What is a "person"? What can a "person" be but the continuos response of a wet chemical neural network to exogenous and endogenous inputs. The response will be modified by changes in the networks chemical environment, and now we learn by strong external pulsed magnetic fields. In a series of very relevant experiments, with readily reproduced results, subjecting certain brain regions to a pulsed magnetic field, changes the brains notions of ethics/morality, while the field is applied. When the field is turned off, the brain returns to it's previous perceptions of the world. The technique, Transcutaneous Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) was first developed as a noninvasive treatment for depression, being much less disruptive than ECT. Then researchers asked, can we modify the functioning of "healthy" brains - possibly even improve functions such as memory ?
Participants in this exchange might enjoy a subscription to Nature: Neuroscience. It's not an easy read, but interesting. Lanny On Jul 14, 2011, at 3:42 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will >> needs the global structure of all computations. >> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown >> physics. > > I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't > disqualify 1p phenomena. I don't get why yellow is any less stable > than a number. > >> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think. >> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything >> physical. > > I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that > affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry > in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my > sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an > experiential aspect and vice versa. > > It is more an information pattern which can emulate all > computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It > exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in > the > physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at > least Turing universal. > > It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist > independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers > insist through the experiences within physical matter. > >> The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither >> physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study >> the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp >> hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument. > > Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made > of anything either. I don't get it. > >> Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just >> a collection of true fact about immaterial beings. > > Have you read any numerology? > >> Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now >> that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers >> have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can >> already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very >> simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object. > > The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense > is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no > independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to > it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your > video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher > might see it. > >> I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to explain >> (mind and matter) in the starting premises. >> Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical) >> reformulation of the mind-body problem. > > Are you more interested in satisfying your premise, or discovering a > true model of the cosmos? > >>> You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though, >>> right? I don't get it. > >> It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it has a >> mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex >> enough to attribute meaning to physical attribute, nor mental one, so >> that your question does not make much sense. > > How does Mickey Mouse have mass? Whoever is drawing the cartoon can > make the universe he is in be whatever they want. It doesn't have to > have pseudophysical laws like gravity. He can just teleport around a > Mandelbrot set. > > Craig > > On Jul 13, 5:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>>>> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves >>>>> differently than a biological plant. >> >>>> Sure. But they have not the same function. >> >>> They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that >>> it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not just >>> what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology >>> produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all outside >>> of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built >>> of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the chip >>> is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old >>> mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't >>> interested. >> >>>> Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which >>>> can >>>> still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. >> >>> But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own >>> interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable? >> >> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will >> needs the global structure of all computations. >> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown >> physics. >> >> >> >>>> By computers I mean universal >>>> machine, and this is a mathematical notion. >> >>> I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic >>> abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads >>> into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel, see, know, think, >>> etc. >> >> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think. >> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything >> physical. It is more an information pattern which can emulate all >> computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It >> exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in the >> physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at >> least Turing universal. >> >> >> >>>> That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand? >> >>> Each sentence is a struggle for me. I could go through each one if you >>> want: >> >>> "I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the >>> mechanist >>> hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough constraints to decide >>> what a "physical reality" >>> can possibly consist in." >> >> This is the abstract. The paper explains its meaning. >> >> >> >>> I read that as "I will first present a theoretical argument showing >>> that the hypothesis of consciousness arising from purely mechanical >>> interactions in the brain is sufficient to support a physical reality. >> >> Not to support. To derive. I mean physics is a branch of machine's >> theology. >> >>> Right away I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm guessing that >>> you mean the mechanics of the brain look like physical reality to us. >> >> I mean physics is not the fundamental branch. You have to study the >> proof, not