On 14.08.2011 02:00 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 12:47 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>
wrote:

How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if
it receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that
it would be able to tell that there is an artificial device there
due to electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial
device is not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the
original tissue.

The question is what does it mean the same stimulation. I guess
that you mean now only electrical signals. However, it well might
be the qualia plays the role as well.

The artificial device must replicate all the I/O behaviour of the
original neurons at the interface with the rest of the brain. This
is purely a problem for engineers who neither know nor care about
qualia. The question is, given that the engineering problem is
solved, would consciousness necessarily be preserved? I think it
would, because otherwise we would have a partial zombie.

A potential problem is that engineers expect a complete description of what should be done. It is not enough to say "all the I/O behaviour" but rather one must to specify explicitly what it means. Only after that you get an offer with a price.

If I understand you correctly, you presume that conscious
experience could be resolved within 'normal science' (there is no
Hard Problem). Jeffrey Gray on the other hand acknowledges the Hard
Problem and he believes that a new scientific theory will be needed
to solve it.

In the recent posts I do not propose any theory of consciousness, I
am just interested in whether consciousness would be preserved if I
had my brain replaced with artificial components. If the answer is
"yes" that still does not explain why we are conscious at all or how
consciousness is generated.

No doubt such an experiment would be interesting and helpful. However, I am afraid, that the current knowledge is not enough to perform it.

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru


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