On 01.08.23 04:02, Alan DeKok wrote:
On Jul 31, 2023, at 6:00 PM, Eliot Lear<l...@lear.ch>  wrote:
We're not quite done.  The following text needs to be removed, an additional 
example added:

If there is no Phase 2 data, then the EAP
    server MUST reject the session.  There is no reason to have TEAP
    devolve to EAP-TLS.
   The intent was clarified in the next paragraph:

Note that the Phase 2 data could simply be a Result TLV with value
Success, along with a Crypto-Binding TLV and Intermediate-Result TLV.
This Phase 2 data serves as a protected success indication as
discussed in {{RFC9190}} Section 2.1.1

   i.e. TEAP with outer client certificate and no Phase 2 crypto-binding seems 
wrong.

IoT devices need a way to authenticate as TEAP is EAP-TLS under nominal 
conditions.  When a certificate is about to expire, then the expectation is 
that either the client will issue a PKCS#10 request or the server will issue a 
request action TLV with PKCS#10, so that the client knows the server wants it 
to renew.
   Sure.

   Perhaps the text could just remove the last sentence about devolving to 
EAP-TLS.

Yes, I think that would do nicely, thanks, along with the diagram demonstrating it (I think I sent that along to you).  Also, I would suggest a small editorial change to help call out the really important concept of outer versus inner, as follows:

OLD:

   TEAP packets may include TLVs both inside and outside the TLS tunnel.
   The term "Outer TLVs" is used to refer to optional TLVs outside the
   TLS tunnel, which are only allowed in the first two messages in the
   TEAP protocol.  That is the first EAP-server-to-peer message and
   first peer-to-EAP-server message.  If the message is fragmented, the
   whole set of messages is counted as one message.  The term "Inner
   TLVs" is used to refer to TLVs sent within the TLS tunnel.  In TEAP
   Phase 1, Outer TLVs are used to help establish the TLS tunnel, but no
   Inner TLVs are used.  In Phase 2 of the TEAP conversation, TLS
   records may encapsulate zero or more Inner TLVs, but no Outer TLVs.

   Methods for encapsulating EAP within carrier protocols are already
   defined.  For example, IEEE 802.1X [IEEE.802-1X.2013] may be used to
   transport EAP between the peer and the authenticator; RADIUS
   [RFC3579] or Diameter [RFC4072] may be used to transport EAP between
   the authenticator and the EAP server.

NEW

   Methods for encapsulating EAP within carrier protocols are already
   defined.  For example, IEEE 802.1X [IEEE.802-1X.2013] may be used to
   transport EAP between the peer and the authenticator; RADIUS
   [RFC3579] or Diameter [RFC4072] may be used to transport EAP between
   the authenticator and the EAP server.

   2.3 Outer TLVs versus Inner TLVs

   TEAP packets may include TLVs both inside and outside the TLS tunnel
   defined as follows:

   Outer TLV: this term is used to refer to optional TLVs outside the
               TLS tunnel, which are only allowed in the first two
               messages in the TEAP protocol.  That is the first,
               EAP-server-to-peer message and first peer-to-EAP-server
               message.  If the message is fragmented, the whole set
               of messages is counted as one message.

   Inner TLV:  this term is used to refer to TLVs sent within the TLS
               tunnel.

   In TEAP Phase 1, Outer TLVs are used to help establish the TLS
   tunnel, but no Inner TLVs are used. In Phase 2 of the TEAP
   conversation, TLS records may encapsulate zero or more Inner TLVs,
   but no Outer TLVs.

This just reverses the order of two paragraphs and visually separates outer / inner definitions.  We could in theory do the same with phase 1/phase 2, but I think this is good enough.

Thanks,

Eliot

   Alan DeKok.


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