-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 25/04/2014 22:19, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > [skipping a bunch of discussion covered elsewhere in the thread and jumping > directly to the UI/UX proposals] > > On 04/22/2014 05:00 PM, Philip Jackson wrote: >> What about some consideration of the time elapsed since [valid] status >> was conferred ? > > Is this the right time limit that a user should be interested in? what > about duration since last use or something like that? compare the two > following scenarios: > > i certified Joe's key a year ago and we never exchanged any e-mails (signed > or otherwise) after that. > > i certified Mary's key a year ago and we exchange encrypted/signed e-mails > every week. > > time elapsed since [valid] status conferred is the same in both cases. > > I agree that a time limit indication could be useful, but it should > probably be "time since last observed/used" or something like that. that's > a little trickier to count, unfortunately, and i'm not sure if the extra UI > complexity is worth the tradeoff. but it's certainly worth considering. > I think you're probably right. I certainly follow your reasoning in the scenarios above. My worry is that auto-encryption may lead to blindness to these 'validity' issues on the part of some users. In the implementation, some warning should be given to induce a measure of paranoia in the user, to cause him to reflect and perhaps recheck.
>>> * if the user manually chooses to encrypt the message when some users
>>> are not [valid, then the non-[valid] icons should be highlighted or
>>> made bigger or flash or blink or something to draw attention to them.
>>
>> With a help message when the cursor is hovered over the icon.
>
> yes, that would be great.
>
>> and perhaps if the time since {valid] status was conferred is greater
>> than some specified interval, something like this -- "it is x months
>> since you accepted this key/userid as valid, are you sure you still want
>> to use it or would you like to re-check?"
>
> if the user said "i'd like to re-check", what do you think enigmail should
> do?
>
If the user is caused to pause and to re-check, then ideally the mail should
not be sent. There is then the possibility to give the sender some options :
- - destroy the mail
- - park the mail in plain text in the Thunderbird 'drafts' box while awaiting
further instructions (supposing the computer is considered to be safe from
intruders)
- - park the mail in the 'drafts' box encrypted with the owner's own key if the
sender fears that casual observers may have access to his machine.
I don't know if these options are possible actions for enigmail to do without
changes to Thunderbird.
Regards,
Philip
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