Very roughly put, phenomenology holds that the world is constituted, in a special sense, but correctly, in consciousness. /Archytas
Ah well....I tried... notice that it fits in a logical square, too... Idealist.......Realist Nominalist....Phenomenologist Or slightly different if "reference" based.... Tell you what, Archytas, just on the Off-chance that you may have missed the "point" of my suggestion.... the next time that you want to tr=y to decide on the difference in thought between a Nominalist and a Realist, say... or any other of the four.... ask yourself.... what do they agree on (more or less) and what do they disagree on (more or less).... I think you will find that for the "contradictories"... there is some agreement as to one "aspect" but there is disagreement as to the other "aspect"... be it concept or reference.... but I can't spoon-feed this to you.... you either care to make the "discovery" or you refuse to.... your choice.... Asta la Vista.... end of sales pitch.... you're on your own.....on your own way toward either ignorance or bliss....(HAR) On Jul 5, 6:59 pm, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote: > Very roughly put, phenomenology holds that the world is constituted, > in a special sense, but correctly, in consciousness. In particular, in > the later Husserl's phenomenology as adopted by Gödel, consciousness > constitutes both subjectivity and objectivity and thereby makes the > latter accessible to the former. Careful Nom - I may go exponentially > existential! We might say your model lacks finesse, but its not a bad > heuristic. No modern form of philosophy is as simplistic, though one > can map work in terrain between subjectivity - objectivity and freedom- > regulation. These things don't matter much > > Incidentally, the may screw up once we talk social - at least > according to the sociologist Merton and some of the maths wizards > behind the banking collapse. > > On Jul 5, 8:04 pm, nominal9 <nomin...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > Archytas.... > > Try this as a hypothetical premise, I've written and proposed it here > > and elsewhere often enough and long ago enough.... > > > REALIST > > Concept...... Reference > > Objective......Objective > > > IDEALIST > > Concept........Reference > > Subjective.....Subjective > > > PHENOMENOLOGIST > > Concept........Reference > > Objective.......Subjective > > > NOMINALIST > > Concept........Reference > > Subjective.....Objective > > > On Jul 5, 8:28 am, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Kant's view is not just that space is not a property of things > > > independent of intuition per se, but that space is not a property of > > > things independent of a priori intuition. That distinguishes Kant's > > > conception from the idealism of a thinker like Berkeley. Kant denies > > > the view that space is somehow dependent upon empirical intuition. > > > Kant also wanted to distinguish his idealism from Leibniz's based on > > > the notion that the representation of space is non-conceptual and > > > Berkeley's based on the notion that the representation of space is non- > > > empirical. Hence the “dogmatic” idealism of Berkeley and the > > > “empirical” idealism of Leibniz are each ruled out by considering the > > > content and origin of the representation of space. That, at least, > > > would seem to form part of Kant's intention in the Transcendental > > > Aesthetic, especially in the Metaphysical Exposition. This indicates > > > that Berkeleyan and Leibnizian idealist views can be construed as > > > conceptions of the relation between space and intuition. Whereas > > > Berkeley takes space to be dependent on empirical intuition, Leibniz > > > takes it to be independent of intuition per se. This illuminates > > > Kant's concern in the Transcendental Aesthetic with our representation > > > of space: considering that representation in particular allows Kant to > > > tackle other conceptions of the relation between space and intuition. > > > Transcendental idealism, in so far as it concerns space and time, has > > > the following essential component: we have a non-empirical, singular, > > > immediate representation of space. Part of Kant's innovation is to > > > introduce into the philosophical lexicon the very idea that we can > > > have non-empirical intuition. Kant rigorously distinguishes between > > > sensation and intuition. That distinction, in turn, forms a crucial > > > component in Kant's extensive rejection of the Leibnizian doctrine of > > > perception. It is only with the rejection of that doctrine that we can > > > understand Kant's break with the Leibnizian view of space and time in > > > the right light. > > > Kant contends that the Newtonians conceive of space as a kind of quasi- > > > object. He seems to return here to the classical discussion of the > > > ontology of space mentioned at the outset of this entry. He emphasizes > > > that on the Newtonian view, space and time are akin to substances—in > > > that they are independent of all objects and relations. They are also > > > imperceptible, and certainly in the case of space, infinite. Thus for > > > Kant, the Newtonians regard space as an infinite substance-like entity > > > that is imperceptible and causally inert.He adds that the Newtonian > > > view seems to conflict with what he calls “the principles of > > > experience”. He notes that absolute space is not an object of > > > possible experience and that one cannot prove its existence by > > > appealing to experience. In this way, Kant's criticisms of the > > > Newtonian view seem to rest on very general metaphysical and epistemic > > > considerations—they seem to be