On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic > physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the > computation that gives rise to the physical world.
That's also how I understand him. And, in fact, I believe something similar (if not identical). My point is that a staunchly anti-zombie philosopher like Dennett would still need convincing, and appealing to his (Dennett's) own anti-zombie leanings wouldn't be enough to convince him. > This is in step 8 > of the UDA, probably the most counterintuitive and most difficult to > grasp part of the argument. Actually, I find it the easiest part of the whole thing to understand. But to echo something someone else said earlier in this thread, I think Bruno's arguments for step 8 could be shored up. As they stand, they wouldn't convince a philosopher like Dennett. But they should be able to. (In principle. In practice, philosophers are rarely convinced by anyone else's arguments on any issue.) Maybe I still don't fully understand Bruno's position. If I were making the argument, his step 8 would be my step 1. -- Kory --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---