Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >>>>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>: >>>>>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is >>>>>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I >>>>>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones >>>>>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the >>>>>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ? >>>>>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says >>>>>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes. >>>>> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations >>>>> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the >>>>> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how >>>>> 2 different physical process could generate the same computation >>>>> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two >>>>> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing >>>>> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ? >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> Quentin >>>> Try substituting "lengths" for "computations". Are lengths primary >>>> because the same length can occur in different physical objects? >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> Why would I ? It's not the same thing at all... You could have said >>> substitute by 'red'... there are multiple physical red object. >>> >>> The thing is you can come up with an infinity of physical (possible) >>> realisation for a given computation. So the question is what is >>> linking the computation to the physical realisation if not the >>> abstract rules (which don't exists with physicalism, because there >>> exists only "realized" computations... no abstract thing) ? >> Lengths are abstract to, but we don't take them to be fundamental. >> Your reasoning is Platonism; you end up reifying every abstraction >> simply because they are common to multiple realizations. >> >> Brent > > I still disagree (about your wording game)... computation is not a > property of a thing like a length is, it's a process.
So is walking. Shall we reify walking too? And then take it to be fundamental? > > And yes I assume abstract rules simply exists... I have no problem with taking rules to exist, but that's not the same as assuming they are fundamental and can exist independently. >that's what allows me > to build "concrete" realisation of such computation. I think they must exist in your brain first. Brent > > Regards, > Quentin > >> >>> Regards, >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
