Hi Lonnie... same question for you... the things that you sopeak of in your post... do you yourself think that they are fact or fancy... manifest or concealed?
On Jun 8, 9:34 pm, Lonnie Clay <claylon...@comcast.net> wrote: > I read the text and examined the diagrams at the link provided below. My > understanding was limited because I lack the context of Budda's teachings. > So I will take a stab at reinventing Budda. > > 1) Through introspection, become *aware* of your thought processes, > following trains of thought from original stimulus down the track of your > thoughts, at each stage asking yourself why you thought what you thought, > and what was implied by that justification of your thought. Learn to > recognize cultural conditioning. > 2) Become *aware* of your senses, starting with low stimulus environments > and working towards highly stimulating environments, honing your focus so > that you are able to isolate and detect *in context* sensory impressions > formerly lost in the *noisy* environment. Learn to prioritize sensory > impressions. > 3) Exercise your thought tools, in the same manner as a mathematician can > derive books full of indeterminate integrals from a few basic rules. In > other words, develop logical reasoning tools for *learning* the answers > rather than learning dogmatic answers provided by others. Check yourself by > examining the texts of your chosen teachers to see how well your conclusions > agree with theirs. BE AWARE that every teacher has their own cultural > conditioning which only exceptional teachers are able to overcome. You can > see their conditioning from the manner in which they *choose* to describe > their insightful conclusions, and their chosen tools used to reason toward > attaining those conclusions. Learn to detect inconsistencies. > 4) Develop your own custom brand of thought tools which are most useful > within your own society. *USE THEM*! See > :https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/epistemology/0dEXdUe4jXQ > > Good Luck! > > Lonnie Courtney Clay > > On Wednesday, June 8, 2011 2:27:42 PM UTC-7, Serenity Smiles wrote: > > > I am glad you raised the subject of senses, in buddhism the calculation of > > actual senses within the mortal vehicle is 6 but, of course, that is not > > the > > end I submit this article for consideration > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayatana. I am interested in how it compares > > with a nominalists viewpoint. > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: nominal9 > > Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 9:44 PM > > To: Epistemology > > Subject: [epistemology 12116] Re: OT For joke lovers > > > So far as universals are concerned regarding the supposed opinions of > > Nominalists, I claim that universals are convenient for categorizing > > specifics into sets of similar observables. To the extent that every > > observation (regardless of how focused) includes the context in which > > the > > observation occurs, and the mental status of the observer, there > > exists a > > diminishing probability that any observation can be duplicated, even > > if the > > observer's attention remains fixed upon an inanimate object. The > > appearance > > of duplicated observations is due to insufficient precision of the > > observation, creating the appearance of identical results. > > > Nominalism is a bit "shy" about granting any actual standing to > > "universals".... beginning Scholasticism dealt in "universals"... then > > came along William of Ockham... the "first" nominalist....(more or > > less... mostly more).... > > Anyway, Ockham says tht Universals do not actually "exist" in > > reality... but that they are, at best, "abstracted thoughts" regarding > > very similar (in many Physical senses "clone" identical) particular > > things..... Ockhams' greatest contribution to Nominalism (to my > > thinking) was distinguishing between levels of "Intention"... First > > and Second.... > >http://www.thefreedictionary.com/First+intention > > First intention > > (Logic) a conception of a thing formed by the first or direct > > application of the mind to the individual object; an idea or image; > > as, man, stone. > > >http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Second+intention > > Second Intention (Logic) a conception generalized from first > > intuition or apprehension already formed by the mind; an abstract > > notion; especially, a classified notion, as species, genus, whiteness. > > > Universals are... second intentions.... > > > As to your observations about "appearance"... that smacks of what I > > used to hear was called the "fallibilist" argument... which pretty > > much amounts to the assertion that "one" can't trust one's own > > senses.... > > >http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Fallibilist > > Fallibilism (from medieval Latin fallibilis, "liable to err") is the > > philosophical doctrine that all claims of knowledge could, in > > principle, be mistaken. Some fallibilists go further, arguing that > > absolute certainty about knowledge is impossible. As a formal > > doctrine, it is most strongly associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, > > John Dewey, and other pragmatists, who use it in their attacks on > > foundationalism. > > > However, it is already present in the views of some ancient > > philosophers, including Xenophanes, Socrates, and Plato. > > > In fact, it had a such a direct philosphical relationship with > > Pyrrhonistic Skepticism, that Pyrrhonists of history are sometimes > > referred to as fallibilists, and modern fallibilists as Pyrrhonists.