On 29 Jan 2011, at 04:59, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:48, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com
>
wrote:
What does "locally" mean in this context? I doubt that
consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to
interact
with.
I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?
Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted
with the
world?
There are evidences (REM) that mammal fetus does dream.
Do you agree that DM implies that possibility.
In practice most of our consciousness grounding heavily relies on
the most
probable worlds arising from long deep (linear) computations. Apes
fetus can
dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the
most
probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long
period.
With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p
when
"luckily" p is true, and to be awaken is to be dreaming of a world
when
"luckily" the world is real. But real means here first person
sharable, and
may result from its stability on random oracles.
I agree with you that being correct is a matter of luck. But isn't
this true of every metaphysical option, not just classical mechanism?
Well, I was working in "classical mechanism". And I agree this might
be true for any theory, which explains the importance of fallibility.
More in my answer to Brent's post on Gettier. Note also that I put
"luck" in quotes, because it is a bit more subtle than that, but
that's the idea (already found by Malebranches). In fact, mechanism
explains where the luck comes from: it comes from the measure near one
on the computational histories.
Bruno
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