Essay: What is Enlightenment?
This essay is not about the Enlightenment. It is an investigation as
to how the idea, ‘Enlightenment’ has been adopted, and is used. It
is closer to a genealogy of Enlightenment than an assessment of the
actions of historical actors of the eighteenth century who have been
enlisted to characterise the term. Due consideration of the ideas of
the Enlightenment is only addressed in the light of this
investigation. First the essay examines the reception of the
Enlightenment into English, as a word to signify aspects of the
eighteenth century. Then it looks at the evidence for the concept, as
it existed in the eighteenth century. The essay will then investigate
some of the historiographical issues that are complicit in the
application of the term and some of the difficulties and arguments
that have arisen from the consequence of the widening of the
boundaries to which the term as been put, in contrast to the actuality
of eighteenth century thinking.
It would appear that no English-speaking historian used the word
Enlightenment to describe the eighteenth century, until the twentieth
century. An investigation into several encyclopaedias of the Victorian
period reveals not a single mention. This may reflect a nineteenth
century attitude that ‘patronised’ the eighteenth century as being
rather shallow. Indeed a late Victorian OED definition associated
Enlightenment with a French “shallow and pretentious intellectualism,
unreasonable contempt for tradition and authority.” A perusal of the
British Library catalogue reveals not a single title containing the
word “Enlightenment” until 1910. But despite this negative evidence,
it is not to say that nineteenth century historians did not concern
themselves with the eighteenth century. Leslie Stephen, for one,
devoted much consideration to the eighteenth century but did not make
‘Enlightenment’ the object of his approach. Next from the study of
the BL catalogue, we have to wait for 1942 when The Age of
Enlightenment, an Anthology of 18th Century French Literature becomes
available. But it is not until 1951 that the word Enlightenment
becomes used to describe a unity of historical thought on the
eighteenth century, in a book translated from the 1932 German version
from the posthumous Cassirer. The next book of significance is
offered from Isaiah Berlin in 1956, The Age of Enlightenment. The
1960s provides a further handful of books, notably from Gay, Manuel,
and Fellows. But even after Enlightenment’s adoption into English,
Bronowski’s and Mazlish’s The Western Intellectual Tradition mention
it only in passing, and then only dismissively; “To us, the Age of
Enlightenment… is not a restful abstraction. It is a complex of people
and groups with conflicting ideas…” Then, when dealing with France
during this period they are again somewhat dismissive of the term:
“usually labelled the French Enlightenment.” This demonstrates that
the link between Enlightenment with the eighteenth century is not a
necessary one and perhaps novel in some respects to twentieth century
thinking. The 1960s is rather an interesting period for the career of
this particular signifier as there was also a growing interest in
Buddhism and so this decade also marks the appearance of another
literary kind of “enlightenment”. It seems the word was attracting a
certain kudos. During the first half of the 1970s both Buddhist
enlightenment and the historical “Enlightenment” start to flourish.
There were around 35 further history books on the eighteenth century
containing the word in their titles. The rest of the decade sees an
explosion of titles of around 100 British Library entries culminating
in a cookbook of the Enlightenment. Presumably if you can eat it, it
must be real? From that time to the present, Enlightenment studies has
now become a massive historical industry. In the early twenty-first
century, Enlightenment has become a historical category driven both by
consensus and argument, and has undergone a massive proliferation of
versions: French, German, Dutch, Scottish, Scientific, Radical,
Counter-Enlightenment and even Christian and Jewish. Not to be left
out we now also have a book about English Enlightenment from Roy
Porter.
There is a claim that ‘Enlightenment’ is one of the few words to
describe an historical period for whom the historical participants are
responsible for its coining. Indeed there is a significant amount of
evidence for this claim and a certain amount of justification. However
the evidence for this claim is somewhat limited considering the
widened scope that the Enlightenment now enjoys. It is true that many
of the historical actors now associated with it would not have
recognised themselves as part of the Enlightenment per se, (at least
not as currently characterised) nor would wish to be associated with
many of the other historical actors also associated with it. This
becomes especially evident if we were to confront say La Mettrie,
author of L’Homme Machine, with a leading light of the so-called
Christian Enlightenment. It seems, that as Intellectual Historians, we
should be in the business of avoiding anachronisms and false
attributions such that it would seem unfair to attribute to people in
the past such descriptions that they would not have employed of
themselves. This essay is a brief investigation of this problem.
