James A Putnam (who sounds a bit like Craig) has written:
"Our ability, or even an insect's ability, to analyze hoards of always
changing, almost random data coming to us at the speed of light is
demonstration that something magnificent is occurring within our
minds. What this means is our conscious mind is in communication with
a subconscious mind that already knows what to do. It also means the
universe is in communication with our subconscious minds. The universe
sends us information for which we must already know the meaning. Our
intelligence contains the meaning of the universe. Universal
intelligence is our intelligence."[6]
"Judging from the universality of phenomena, the nature of such
phenomena, and the logical necessity of an adequate cause therefor, it
is assumed that there is a Universal Intelligence which is the
governing power of nature. Everything which exists is, in its degree,
a manifestation of an Intelligence which is superior to the
individual's comprehension. This Intelligent Power is not found alone
in the great crises such as the first appearance of life and the
dawning of consciousness or mind, but in the whole continuous,
purposeful process."[7]
"There is more to intelligence than human intelligence. Intelligence
is a property of the universe and of all that is in it. Universal
Intelligence is the intrinsic tendency for things to self-organize and
co-evolve into ever more complex, intricately interwoven and mutually
compatible forms. Our human intelligence is but one manifestation of
that universal dynamic. The more we are conscious of universal
intelligence and connect ourselves to it, the more intelligence (and
wisdom) we will have to work with. One might also describe Universal
Intelligence as the mind or will of God or Spirit."[8]

His work on physics can be found here - 
http://newphysicstheory.com/COMPLETE_THEORY.pdf

The perplexing thing is whether there is insight here or complete
bollox.  I don't have enough physics to know.  For that matter,
visiting a local allotment and listening to an old Asian guy who does
grow better vegetables than me, I don't make the right sense of
gardening books either!

