Rex, Brent,
On 1/28/2011 7:59 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:48, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com
>
wrote:
What does "locally" mean in this context? I doubt that
consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to
interact
with.
I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world
to
interact with...?
Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted
with the
world?
There are evidences (REM) that mammal fetus does dream.
Do you agree that DM implies that possibility.
What's DM?
DM is digital mechanism, alias comp. It is the belief that my body is
Turing emulable (be it by a physical reality or Robinson arithmetic).
Comp, as an hypothesis is neutral about the primitive character of the
physical reality. Then by MGA, it appears to be in conflict with weak
materialism.
You're theory that the world is a subset of the computations of the
universal dovetailer? In that case it certainly implies the
possibility - in fact it seems to imply the possibility of far too
much.
I have no theory. Only theorems in the Digital Mechanist *theory*.
Also, the world is not a subset of the computations of the universal
dovetailer. It is a first person (plural) view emerging from *all*
computations, making it (the worlds) not Turing emulable, and never
emulated by the UD. Just take into account the 1-indeterminacy.
That *this* implies too much is an open problem. Indeed it is *the*
problem to which the mind-body problem has been reduced to in the DM
theory.
In practice most of our consciousness grounding heavily relies on
the most
probable worlds arising from long deep (linear) computations.
How do you mean "linear" computations? Is there a definition of the
sum of two computations? or does it just refer to the computations
being sequential?
Hmm... do you remember the combinator? A computation is linear if it
does not eliminate information (no erasing), and it does not duplicate
information (no copy). It is reversible also. Example: unitary
transformations, or BCI algebra + S4-like modal operators.
Thanks to the fact that the material hypostases prove, with p sigma_1,
p -> BDp (what I called LASE on this list, the little abstract
Schroedinger Equation), we have evidence that comp implies that the
bottom of the physical laws is symmetrical and linear. In that setting
it is natural to expect a good tensor product making it possible to
"sum" computations. Cf also Girard linear logic and its "geometry of
interaction". But for the qualia, Girard's logic is still too much
physically motivated. WE have to extract this from Gödel, so that we
can use the G/G* splitting to distinguish what the machine can prove
and what is true about the machine, and why there exist physical laws
at all.
Apes fetus can
dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the
most
probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long
period.
With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe
p when
"luckily" p is true,
So what is your response to Gettier's problem? [Brent Meeker]
The answer is that, with comp, we cannot distinguish reality from
dream. We can know that we are dreaming (sometimes), but we cannot
ever know for sure in a public way that we are awaken.
Another fact related to this is that knowledge, consciousness and
truth are not machine-definable. If we are machine, we can use those
notion in theoretical context only.
In practice, as real life illustrates very often, we never know as
such that we know. We belief we know, until we know better.
The SAGrz logics is a logical tour de force. Here Gödel's theorem
gives sense to Theaetetus. S4Grz, the logic of (Bp & p) formalizes a
notion which is not even nameable by the machine, unless she
postulates comp and relies explicitly on that postulate, or better,
relies on the study of a simpler than herself machine.
In science, or in public, we never know. Knowing is a pure first
person notion. But this does not mean that we cannot make 3-theory on
such pure first person notion, as S4Grz illustrates particularly well.
Same remarks for feelings (Bp & Dt & p).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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