The evidence for the attribution of the word “Enlightenment” to be
applied to the eighteenth century comes from two key areas, and a
third rather less satisfying one. First, it may be accurate to say
that the philosophe grouping in France during the eighteenth century
were explicitly and openly were conscious of a distinct movement,
initiated by Voltaire, in which the metaphor of revealing a light was
used textually and iconographically – this can be seen clearly in the
preface and frontispiece, respectively, to the Encyclopaédie of
D’Alembert and Diderot. But it is not clear to what degree their
movement attracted a signifier that approximates “Enlightenment” at
the time, though the English translation uses the ‘enlightenment’
throughout the entire work. In particular, the use to which this word
was put, by D’Alembert was a recognition that the philosophes were
reflecting a previous age in ancient times in which the search for
truth was less restrictive than their present. D’Alembert in writing
his encyclopaedia was uncovering 1200 years of darkness stating, “The
masterpieces that the ancients left us in almost all genres were
forgotten for twelve centuries.” This somewhat retrospective
viewpoint stands in some distinction to which various practitioners of
intellectual history have applied the term “Enlightenment”, as we
shall see. What does come near is the use of the term of Diderot’s,
siècle philosophe, which he applied to the eighteenth century, whereas
the term siècles de lumiére referred, not to the eighteenth century,
but to pre-Christian, ancient times. But it is this siècles de
lumiére that has been recruited, and used to form the Enlightenment.
This “French Enlightenment” seems to be the seed from which most other
Enlightenments have borne their own contradictory progeny.
The second main area of evidence comes from the much quoted and
perhaps over stated connection to Enlightenment that is the result of
the famous question “was ist Aufklärung?” presented as a competition
in a Berlin journal in 1783. It is often Kant’s answer that receives
the most attention. This position was that Aufklärung was a maturing
of mankind in its ability to be able to think for itself. Although the
subsequent debate “raged” for the rest of the decade, it is evident
from Schmidt’s study of the Mittwochsgesellschaft that the Aufklärung
was a limited phenomenon: limited to a small group of thinkers who
under the license “you can think as much as you like as long as you
obey”, were asking the questions: why had the public received so
little Enlightenment, and even so, was it really a good idea to let
them have any more? The restrictions proposed for this limitation were
class based and considered application to the public and private. Even
though these thinkers considered that they were enjoying many
liberties, in being able to conduct this discourse, nonetheless this
was conducted to a degree in secret, and this ‘liberty’ was peculiar
to the benign despotism of the reign of Frederick the Great. What
little liberty the Prussians enjoyed was soon to be reversed by the
succession of Frederick William II when a Censorship Commission was
there to “stamp out the Enlightenment”. This Aufklärung has fed the
imagination of Enlightenment studies as is exemplified by Foucault
asking the same question in 1984. He was not imune to the irony that
Kant’s view is the very antithesis of a position of social
responsibility, and was a position not likely to have a major impact
on a wide swath of the public. It might be concluded that Kant’s view
is paradoxical in allowing ‘public’ freedom to a ‘scholar’, but to
demand obedience to all those in a ‘private’ role : is not a scholar
also holding an office? One has to ask if some great irony has been
lost from the context, but also how much of an influence did
Aufklärung actually have at the time in the brief reign of Frederick
the Great? If this influence was so limited; why call the eighteenth
century the Enlightenment? For Moses Mendelssohn, answering the same
question as Kant, associates Aufklärung, with Bildung and Kulture. He
stated that though these words may have been newcomers to the
language, this did not prove that they are new things. “The Greek had
both culture and enlightenment.” With this we might reflect how
Enlightenment is become so heavily associated with the eighteenth
century; or why be concerned to translate Aufklärung as Enlightenment?
The third justification for the attribution of ‘Enlightenment’ to the
eighteenth century is that contemporary authors used the term of their
own age. Burke, is sometimes quoted. But his reflections on the
abandonment of old prejudices were somewhat ironic. The word was also
used contemporaneously in a general way to describe a sense of growing
modernity. An example of this is from Porter, quoting Revd Richard
Price, “our first concern, as lovers of our country, must be to
enlighten it.” Although Porter also calls the Enlightenment
anachronistic he still feels the need to title his book thus. Other
examples range from; “an enlightened age… of age of enlightenment –
[but] the designation ‘the Enlightenment’ is nowhere to be found.”
