Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >> >> >> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>: >>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is >>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I >>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones >>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov). >>> >>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the >>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ? >> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says >> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes. > > If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations > aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the > independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how > 2 different physical process could generate the same computation > without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two > processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing > thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ? > > Regards, > Quentin
Try substituting "lengths" for "computations". Are lengths primary because the same length can occur in different physical objects? Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
