Bruno, I hope you feel better. My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
--- Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> > Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you just have to assume
> > that counterfactuals count. No one but you considers that 'prescience' or
> > any kind of problem.
>
> This would lead to fading qualia in the case of progressive substitution from
> the Boolean Graph to the movie graph.
I thought you said you don't use the 'fading qualia' argument (see below),
which in any case is invalid as my partial brain paper shows. So, you are
wrong.
> >>> gradually replace the components of the computer (which have the standard
> >>> counterfactual (if-then) functioning) with components that only play out
> >>> a pre-recorded script or which behave correctly by luck.
> >>
> >>> You could then invoke the 'fading qualia' argument (qualia could
> >>> plausibly not vanish either suddenly or by gradually fading as the
> >>> replacement proceeds) to argue that this makes no difference to the
> >>> consciousness. My partial brain paper shows that the 'fading qualia'
> >>> argument is invalid.
> >>
> >> I am not using the 'fading qualia' argument.
> >
> > Then someone else on the list must have brought it up at some point. In
> > any case, it was the only interesting argument in favor of your position,
> > which was not trivially obviously invalid. My PB paper shows that it is
> > invalid though.
>
> ?
What do you mean by "?"?
> > I guess by 'physical supervenience' you mean supervenience on physical
> > activity only.
>
> Not at all. In the comp theory, it means supervenience on the physical
> realization of a computation.
So, it includes supervenience on the counterfactuals? If so, the movie
obviously doesn't have the right counterfactuals, so your MGA fails. I see
nothing nontrivial in your arguments.
> > Computationalism assumes supervenience on both physical activity and
> >physical laws (aka counterfactuals).
>
> ? You evacuate the computation?
I have no idea what you mean by that. Computations are implemented based on
both activity and counterfactuals, which is the same as saying they supervene
on both.
> Consciousness does not arise from the movie, because the movie has the wrong
> physical laws. There is nothing about that that has anything to do with
> 'prescience'.
>
> This is not computationalism.
Of course it is. Any mainstream computationalist agrees that the right
counterfactuals (aka the right 'physical' laws) are needed. Certainly Chalmers
would agree. What else would you call this position?
(I should note that when I say 'physical laws' it might instead be Platonic
laws, if Platonic stuff exists in the right way. I say 'physical' for short.
I am agnostic on whether Platonic stuff exists in a strong enough sense. In
any case I maintain that it *could* be physical, as far as we know.)
> > Bruno, try to read what I write instead of putting in your own meanings to
> > my words.
>
> I try politely to make sense to what you say by interpreting favorably your
> term.
There is no polite way to say this: C'est merde. You tried to twist my words
towards your position. Don't.
> Show the error, then.
I have already done so (for MGA): You claim that taking counterfactuals into
account amounts to assuming 'prescience' and is thus implausible, but that's
NOT true. Using counterfactuals/laws is how computation is defined.
Your repeated claims that the error has not been pointed out are a standard
crackpot behavior.
> It helps to be agnostic on primitive matter before trying to understand the
> reasoning.
In that case I should be the perfect candidate, being that I am agnostic on
Platonism. Your arguments don't sway me because they don't make any sense.
Remember, I came to this list because like many others here I thought up the
'everthing that exists mathematically exists in the same way we do' idea by
myself, and only found out online that others had thought of it too. So I'm
not prejudiced against it. I just don't know if it's true, and I think it's
important not to jump to conclusions. Your 'work' has had no effect on my
views on that.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
