I give a rebuttal to the Electoral Reform Society's assessment of party-list PR for the case of 3-seat LR Hare. http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html
dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:54 PM, David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > From: Richard Fobes <electionmeth...@votefair.org> >> To: election-meth...@electorama.com >> Cc: >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800 >> >> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >> On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: >> >>> ... >>> >>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked >>> choices or party-list PR. ... >>> >>> >>> So what do you think? >>> >> >> I don't see this as an either/or choice, > > > dlw: U2 apparently are not among most folks... > > >> nor do I see a viable "both" option being suggested. >> > > dlw: viability is a low-blow at this stage, but I guess it's a blow I use > quite often. > >> >> So I'll again suggest VoteFair ranking: >> >> VoteFair ranking uses "ranked choices" (1-2-3 ballots and pairwise >> counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for filling the >> first seat in a legislative district. >> >> VoteFair ranking fills the second district-based seat with the >> "second-most representative" candidate. In the U.S., even without asking >> voters to indicate a party preference, that would usually be the most >> popular candidate from the opposite party (i.e. the opposite party compared >> to the first-seat winner). >> >> To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking fills some >> proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters. (Whichever >> party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and filled-seat >> proportion wins the next seat.) >> >> We don't have to choose between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods. >> We can get both. And in a U.S.-compatible way. >> >> If election-method reform is to happen in the U.S., it has to merge with >> the reality of the two-party system. And I believe it should accommodate >> third parties only to the extent that voters are unable to regain control >> of the two main parties. >> > > dlw: I agree with the reality of the 2-party system. I also believe that > we need to make the case that our 2-party system will work much, much > better if we give 3rd parties a constructive role to play in it. Giving > them access to one-third of the seats in the state assembly so they get to > determine which major party is in power in that body every two years is > such a constructive role. It will give folks more exit threat from the two > major parties, thereby making both of them more responsive to the moving > center. > >> >> As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces unfair results. And >> in the U.S. the results also would be quite unstable (i.e. not mesh well >> with the current two-party system). >> > > Can you elaborate? > I don't see why 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota wouldn't have results like > what you described that would maintain yet transform the US's 2-party > system. > > dlw > >> >> Richard Fobes >> >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >> To: David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 14:35:58 -0600 >> Subject: Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA >> If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with >> plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. >> >> Jameson >> >> 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >> >>> IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to >>> convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if >>> you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. >>> >>> But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many >>> serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over >>> IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more >>> significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight >>> modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first >>> stage. >>> >>> dlw >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, < >>> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>> >>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>>> >>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>> >>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>>> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com >>>> >>>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>>> election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com >>>> >>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>>> >>>> Today's Topics: >>>> >>>> 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? >>>> (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) >>>> 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) >>>> 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) >>>> 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) >>>> 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) >>>> 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_el...@lavabit.com> >>>> To: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >>>> Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 >>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? >>>> On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >>>> >>>>> As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken >>>>> dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. >>>>> Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either >>>>> plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would >>>>> have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two >>>>> "vote splitting" factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred >>>>> each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad >>>>> blood >>>>> and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to >>>>> cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 >>>>> doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not >>>>> have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the >>>>> most self-consistent counts of Florida. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was >>>> used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property >>>> would remain in a singlewinner context. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >>>> To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>>> Cc: >>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 >>>> Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>>> It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets >>>> used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. >>>> >>>> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. >>>> STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not >>>> complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled >>>> with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd >>>> parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. >>>> >>>> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in >>>> a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring >>>> process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and >>>> 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter >>>> two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter >>>> attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates >>>> in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep >>>> it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the >>>> system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? >>>> >>>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked >>>> choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both >>>> can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a >>>> 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra >>>> seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified >>>> before hand. >>>> >>>> So what do you think? >>>> >>>> I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power >>>> aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're >>>> wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having >>>> their representative and they could keep that if there are relatively few >>>> seats per election. >>>> >>>> dlw >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >>>> To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>, >>>> electionsciencefoundation <electionscie...