Sorry I should have added that I was assuming that the UD was operating at some future time as in step 7 (fig 7) of Bruno's paper. Is my reasoning correct in what I have said in the last post?
On Dec 21, 9:33 pm, Nick P <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk> wrote: > Thank you quentin and Bruno... > > Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the > copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however > technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. > What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to > extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying > process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many > times) by the UD. Hence by it generating all possible emulations of > me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any > stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next > OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current > wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already > software constructs in a simulation). > > On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > > > On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2009/12/21 Nick P <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk> > > > Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” > > > that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting > > > process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, > > > given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and > > > the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different > > > places, for example Washington and Moscow”. > > > > However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this > > > might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a > > > passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. > > > > “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating > > > some unitary transformation in case the > > > brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. > > > This recall that quantum computer does not > > > violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist > > > form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the > > > brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine > > > Turing state, it can be recopied, without > > > violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. > > > > The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial > > > state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state > > > must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain > > > configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure > > > that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? > > > > You're anticipating "how this could be done on humans". But the > > > argument is done by taking for granted that "we"/consciousness can > > > be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So > > > let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something > > > else as "wetware" with input/output system that permits easy access > > > to the current computational state. > > > > The fact that we would be "turing emulable" does not entails that it > > > is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing > > > the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible > > > (even at the expense of destructing the "original") then after that > > > data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact > > > that the "original" would have been destroyed in the copying process > > > doesn't matter. > > > That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a > > quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, > > despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can > > actually "prepare" them (in the quantum sense of "preparation") in > > many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal dovetailer > > generate those "preparations" infinitely often. The universal > > dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate > > all rational possible quantum states. > > Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all > > decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum "preparable", but > > in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are > > working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum > > mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the > > decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine > > either). > > > Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece > > of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from > > an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not > > ( priori) digitally emulable. > > > Bruno > > >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - > > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
