On 9/15/2011 10:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Evgenii,
On 13 Sep 2011, at 21:45, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Bruno,
As I have already mentioned, I am not that far to follow your theorem. I will do it
presumably the next year.
Take your time. I am at the step 6 on the dot forum, where things are done slowly,
deeply and in a nice atmosphere :)
I have been working for the last ten year with engineers and my consideration is so far
at the engineering level.
All my work has been possible thanks to engineers, not scientist nor philosopher who are
still too much in the "the boss is right" type of philosophy. To be sure there are some
exceptions. But usually engineers have a much better common sense and lucidity, than
scientist who seems to want to believe religiously in their theories.
After all, if we know something, we should be able to employ it in practice. And if
this does not work in practice, then how do we know that our knowledge is correct.
Working in practice does not mean truth.
Said that, I understand the importance of theory and appreciate the work of
theoreticians. After all, if we say A, then we must say B as well. Hence it is on my
list to follow your theorem (but not right now).
No problem.
At present, I am just trying to figure out our beliefs that make the simulation
hypothesis possible.
But this is really astonishing, and in quasi-contradiction which what you say above. We
just don't know any phenomena which are not Turing emulable.
But isn't that just a selection effect. If it weren't Turing emulable, how would we know
that?
As a theorician, but only as a theorician, I can show the theoretical existence of non
simulable phenomena, but that really exists only in theory, or in mathematics. Worst,
most non simulable phenomena will be non distinguishable from randomness, and if we are
machine, we will never been able to recognize a non Turing emulable phenomenon as such.
It seems that the question is more like "how can we believe something non Turing
emulable could exist in Nature".
But your argument assumes that arithmetic exists, which is also "only in
mathematics".
After all, "Human brain is similar to the Nelder-Mead simplex method. It often gets
stuck in local optima."
That can happen. But I am not sure it can makes sense to doubt about mechanism. You need
to study hard mathematical theories to even conceive non-comp. Non-comp seems possible
in theory, and has an important role in the epistemology of machines, but in nature and
physics, it simply does not exist.
Yet most people on the 'everything' list assume the universe is infinite and
uncomputable. Isn't it implicit in Everett's multiverse (and even explicit in Tegmark's)?
It might even be a reason to doubt comp, because comp might predict the existence of
more non computable phenomena that what we "see" in nature (basically the personal
outcome of self-superposition).
But as you say above, we wouldn't recognize them as non-computable - except perhaps in the
sense of random, as in quantum randomness.
Also, the UD simulates not just the computable phenomena, but also the non-computable,
yet computable, with respect to oracles, and this is even more complex to verify for a
'natural' phenomenon.
The winning physical histories/computations
What do you mean by "winning" and how do you know this?
Brent
are those who are very long and deep, and are symmetrical and linear at the bottom,
apparently, but this must be extracted from addition and multiplication, and it is
partially done with the gifts of distinguishing the truth (about a machine), and the
many modalities: the observable, the feelable, the communicable, the provable, the
believable, the knowable, etc (with reasonable modal axiomatics and their arithmetical
realization.
The ideally correct universal machine has a particularly rich and intriguing theology,
which is made refutable, because that theology contains its physics. So we can compare
with nature, and if comp is false, we can measure our degree of non computationalism.
Best,
Bruno
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