However, there is an important sense in which a long historical
process that challenged the power of theology to dominate thinking had
gathered pace. The question is whether such a complex process can be
signified with a single word. However, it seems that the Aufklärung
was the result of a thinly spread new outlook from philosophers across
Europe, reaching the German speaking world who were making
achievements in political thought, science and knowledge against
traditional beliefs; that the philosophes and other intellectuals
across Europe approximated a community connected by travel; a republic
of letters and printed academic works. Significant evidence of cross
fertilisation of ideas amongst European intellectuals – is, then, the
basis upon which the eighteenth century has been characterised as the
Enlightenment. As this concept has been conceived in the twentieth
century, it has been appropriated by various interests in the academic
community and has attracted a large range of supporters and detractors
too numerous to even summarise in a small work such as this. What is
clear is that “Enlightenment” has been used as a post hoc attribution
to characterise an explicit philosophical movement, which departed
from religion and faith, and has been characterised by a spectrum of
philosophies, which included atheism, deism, pantheism and a
mechanistic and materialistic approach to explain the natural world.
This is to say nothing of a growing challenge to traditional political
power relations, which is characterised by the struggle for liberty by
the revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
Enlightenment as well as being coterminous with the eighteenth century
is now also indistinguishable from the birth of modernity. This has
led to the Enlightenment having its critics. This criticism does not
only addresses what might be called the essential issues of that
philosophical movement, but has also encompassed many other areas of
eighteenth century history as the boundaries of the Enlightenment have
been exceeded. Now we seem to have a position in historical discourse
that has seen a proliferation and appropriation of the ‘Enlightenment’
which seems now to reside in a range of versions, as listed (p3)
above.
As the “Enlightenment” has grown its various branches a critical
response has emerged from James Schmidt and others. Some ground has
been gained by his critique. In support of Schmidt, Delacapagne (2001)
stated; “There is probably not a single philosophical position around
which we could end up finding all the main representatives of the
Enlightenment family gathered as if at a birthday party… except
(perhaps) the anti-religious position.” Today, not even that is
true, as the “Christian Enlightenment” has tried to gatecrash that
party. Though most of the French philosophes never publicly declared
full atheism, (presenting themselves as deists), it seems fair to say
that this concern with unpacking of religious dogma so central to
early twentieth century characterisations of the period has set the
bar for Enlightenment studies. Collingwood described the
Enlightenment thus: ”it was a revolt not only against the power of
institutional religion but against religion as such.” This view was
also shared by Paul Hazard who suggested that the aim of the
Enlightenment was to put Christianity on trial, and by Peter Gay who
described it as a “war on Christianity.” This position is now
somewhat emasculated by a growing Christian Enlightenment which relies
on what Rosenblatt, calls a ‘pluralizing’ rejection of a ‘single
Enlightenment’. She suggests, “we now know … that the relationship
between Christianity and the Enlightenment was more complicated and
interesting.” But is this we now know better position fair? Is it not
simply a consequence of the ‘pluralization’ or more aptly a
‘colonisation’ of the word ‘Enlightenment’ by theological history? Is
it not simply an artefact of a false attribution, which has extended
the word beyond all reasonable limits? The result of this is that what
was once considered, as the definitive Enlightenment, is now relegated
to “French Enlightenment”, subsumed to allow for the growth of further
branches. This simply begs the question: what is Enlightenment that a
static past can be so seemingly transformed in just 60 years of
scholarship? Were Collingwood et al so wrong? Within this new
discourse the accompanying adjective is now pruned so that, for
example, Professor Stewart Brown is now able to characterise Hugh
Blair’s sermons, which specifically denounce Deism, Atheism,
Materialism and the American and French revolutions, as “… the
greatest influential achievements of the Enlightenment.” This usage
renders “The Enlightenment” as nothing other than equivalent to “the
eighteenth century”, devoid of a core meaning. If the most
significant core value of the Enlightenment can be so easily swept
aside, this means that the Enlightenment of Collingwood has become
stretched to its maximal extent: an extent that is as wide as the time
period is describes. It now seems to have been robbed of its anti-
superstition, anti-religion characteristics of the French philosophes,
and the ‘thinking for one’s self’ aspect characteristic of Kant’s
essay. The emergence of a Christian Enlightenment is in some ways the
most extreme example of the extension of the boundaries of the
Enlightenment. However, the various critiques of Enlightenment studies
has more subtle and far less easy targets for this essay to pursue.