to speculate on a theorem. >> >>> Which I would have agreed with a couple years ago, but my hypothesis >>> now makes more sense to me, that the exterior mechanism and interior >>> experience are related in a dynamic continuum topology in which they >>> diverge sharply at one end and are indistinguishable in another. >> >> That's unclear. >> >> >> >>>> Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of >>>> course, >>>> you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all >>>> along >>>> in the reasoning. >> >>> I'm trying, but it's not working. I think each step would have to be >>> condensed into two sentences. >> >>>> No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of >>>> arithmetical relations. >>> Maybe that's the issue. I can't really parse math. I had to take >>> Algebra 2 twice and never took another math class again. If the >>> universe is made of math >> >> The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither >> physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study >> the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp >> hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument. >> >>> I would have a hard time explaining that. Why >>> is math hard for some people if we are made of math? >> >> Well, I could ask you why physics is hard if we obey to the laws of >> physics. this is a non sequitur. >> Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just >> a collection of true fact about immaterial beings. >> >>> Why is math >>> something we don't learn until long after we understand words, colors, >>> facial expressions, etc? >> >> Because we are not supposed to understand how we work. The >> understanding of facial expression asks for many complex mathematical >> operations done unconsciously. We learn to use our brain well before >> even knowing we have a brain. >> >> >> >>>> God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the >>>> natural numbers. >>> Numbers create things? Why? >> >> Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now >> that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers >> have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can >> already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very >> simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object. >> See:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9G6uO7ZHtK8http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UrEoKFYk0Cs >> >> >> >>>>> My focus is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. >>>>> To my mind, >>>>> what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic >>>>> relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their >>>>> origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color, >>>>> sound, taste, feeling, etc. >> >>>> Nice picture. This is what happens indeed. >> >>> You are saying that there is an absolute ontological correlation >>> between numbers and phenomenon, ie all possible spectrums begin with >>> red, all possible periodic tables begin with Hydrogen - the >>> singularity of the proton is immutably translated as the properties of >>> elemental hydrogen in all physical universes? >> >> Not necessarily. The structure of the proton might be more >> geographical (contingent) than physical (same for all observers). >> It is better to understand the reasoning by yourself than to speculate >> ad infinitum of what I could say. The exact frontier between geography >> and physics remains to be determined (in the comp theory). In the non >> comp theory, the question cannot even be addressed. >> >> >> >>>> It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the human >>>> mind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind. >>> I can go along with that, although I would not limit the universal >>> interior order to machine, number, or mind, but rather a more all- >>> encompassing phenomenology like 'sense' or 'pattern'. >> >> I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to explain >> (mind and matter) in the starting premises. >> Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical) >> reformulation of the mind-body problem. >> >> >> >>>>> By definition, mental phenomena are >>>>> exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics, >>>>> etc. >> >>>> They are not; even in Platonia. >> >>> You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though, >>> right? I don't get it. >> >> It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it has a >> mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex >> enough to attribute meaning to physical attribute, nor mental one, so >> that your question does not make much sense. >> >> >> >>>> The complex problem is how pain are possible, and yes, I think that >>>> computer science has interesting things to say here. >> >>> Like what? >> >> Like obeying to the las of qualia, where qualia are defined by what >> the machine can know immediately, yet cannot prove that they know >> that. It is a part of "machine's theology". >> >> >> >>> There might be a bit of a language barrier.. I'm just not sure what >>> you mean towards the end. Why does the universal machine pretend not >>> to be a machine? >> >> Because the machine's first person experience is related to the notion >> of truth, which is a highly non computable notion. >> Computationalism confronts all machines with a lot of non computable >> elements. Theoretical computer science is mainly the study of the non >> computable reality (of numbers). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Craig >>> On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >>> On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >>>>> I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying. >> >>>>>>> Computer chips don't behave in the same way though. >> >>>>>> That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless >>>>>> you >>>>>> believe in substantial infinite souls. >> >>>>> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves >>>>> differently than a biological plant. >> >>>> Sure. But they have not the same function. >> >>>>> A computer chip behaves >>>>> differently than a neuron. >> >>>> Not necessarily. It might, if well programmed enough, do the same >>>> thing, and then it is a question of interfacing different sort of >>>> hardware, to replace the neuron, by the chips. >> >>>>> Why assume that a computer chip can feel >>>>> what a living cell can feel? >> >>>> Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which >>>> can >>>> still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. In the case >>>> of >>>> biology, there is strong evidence that nature has already bet on the >>>> functional substitution, because it happens all the time at the >>>> biomolecular level. >>>> Even the quantum level is Turing emulable, but no more in real time, >>>> and you need a quantum chips. But few believes the brain can be a >>>> quantum computer, and it would change nothing in our argumentation. >> >>>>>>> Your computer >>>>>>> can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide. >> >>>>>> Why? >> >>>>> I'm talking about your actual computer that you are reading this on. >>>>> Are you asking me why it can't commit >> >> ... >> >> read more ยป > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
