On 15.08.2011 19:18 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Hi Evgenii,
On 14 Aug 2011, at 21:25, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Bruno,
Let me put it this way. I guess that a Lobian machine could be
implemented, or it has been already implemented. So let us then
take some Lobian machine and then you demonstrate practically that
such a machine is conscious. Then it would much easier to
understand what you mean.
I don't think we can demonstrate technically that anything is
conscious. If someone did this for anything, he would have solve the
mind body problem.
It is generally accepted that we cannot prove our own consciousness
(we can know our own, here and now, but we cannot provide a proof for
that). It is accepted that we cannot prove that something is
conscious.
Well, let me quote Jeffrey Gray
p. 18. “Philosophers sometimes endow conscious experience with an
inviolable privacy, rendering it incapable of meeting the scientific
requirement for replicability of empirical observations. Nothing could
be further from the truth, as attested by the reliability of visual
illusions, among many other phenomena.”
p. 135. "These experiments demonstrate yet again, by the way, that the
'privacy' of conscious experience offers no barrier to good science.
Synaesthetes claim a form of experience that is, from the point of view
of most people, idiosyncratic in the extreme. Yet it can be successfully
brought into the laboratory."
He seems to disagree with you. Hence, as I have said, your meaning of
"conscious" seems to be different from his meaning.
Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru
I often claim that consciousness is both not 1-doubtable and yet
3-incommunicable.
That is related to the fact that comp is a theology. It is a bet on a
form of reincarnation.
If you accept this, I can explain how some "belief" a machine can
develop by looking at herself, into a belief in a reality, or the
possibility of a world, and this correspond, by Gödel completeness
theorem (not INcompleteness) in a statement of self-consistency,
which has indeed the property, for the ideally correct LUM, that it
is true and unprovable. This means that consciousness, seen as a
basic instinctive bet in a reality, already compared well with Löbian
machine's self-consistency notion. Self-consistency is not
identified with consciousness, though, but can be seen as a logical
descendant of it.
But, if you can assume comp, if only for the sake of the argument,
you can imagine what it means for a machine to be conscious. It means
that you can survive with a digital brain and become a machine
without you, nor your friend, noticing any change. That will be an
example of a conscious machine.
I am not trying to prove that machine are conscious, or that we are
machine. I just make the statement a bit more precise than usual, by
using computer science and the substitution level, and I show that
if we are machine, then Plato's conception of reality is far more
plausible that Aristotle's one. In particular physics is derivable by
machine's introspection, and this makes the comp theory testable.
UDA shows without math the reason why it has to be like that. This is
understandable by anyone having a rough idea how a computer works at
its most basic level.
AUDA shows with math how to derive concretely physics (but also other
'points of view' on the arithmetical reality).
I think it is better to be entirely convinced personally by UDA
before studying AUDA. But logicians find AUDA a billionth times more
easy, because it does no more refer, for them, to the mind-body
problem (in which they are not usually interested, and which UDA
illustrates the heart of the trickyness).
I hope this can help, and don't hesitate to ask any question, at any
level suiting you the best,
Bruno
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