And despite the difficulties with a definitively identifiable
Enlightenment, Enlightenment studies have attracted a compelling and
attractive scholarship that has asked questions which lie at the very
heart of the nature and practice of Modernity.
In addition to the acquisition of the term and its promotion by
sectional interests within academia, Enlightenment has also been
acquired for a range of critiques. Schmidt notes that the
Enlightenment has been blamed for a long list of crimes from the
French revolution, totalitarianism, absolute values, imperialism,
aggressive capitalism, the destruction of a sense of community by
individualism and many more. Ironically enough many of the earliest
attacks from the nineteenth century were made on the basis of the
apparent opposition to faith and religion to those identified as
atheistic philosophes and deistic Aufklärer and by those that might
now be welcomed paradoxically into the Christian Enlightenment. The
attacks have continued in many forms to the present. But as the
temporal distance has grown and the boundaries of Enlightenment have
extended, the attacks become inconsistent as the object of the attack
changes, so much so that any attack made against it could, with some
little effort, be engineered in support of it. For example, Political
scientist J. Q. Wilson attributes modern day problems with rights, as
a legacy of the Enlightenment. Haakonssen’s objection to Wilson
correctly drives a distinction between the Enlightenment’s
hierarchical social ethics and a rights-based liberalism of modernity.
However, this begs the question, what is Enlightenment, and although
Haakonssen’s objection is accurate using a precisely defined
Enlightenment, it may simply be too late for such an objection to fit.
The Enlightenment and its legacy, it seems have moved on: it is now
indistinguishable from Modernity itself.
Garrard sets out a range of “Counter-Enlightenments” from the
eighteenth century to the present. Some of the contemporary ones share
features with those set out by Schmidt. Schmidt (2000) explains some
of the abuses to which the term Enlightenment has been put. He
characterizes such critiques as falling into categories of jeopardy,
futility and perversity. He shows how the critics of the Enlightenment
project, use ‘a projection’ of the writers own choice and runs with
this to knock down what might be called a straw man argument.
“Critiques of the Enlightenment project thus rest on an act of
projection in which the unpleasant features of our own time are
explained as the consequences of certain general principles whose
ultimate origins are located in a particular eighteenth century
thinker or group of thinkers who are stipulated as representative of
the Enlightenment.” Though he hints later on, he does not make quite
so much of the same evident tendency in the supporters and defenders
of the Enlightenment to do the same thing. Are the Enlightenment’s
defenders not also projecting their own concerns? Surely this too is a
feature of Enlightenment studies. When Berlin, Lively and Manuel made
choices as to those particular philosophers who were to be included in
their own works, they were inevitably projecting their own concerns by
allowing a selection of eighteenth century philosophers to speak for
‘themselves’, by speaking for the ‘Enlightenment’. But by making those
choices they were inevitably creating and defining the boundaries and
essential qualities of their personal conception of the Enlightenment.
Whilst Schmidt points to Birken and Lang, Garrard points to Crocker
and Macintyre as critics of Enlightenment, all implicitly or
explicitly implicate the Enlightenment in the horrors of WWII and
totalitarianism. Is this justification any more convincing than laying
the blame of racism and Nazism at the door of Darwin or Pol Pot at the
door of Marx? Arguments against Birken’s and Lang’s notion that the
Enlightenment is to blame for the horrors of Nazism is discarded and
replaced by the more reasonable suggestion that the mysticism of
Hegel; the Irrationalism of the Romantic and Nationalist nineteenth
century, and the misappropriation of Nietzsche, are far more
responsible for the rise of Nazism, and the concentration camps. It
was not the rejection of faith and superstition, so characteristic of
the philosophy at the time of the Enlightenment that can be held
responsible for these horrors. But it is the use of science as a
socially constructed tool, by political forces motivated by the
irrational superstition that is Nationalism and Racism. Forces that
justified evil deeds on scientific grounds, by using science as a
rationale for an anti-Semitism that predated the eighteenth century by
100s of years. Anti-Semitic forces needed no encouragement from a
thing that could have been called Enlightenment. Such an aberration
seems able to justify itself within any historical context and was at
the heat of Martin Luther’s personal ideology. Could this inversion be
laid at the door of the anti-clerical forces of thought contained in
eighteenth century philosophy; and the rise of nineteenth century
Nationalism that seemed to have taken the place of the binding force
of religion? It is clear from this, that if Enlightenment thinking
can be blamed for this, it is due to omission rather than commission.