[1] > > [2] > > > Another proponent of fallibilism is Karl Popper, who builds his theory > > of knowledge, critical rationalism, on fallibilistic presuppositions. > > Fallibilism has been employed by Willard Van Orman Quine to attack, > > among other things, the distinction between analytic and synthetic > > statements. > > > Unlike scepticism, fallibilism does not imply the need to abandon our > > knowledge - we needn't have logically conclusive justifications for > > what we know. Rather, it is an admission that, because empirical > > knowledge can be revised by further observation, any of the things we > > take as knowledge might possibly turn out to be false. Some > > fallibilists make an exception for things that are axiomatically true > > (such as mathematical and logical knowledge). Others remain > > fallibilists about these as well, on the basis that, even if these > > axiomatic systems are in a sense infallible, we are still capable of > > error when working with these systems. The critical rationalist Hans > > Albert argues that it is impossible to prove any truth with certainty, > > even in logic and mathematics. This argument is called the M�nchhausen > > Trilemma. > > > Fallibilism will often discard absolute doctrines such as papal > > infallibility, claiming that they are merely authority-based > > arguments. > > > My quick reply to "fallibilism is.... That's what measurement or > > other such observation "tools" are made for.....don't trust your > > eyes?... get a telescope or a microscope... same goes for other > > senses... can't remember right?... record it....In other words... you > > can get around.... "apperances"....not a problem to actual > > "knowledge"....But the Jack-ass Phenomenologists (like even Kant).... > > make a big to-do about it..... > > > On Jun 8, 12:53 pm, Lonnie Clay <clayl...@comcast.net> wrote: > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism > > > > Hmm. I'm glad that we can agree to refrain from combat. Verbal jousting > > > becomes tedious after repetition. > > > > So far as universals are concerned regarding the supposed opinions of > > > Nominalists, I claim that universals are convenient for categorizing > > > specifics into sets of similar observables. To the extent that every > > > observation (regardless of how focused) includes the context in which the > > > observation occurs, and the mental status of the observer, there exists a > > > diminishing probability that any observation can be duplicated, even if > > > the > > > observer's attention remains fixed upon an inanimate object. The > > > appearance > > > of duplicated observations is due to insufficient precision of the > > > observation, creating the appearance of identical results. However, the > > > need > > > to go about one's business makes this irrelevant and a satisfactory > > > performance of one's tasks can be attained by merely a casual glance at > > > most > > > observables, with the observation filed away along with similar > > inaccurate > > > observations in one's memory. If some problem results due to that casual > > > approach to life, then and only then do *I* take a closer look to see > > what > > > went awry... > > > > I guess that you could say that I am superciliously superficial, shallow > > > even... > > > > Lonnie Courtney Clay > > > > On Wednesday, June 8, 2011 9:23:25 AM UTC-7, nominal9 wrote: > > > > > I don't like slinging mud or fighting wars with other posters.... I > > > > prefer to reserve my bile and vitriol for "Public figures".... or > > > > points of argument... > > > > No need to get personal with me... unless you want to..... > > > > I like Anarchists.... don't like Libertarians... some say Libertarians > > > > are anarchists.... couldn't be farther from the truth....Libertarians > > > > like the State, to protect their Contract Rights..... A true > > > > Anarchist..... thinks a "contract" IS THE STATE..... I prefer > > > > individual rights... political, human, whatever.... any encroachment > > > > on individual rights.....I look at very suspiciously.... > > > > Ever hear of "Nominalism"... as distinguished from Idealism... > > > > Realism... or Phenomenology?... that's my take on > > > > epistemologies....pretty much four branches to it (give or take > > > > variations in all branches)... I prefer the Nominalist branch, but I > > > > think I understand the others well enough.... at least to know what I > > > > dislike about them.... > > > > Nice to meet you, maybe "we" can discuss "things".... without getting > > > > "personal".... > > > > > On Jun 8, 11:23 am, Lonnie Clay <clay...@comcast.net> wrote: > > >https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/lonnie-courtney-clay/sYe16Qq5iTA > > > > > > Perhaps you should read at the link above. I despise > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. 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