meek|WIGM|Othe|Appr >>> ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- >>> Open| 0| 12| 10| 13| 12| 13| 3| 4| 5| 13 >>> Clos| 1| 0| 3| 9| 8| 10| 3| 2| 2| 8 >>> Mixe| 4| 9| 0| 9| 9| 11| 3| 2| 2| 10 >>> Cumu| 1| 2| 3| 0| 8| 10| 1| 1| 1| 8 >>> Limi| 1| 2| 3| 2| 0| 9| 0| 0| 0| 4 >>> Plur| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0| 0 >>> Meek| 10| 9| 10| 11| 11| 11| 0| 9| 8| 11 >>> WIGM| 9| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 3| 0| 8| 12 >>> Othe| 8| 10| 11| 12| 12| 12| 4| 4| 0| 12 >>> Appr| 2| 4| 3| 3| 7| 9| 2| 2| 2| 0 >>> >>> Smith Set: Meek STV >>> >>> No completion necessary since the Smith set has just one candidate. >>> Winner is Meek STV. >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> Counting votes using Approval Voting. >>> >>> Candidate | Count >>> =================================== >>> Open list PR | 13 >>> Closed list PR | 10 >>> Mixed member PR | 12 >>> Cumulative voting | 10 >>> Limited voting | 9 >>> Plurality at-large voting | 6 >>> Meek STV | 11 >>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 12 >>> Other STV | 12 >>> Approval voting | 9 >>> Exhausted | 0 >>> >>> Count of all approvals. >>> >>> Winner is Open list PR. >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> Counting votes using Borda Count. >>> >>> Candidate | Count >>> =================================== >>> Open list PR | 85 >>> Closed list PR | 46 >>> Mixed member PR | 59 >>> Cumulative voting | 35 >>> Limited voting | 21 >>> Plurality at-large voting | 1 >>> Meek STV | 90 >>> WIGM STV (eg, Scottish STV) | 89 >>> Other STV | 85 >>> Approval voting | 34 >>> Exhausted | 130 >>> >>> Borda count totals. >>> >>> Winner is Meek STV. >>> >>> >>> >>> _________________________________________________________ >>> OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting >>> OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting >>> http://www.OpenSTV.org >>> http://www.OpaVote.org >>> >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: "C.Benham" <cbenha...@yahoo.com.au> >>> To: em <election-meth...@electorama.com> >>> Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:13:22 +1030 >>> Subject: [EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?) >>> >>> Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the >>> "Approval >>> Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by >>> >>> 49: C (sincere) >>> 27: A>B (sincere) >>> 24: B (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A). >>> >>> He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal >>> Criterion (FBC) and >>> also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded for >>> their "defection" >>> from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that meets >>> both the Plurality >>> and Minimal Defense criteria). >>> >>> I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special >>> "Tied-at-the-Top" >>> pairwise rule. >>> >>> http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_**the_top<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top> >>> >>> *Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom >>> signifying least preferred, >>> Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle. >>> >>> According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X >>> beats candidate Y >>> if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y >>> *plus the number of >>> ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number >>> of ballots on >>> which Y is given a higher rating than X. >>> >>> (And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates >>> X and Y that some >>> ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other). >>> >>> If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP beaten >>> by Y and is >>> not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y >>> is disqualified. >>> >>> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is rated Top on the highest >>> number of ballots.* >>> >>> I think and hope this meets the FBC. If it can be shown not to then I >>> will withdraw my >>> support for it. It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria. >>> >>> In the above example election no candidate is disqualified and C wins. >>> If the B supporters >>> vote sincerely then C will be disqualified and A will win. >>> >>> My suggested name for this method "Tied at Top Pairwise >>> Disqualification, Top Ratings" >>> (TTPD,TR) is currently tentative and unenthusiastic, so if it is agreed >>> that it meets the FBC >>> then I'm open to other suggestions. >>> >>> Chris Benham >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Election-Methods mailing list >>> Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com >>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>> >>> >> >
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