Is it that Enlightenment thinking was unable to account for, or
replace with reason, the human need to be bound to a systematized
human group in distinction to the other, as it is this tendency that
lies at the heart of Nazism and is a continuing problem to the present
that seems always to plague our species. If it is the Age of Reason
that is to blame, perhaps the detractors of Enlightenment thinking
would like to suggest how unreason might have faired in the
intervening 2-300 years? In Dialectic of Enlightenment , Adorno and
Horkheimer tend to identify the problems of the twentieth century by
posing the question: why has value neutral instrumental reason failed
to enlighten humanity, which has continued to sink into barbarism.
There seem to be two things that the Enlightenment could be criticized
for in the reception of modernity and what that has involved for the
world at large. One, is a critique of the thoughts and values
contained within the historical period. And two, the valorization of
the Enlightenment in terms of the historiographical process which has
maintained it, writes about it, and feeds a kind of mythologisation of
modernity. In this, Intellectual History would seem to be complicit
with this activity. But are Adorno and Horkheimer criticizing one or
the other, or both? It seems that they dissolve this distinction. Thus
Enlightenment is all that characterizes the project of modernity from
the eighteenth century to the present. The Dialektik der Aufklärung is
less about the historically defined ‘Enlightenment’, but a general
attack on the way elements of modern thought from Homer to the present
that ought to have produced a better world have lost their way. If one
were to hold to a definitive Enlightenment their critique is more
about the failure of Modernity than its subordinate; the
Enlightenment. Despite this compelling and thoughtful approach their
own critics have caricatured their approach. It has been suggested, by
Jan Gollinski, that Adorno and Horkeimer level a criticism at the
Enlightenment for the ‘enlightened rationality responsible for the
rise of totalitarianism itself… and ultimately to the extermination of
human beings.” But the book is written in a mode of ironic puzzlement
in which rationality has failed to penetrate deeper levels of human
horror. Thus the debate seems to be rather confused if we look at what
they actually said. They demonstrate that there is nothing new in Anti-
Semitism. It has been transformed by a new rationale, and is “all
that has been retained of religion by German Christians.”
The result of this widening of its boundaries, then, has led to a
diminution of its meaning and its value as a tool in understanding the
history of ideas. Outram suggests that the Enlightenment is “obscure
or even meaningless” due to history studying ideas, “not as autonomous
discrete objects, but as deeply embedded in society.” This would be
correct if the Enlightenment could be identified exactly with a series
of autonomous ideas: it cannot. There never was any agreement as to
what the Enlightenment was or whether it was possible to make it
conform to a clear set of ideas. But is it clear that the seeds of
that obscurity can be found not in the late twentieth century but in
the middle of the twentieth century, between the works of Cassirer on
the one hand and the likes of Manuel and Berlin on the other, at the
very moment that ‘Enlightenment’ is introduced. These distinct
approaches lie at opposite ends of a conceptual spectrum: in the very
use of the term which is used as if the Enlightenment were a causal
agent by Cassirer, but only as a label for a period of philosophical
history by Berlin and Manuel. Cassirer, far from applying ideas as
autonomous objects he imposes a Geist – a process or form of thought
not simply the sum total of the leading thinkers of the time, but he
rather chooses to characterise the work of those thinkers as a
“manifestation” of the essential Enlightenment. This is the very
epitome of ‘embedded ideas’. But this was fraught with problems from
the start, as Price pointed out: Cassirer fails to establish the
Enlightenment as an “event”, but effectively produces a work of
fiction by attributing to it a gentle process of historical
development, devoid of the conflicts inherent in the period. Berlin
suggested that Cassirer “offers a conciliatory view at the expense of
the critical faculty”, by characterising the Enlightenment without the
“conflicts and crises … [in this] serenely innocent book”, showing the
need for a more “business-like approach.” Cassirer is not without
further critique: Boas in 1952 asked whether such an approach was at
all possible; “neither times nor movements have Minds in any
intelligible sense of the word.” Oddly, Cassirer, by promoting this
type of thinking, it seems, is flying against the aims of eighteenth