On 6 Mar, 23:40, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Most gardening books in England are fairly hopeless for someone on the
> Northwest - here the environment is mostly rain and questions on how
> to keep most of it off one's crop are rarely addressed - one finds a
> flood of recommendations on water preservation.  Even the photon
> leaving a particle leaves us with questions on how it 'achieves' light
> speed in what we mistakenly regard as nothing.  Physics enters a form
> of relableism here, collating evidence of the very small with that
> from the cosmos.
>
> On Mar 6, 10:59 am, sadovnik  socratus <socra...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >      About ‘tropical fish’
> > One can study tropical fish in a restaurant and have
> > his a culinary philosophical doctrine .
> > Other can study tropical fish in their own surrounding natural
> >  environment.   His philosophy is absolutely different.
> > The problem is that physicists study electron without know
> >  its own surrounding natural environment -  vacuum.
> > Therefore we have ‘a culinary philosophical doctrine’.
> > ==.
>
> > On Mar 6, 10:22 am, archytas <nwte...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Electron is now three quasi-particles - spinon, holon and orbiton.
> > > Physics is less about what an electron is than that it helps us use
> > > them - "sending them down wires so our computers work" and so on.  We
> > > don't know what a particle is.
>
> > > My take on Socratus is he may ask (rightly) too much of science.
>
> > > My take on science is this:
> > >  ‘… scientific realism[is defined] as the common sense (or common
> > > science) conception that, subject to a recognition that scientific
> > > methods are fallible and that most scientific knowledge is
> > > approximate, we are justified in accepting the most secure findings of
> > > scientists "at face value." What requires explanation is why this is a
> > > philosophical position rather than just a common sense one. Consider,
> > > for example, tropical fish realism -- the doctrine that there really
> > > are tropical fish; that the little books you buy about them at pet
> > > stores tend to get it approximately right about their appearance,
> > > behavior, food and temperature requirements, etc.; and that the fish
> > > have these properties largely independently of our theories about
> > > them. That's a pretty clear doctrine, but it's so commonsensical that
> > > it doesn't seem to have any particular philosophical import. Why is
> > > the analogous doctrine about science a philosophical doctrine?
> > > The answer is that -- setting aside skepticism about the external
> > > world -- there are no philosophical arguments against tropical fish
> > > realism, whereas important philosophical challenges have been raised
> > > against scientific realism.’ (Boyd 2002:1 [] mine)
>
> > > The philosophical issues are intractable if we start with the idea
> > > they can be bottomed-out.  With a comfortable sinecure I might spend
> > > the rest of my life trying, say, to reconcile what the Ancient Greeks
> > > knew about argument and complex set theory in the programmes of
> > > Scheibe, Ludwig and Sneed (see Balzer and Moulines 1996; Ludwig &
> > > Thurber 1996 and Scheibe 2001).  The later work is German and may give
> > > us some pointers by describing the complexity of theory formation in
> > > physics.  Ludwig’s main points are:
> > > •      Physical observations are first translated into sentences of an
> > > auxiliary mathematical theory containing only finite sets, and, in a
> > > second step, approximately embedded into an idealized theory. By this
> > > manoeuver the authors accentuate the contrast between finite physical
> > > operations and mathematical assumptions involving infinite sets.
> > > •     Inaccuracy sets and unsharp measurements are always considered right
> > > from the start – the role of approximation is held key in theory
> > > formation.
> > > •     The ‘basic domain’ of a theory is now that part of the ‘application
> > > domain’ where the theory is successfully applied, up to a certain
> > > degree of inaccuracy.
> > > •     The complicated terminology concerning various kinds of hypotheses
> > > in Ludwig is radically reduced to a small number of cases including
> > > fuzzy hypotheses.
> > > •     The problem of unsharp indirect measurements is reformulated in an
> > > elegant way which yet should be scrutinized by means of case studies.
>
> > > I'm not good at this stuff as it 'butters no parsnips' in my life -
> > > just interested.  Issues of science and technology as ideology are
> > > well articulated in Critical Theory (esp. Habermas) and I take them to
> > > be right if construing 'use' (as in the vampire squid of neo-classical
> > > economics and corrupt politics).
>
> > > We don't work in the certainty of faith in science and approximation
> > > plays a key role.  I think this gets lost and to some extent Nom I
> > > think your nominalism plays a role in ironing some of this out.  David
> > > Deutsche recently said:
>
> > > Constructors appear under various names in physics and other fields.
> > > For instance,
> > > in thermodynamics, a heat engine is a constructor because of the
> > > condition that it be
> > > capable of ‘operating in a cycle’. But they do not currently appear in
> > > laws of physics.
> > > Indeed, there is no possible role for them in what I shall call the
> > > prevailing conception
> > > of fundamental physics, which is roughly as follows: everything
> > > physical is composed of elementary constituents such as particles,
> > > fields and spacetime; there is
> > > an initial state of those constituents; and laws of motion determine
> > > how the state
> > > evolves continuously thereafter. In contrast, a construction is
> > > characterised only
> > > by its inputs and outputs, and involves subsystems (the constructor
> > > and the
> > > substrate), playing different roles, and most constructors are
> > > themselves composite
> > > objects. So, in the prevailing conception, no law of physics could
> > > possibly mention
> > > them: the whole continuous process of interaction between constructor
> > > and substrate
> > > is already determined by the universal laws governing their
> > > constituents.
> > > However, the constructor theory that I shall propose in this paper is
> > > not primarily
> > > the theory of constructions or constructors, as the prevailing
> > > conception would
> > > require it to be. It is the theory of which transformations
> > > input state of substrates → output state of substrates
> > > can be caused and which cannot, and why. As I shall explain, the idea
> > > is that the
> > > fundamental questions of physics can all be expressed in terms of
> > > those issues, and
> > > that the answers do not depend on what the constructor is, so it can
> > > be abstracted
> > > away, leaving transformations as the basic subject matter of the
> > > theory. I shall
> > > argue that we should expect such a theory to constitute a fundamental
> > > branch of
> > > physics with new, universal laws, and to provide a powerful new
> > > language for
> > > expressing other theories.
>
> > > We are not perplexed alone!
>
> > > On Mar 5, 6:42 pm, sadovnik  socratus <socra...@bezeqint.net> wrote:
>
> > > > Are you "Physics" perplexed, like me? Options
> > > > ==.
> > > > 1
> > > > *ATOMS*  - have electrons. . . . . . . . .
> > > > 2
> > > > *ELECTRONS* Negatively charged particles that constitute electricity.
> > > > 3
> > > > *ELECTRON VOLT*  . . . .
> > > > 4
> > > > *FERMIONS*   . .  have leptons . . . . . . .
> > > > 5
> > > > *LEPTONS*  . . . .Lightweight particles like the electrons that
> > > > constitute  electrical current and  . . . . .
> > > > 6
> > > > *NEUTRINOS* Extremely light, almost massless, invisible particles
> > > > produced
> > > > in radioactive decays, they are part of the lepton family  . . . .
> > > > 7.
> > > > PHOTONS* Particles that transmit electromagnetic forces, or light.
> > > > 8
> > > > *STANDARD MODEL* A set of equations that describes forces of nature
> > > > in
> > > > terms of elementary particles, known as fermions,  . . . . .
> > > > 9
> > > > There are three forces of nature in the Standard Model:
> > > >  light, or  electromagnetism . . . .
> > > > ===.
> > > > Half of your perplexed  points tied  with electron / photon.
> > > > Nobody knows what electron is.
> > > > If we solve that problem - the perplex will be disappeared
> > > > ==========================..
> > > >      The Electron’s  puzzle.
> > > > ===.
> > > > 1900, 1905
> > > > Planck and Einstein found the energy of electron: E=h*f.
> > > > 1916
> > > > Sommerfeld found the formula of electron : e^2=ah*c,
> > > >  1928
> > > > Dirac found two more formulas of electron’s energy:
> > > >           +E=Mc^2  and  -E=Mc^2.
> > > > According to QED in interaction with vacuum electron’s
> > > > energy is infinite: E= ∞
> > > > Questions.
> > > > Why does the simplest particle - electron have five ( 5 ) formulas ?
> > > > What is connection between them ?
> > > > Why does electron obey five ( 5) Laws ?
> > > >     a) Law of conservation and transformation energy/ mass
> > > >     b) Maxwell’s equations
> > > >     c) Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle / Law
> > > >     d) Pauli Exclusion Principle/ Law
> > > >     e) Fermi-Dirac statistics
> > > > What is connection between them ?
> > > > #
> > > > What is an electron ?
> > > > Nobody knows.
> > > > In the internet we can read hundreds theories about electron
> > > > All of them are problematical
> > > > We can read hundreds books about philosophy of physics.
> > > > But how can we trust them if we don’t know what electron is ?
> > > > ==.
> > > > Quote by Heinrich Hertz on Maxwell's equations:
>
> > > > "One cannot escape the feeling that these mathematical formulae
> > > > have an independent existence and an intelligence of their own,
> > > > that they are wiser than we are, wiser even than their discoverers,
> > > > that we get more out of them than was originally put into them."
> > > > =.
>
> ...
>
> read more »

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