largely divorced from the sort of > > > specific views of intuition and of representation that played a > > > substantial role in his own criticisms of Leibniz. > > > > In short he was playing with what was known in his own time and > > > without the rigorous experimentation that was to come. We surely do > > > not go to these great sources today to discover the philosophers' > > > stone. I see many people drink at his well (maybe only sip) and > > > 'discover' what amounts to theories spun in observation and > > > observations spun in theories - some even taking on a naive form of > > > relativism they take to mean their own arguments being as good as any > > > others. They neglect that science does lots of stuff that their magic > > > pigeon cannot. The key thing is whether we can spot was of thinking > > > that might help us through current impasse. > > > > On Jul 5, 12:24 pm, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > We have a tendency to want to summarise other people's work. Here's a > > > > tiny bit on Kant. > > > > > The fundamental idea of Kant's “critical philosophy” — especially in > > > > his three Critiques: the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787), the > > > > Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Critique of the Power of > > > > Judgment (1790) — is human autonomy. He argues that the human > > > > understanding is the source of the general laws of nature that > > > > structure all our experience; and that human reason gives itself the > > > > moral law, which is our basis for belief in God, freedom, and > > > > immortality. Therefore, scientific knowledge, morality, and religious > > > > belief are mutually consistent and secure because they all rest on the > > > > same foundation of human autonomy, which is also the final end of > > > > nature according to the teleological worldview of reflecting judgment > > > > that Kant introduces to unify the theoretical and practical parts of > > > > his philosophical system. In Kant's transcendental conception, an > > > > argument of this kind begins with an uncontroversial premise about our > > > > thought, experience, or knowledge, and then reasons to a substantive > > > > and unobvious necessary condition of this premise. Typically, this > > > > reasoning from uncontroversial premise to substantive conclusion is > > > > intended to be priori in some sense, either strict or more relaxed. > > > > Often, but not always, the conclusion of the argument is directed > > > > against skepticism of some sort. Targets of Kant's transcendental > > > > arguments include skepticism about the applicability of concepts not > > > > derived from experience to the world of experience, and skepticism > > > > about the existence of objects external to us in space. There is only > > > > one innate right," says Kant, "Freedom (independence from being > > > > constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the > > > > freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law" . Kant > > > > rejects any other basis for the state, in particular arguing that the > > > > welfare of citizens cannot be the basis of state power. A state cannot > > > > legitimately impose any particular conception of happiness upon its > > > > citizens. To do so would be for the ruler to treat citizens as > > > > children, assuming that they are unable to understand what is truly > > > > useful or harmful to themselves. One of his popular essays, "An Answer > > > > to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" discusses Enlightenment in > > > > terms of the use of an individual's own reason. To be Enlightened is > > > > to emerge from one's self-incurred minority (juvenile) status to a > > > > mature ability to think for oneself. In another essay, "What Does it > > > > Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?" Kant defines Enlightenment as "the > > > > maxim of always thinking for oneself". "What is Enlightenment" > > > > distinguishes between the public and private uses of reason. The > > > > private use of reason is, for government officials, the use of reason > > > > they must utilize in their official positions. For example, a member > > > > of the clergy (who in Kant's Prussia were employees of the state) is > > > > required to espouse the official doctrine in his sermons and > > > > teachings. The public use of reason is the use an individual makes of > > > > his reason as a scholar reaching the public world of readers. For > > > > example, the same member of the clergy could, as a scholar, explain > > > > what he takes to be shortcomings in that very same doctrine. > > > > Similarly, a military officer can, using public reason, question the > > > > methods and goals of his own military orders, but in his function as > > > > an officer, using private reason, is obliged to obey them. Since the > > > > sovereign might err, and individual citizens have the right to attempt > > > > to correct the error under the assumption that the sovereign does not > > > > intend to err, "a citizen must have, with the approval of the ruler > > > > himself, the authorization to make known publicly his opinions about > > > > what it is in the ruler's arrangements that seems to him to be a wrong > > > > against the commonwealth," writes Kant in "Theory and Practice". > > > > > In the last half of the above we might summarise to 'do what the boss > > > > says in public' (which is weirdly 'private reason') but fell free to > > > > criticise in 'public reason' which is weirdly kept from the wide > > > > public except as some form of > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com. 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