century materialist philosophy by ironically promoting a romantic view
of history and reflecting Hegelian counter-Enlightenment interests of
the nineteenth century. The echo of this Geist appears throughout
Enlightenment studies. Both the critics and promoters of “the
Enlightenment” rely on a modified conceptualisation of the Geist of
the eighteenth century. It is this unity of concept, and idealist
notion of ‘culture’ this single mind that relies, not on eighteenth
century self-critical thinking, but on the sort of nineteenth century
mysticism of Hegelian Geistgesische. It is then of the deepest irony
that Cassirer uses this to promote the Enlightenment. At the other end
of the conceptual spectrum, Berlin et al cleverly allow the
philosophers of the eighteenth century to speak for themselves with
books that are selections of their writings with commentary. For
example, Berlin with Locke and Voltaire but reveals his own peculiar
interests by devoting a third of his book the writings of Hume. This
sort of approach, which is common to Enlightenment studies, is a means
by which the editors create their own toolkit of connotations and
piece together an Enlightenment of their own imagination.
Concluding Remarks
In 1876, Leslie Stephen observed; “in some minds the desire for unity
of system in the more strongly developed; in others the desire for the
conformity to facts.” In the case of Enlightenment studies both
attributes stand out in clear contrast. Those that love facts would
seek conformity to a narrowly definitive Enlightenment; those that
love a system can, like a magpie, attribute whatsoever they desire to
find a systemic truth. Those wishing to hold hard to the facts have
more chance to agree, whilst the systematisers can only hope to adopt
a relativism to co-exist with other participants in Enlightenment
studies. Outram has suggested a way forward. She prefers to look at
the Enlightenment as a “capsule containing sets of debates, stresses
and concerns, which however differently formulated or responded to, do
appear to be characteristic of the way in which ideas, opinions and
social and political structures interacted and changed in the
eighteenth century.” Her idea is a viable and pragmatic approach to
tackle some of the key issues that were discussed in the eighteenth
century, though the notion that the selection of such issues will also
tend to pre-configure the Enlightenment, there will also be those
practitioners that see a spirit or system emerge out of their chosen
arguments. Perhaps this is an unavoidable tendency that leads towards
the Enlightenment becoming a thing with its own volition; a simple
consequence of what to choose to place inside the capsule? There is a
sense in which Outram is trying to salvage the Enlightenment. Her idea
seems to be workable, but makes one ask, why not jettison the term
entirely and continue to talk about what actually happened in the
eighteenth century without colouring it with an inappropriate term, a
term that carries the baggage of so much connotation and textual
accretion? Perhaps the attractiveness of the word preserves its
usage? Schmidt noted; “Historians searching for a felicitous way of
capturing the spirit of the age have cited it, philosophers hoping to
incite a renewed devotion to the ideal of Enlightenment have appealed
to it, and present-day social critics-apparently in need of a bit of
historical legitimacy have sometimes wrapped themselves in its
mantle.” So why has the term attracted so much interest, or should it
be asked, what has encouraged its acquisition by a range of interests?
Such a word has a great positive feeling to a degree that anyone would
wish to be associated with it. And when using it as an object of
critique or ridicule, the effect is so much more enhanced being such a
positive sounding word. But the Enlightenment by being vague such
critiques are easier to pursue than, say, an attack on “the Age of
Reason”. After all who would attack Reason? The Enlightenment connotes
accomplishment, knowledge acquisition, attainments, illumination,
awakening, civilisation, debunking, broad mindedness, sophistication,
de-mythologisation. It is no surprise given the set of connotations
that theological studies would wish to cover themselves in its mantle
or is it just seeking a bit of historical legitimacy? These
connotations stand against confusion, darkness and ignorance, notions
that no one would wish to be associated with. What it has come to
denote is far more complex and indefinable: the period terminating in
the eighteenth century; a philosophical movement; a philosophical
process; a philosophical project; a mental and social attitude; a set
of philosophical and political argumental vignettes; and it is
conflated with a wider category: Modernity itself.
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