@googlegroups.com> >>>> Cc: >>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600 >>>> Subject: [EM] SODA arguments >>>> For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all >>>> measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters >>>> will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval. >>>> >>>> For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all, >>>> a majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and >>>> full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but >>>> in all cases the strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet >>>> systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to >>>> lose. >>>> >>>> For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, >>>> SODA is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has no burial >>>> incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the >>>> two most-approved candidates (where it matters most). It's monotonic, and I >>>> believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation, >>>> cloneproofness, and IIA for up to 4 candidates. >>>> >>>> For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability to >>>> current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to vote >>>> plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows >>>> those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from winning, even if >>>> polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner. >>>> >>>> For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting >>>> process is more complicated than approval, the process of voting is >>>> actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your >>>> favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with their favorite >>>> candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and >>>> figure out who the frontrunners are, and no nail-biting dilemma of whether >>>> to rank others as equal to your favorite. >>>> >>>> And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a >>>> direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do delegate to know >>>> how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't >>>> want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into a candy store because you >>>> don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation. >>>> >>>> I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of >>>> the above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA? >>>> >>>> Jameson >>>> >>>> ps. I clarified the SODA >>>> procedure<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules> >>>> on >>>> the wiki, though there were no substantive changes. I improved the >>>> formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that >>>> winning candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely >>>> because they will probably choose not to approve others. >>>> >>>> Comments are welcome. >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >>>> To: David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >>>> Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600 >>>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>>> >>>>> >>>>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked >>>>> choices or party-list PR. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked >>>> choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better >>>> than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA. >>>> >>>> Thus my favored system is PAL >>>> representation<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation>. >>>> It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like >>>> aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts >>>> at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping) >>>> geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar >>>> delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role. >>>> >>>> Jameson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: "James Gilmour" <jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk> >>>> To: "'David L Wetzell'" <wetze...@gmail.com>, "'EM'" < >>>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>>> Cc: >>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000 >>>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>>> But why would you want all these differences and complications? >>>> >>>> If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use >>>> STV-PR for all of these elections to the various >>>> "representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures, US House of >>>> Representatives, US Senate). STV-PR works OK in both >>>> partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper >>>> representation of the VOTERS in all these different >>>> elections. >>>> >>>> Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the >>>> proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but >>>> if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested >>>> interests, then so be it. STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member >>>> districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member >>>> districts and to plurality at large. We had to accept local >>>> government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR >>>> package - that's practical politics. But that reform has >>>> transformed our local government - no more "one-party states". >>>> >>>> James Gilmour >>>> >>>> >>>> > -----Original Message----- >>>> > From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com >>>> > [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On >>>> > Behalf Of David L Wetzell >>>> > Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM >>>> > To: EM >>>> > Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base >>>> > which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed >>>> > about the elections. >>>> > >>>> > Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types >>>> > of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in >>>> > the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify >>>> > things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR >>>> > Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a >>>> > constructive role to play in US politics. >>>> > >>>> > So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps >>>> > using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the >>>> > vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional >>>> > elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for >>>> > state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two >>>> > elections are less important and get less media coverage and >>>> > voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank >>>> > multiple candidates in an election where they often simply >>>> > vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the >>>> > mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's >>>> > duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? >>>> > >>>> > It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between >>>> > ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of >>>> > context and that both can be useful, especially when no >>>> > explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare >>>> > election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats >>>> > a party wins could either be selected after the victory or >>>> > specified before hand. >>>> > >>>> > So what do you think? >>>> > >>>> > I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those >>>> > in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and >>>> > I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to >>>> > voting the candidate and having their representative and they >>>> > could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election. >>>> > >>>> > dlw >>>> > >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: "Markus Schulze" <markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de> >>>> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>>> Cc: >>>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100 >>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method >>>> Hallo, >>>> >>>> it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path >>>> from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the >>>> strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link, >>>> say CD. >>>> >>>> I recommend that, in this case, the link CD should be declared >>>> "forbidden" and the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B >>>> and the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A, that does >>>> not contain a "forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the >>>> weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B >>>> and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to >>>> candidate A is the same link (say EF), then also this link should >>>> be declared "forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A >>>> should be calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest >>>> link in the strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the >>>> strongest path from B to A are different links. >>>> >>>> Markus Schulze >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Election-Methods mailing list >>>> Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com >>>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>>> >>>> >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Election-Methods mailing list >> Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> >
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