On 09 Oct 2011, at 22:45, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know
that
at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the
countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism.
For the flaw in the reasoning, see my post above.
Below. I will see.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere
symbols,
when removed from that context.
What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation
independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model theory.
For using the axiom you need only the inference rules.
But just rules give just rules.
The context I am talking about are particular measurements, or
particular
countable things. COMP uses it outside of this context, making it
meaningless.
What context?
Also, if you were right here, all theories, especially the first order
theory, would be meaningless.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't agree with these axioms removed from any context, as without
it,
they are meaningless. I don't necessarily disagree with them,
either, I just
treat them as mere symbols then.
They are much more than that. There are symbols + finitist rule of
manipulation.
Which are just symols as well. The rules are just more then symbols
with
unspecified meaning if they represent something.
The rules are algorithmic. They make the theorem checkable by machine.
You are arguing against all theories.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The difference is as big as the difference between what
you can feel looking at the string "z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c" and what you
can feel looking at a rendering of what it describes, like this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7JLHxBm0eY
This just works if we give the rules meaning in terms of particular
objects,
namely pixels on the screen. In this context they aren't removed from
context, because an image of a screen with measureable distance is an
obvious context for numbers.
The equation without an geometrical context means very little to an
average
human (of course to mathematician it means a lot in terms of other
mathematical things, which is no valid context for the average human).
COMP doesn't give an adequate context. If it would, you could give
particular predictions of what COMP entails in term of measureable or
countable objects.
Comp just do that in the extreme, given that it gives the physical
laws. That is what the UDA proves. (And AUDA confirms partially, and
shows it consistent, also).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course we can still use them in a meta-sense by using .. = "2"
as a
representation for, say a nose, and ... = "3" as a representation
for a rose
and succesor= "+1" as a representation for smelling, and then 2+1=3
means
that a nose smells a rose. But then we could just as well use any
other
symbol, like ß or more meaningfully ":o) o-".
I am not sure that you are serious.
I am serious, I just presented it in a ";)"-manner.
Well, if you are serious, you have to study a bit about numbers,
addition and multiplication. You are confusing the symbol "2", which
can indeed represent a nose, and the number 2, which does not
represent anything a priori, but is the number 2 that you are supposed
to be acquainted with since high school.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
There are intented meaning, and logics is a science which study the
departure between intended meaning and a mathematical study of
meaning.
Logic studied both the
syntactical transformation (a bit like neurophysiologist study the
neuronal firings) and the space of the possible interpretations.
Interesting things happen for the machine doing that on themselves.
This is a lot of talk of how meaningful it is without presenting any
actual
relevant meaning.
What is missing?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Personally, I might prefer to use the combinators. But we have to
agree on some principle about some initial universal system to see
how
they reflect UDA, in such a way that we can explain the quanta and
the
qualia, with the comp assumption in the background, and in the
theory
itself.
Yes, you can use any universal system, which is going to be just as
meaningless as numbers.
That is like saying that a brain, which only manipulate finite
meaningless information pattern (assuming comp) is useless.
No, because it is an actual existing real object, you can interact
with,
therefore it is not useless.
I thought only consciousness was real, and now you are telling me that
there are actual existing real object?
It is hard to follow you.
Also, numbers are of course not useless in general, just in the
context you
are using it.
Numbers are not useful in computer science?
So you could say in the context you are using it, that is, in
the context of a TOE, the brain is pretty useless also. It can just
generate
a lot of words and concepts, but no useful TOE is actually found.
Well, actually the brain, as being a UM, might be used as a TOE,
except that we have to provide a first order logical specification of
it, and that might be as long as the diameter of the universe
containing unreadable symbols. That would not be very useful indeed,
so we are glad when we discover very little UMs, like with
combinators, numbers, lambda expressions, etc.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Are you just telling me that, like Craig, you assume non-comp?
No, I am saying COMP doesn't make sense, or at the very least is
extremely
implausible.
That is the only thing we can discuss, given that your reasoning is
just a
restatement (or explantation) of the axiom that we are immaterial
machine
("yes" doctor).
See my answer to the other post. this is plainly faulty. I would not
have search for years what has become the movie argument if matter was
so easily eliminable.
The conclusion that if we are immaterial machine then matter
is just an appearance that follows from that is pretty trivial, so I
surely
don't disagree there.
Not only it is not trivial (you really need step-8 or equivalent to
meet Peter Jones critics), but the argument is constructive: it
explains where the physical laws come from and it shows the actual
shape of the physical laws.
If you don't want to discuss COMP, then just say that and I'll stop
talking
with you about that subject. It is just a bit dishonest to ask for a
flaw of
the reasoning, apart from the axioms, if the reasoning itself is
just an
explanation of the axiom. Your explanation is fine, if you want to
hear
that.
?
I have serious doubt that you have understood the non triviality of
the theorem, and of its proof. But if you get the point that would be
nice. But I think you miss Peter Jones-like type of argument. We might
be digital and yet primarily physical machine.
Also, if you get the point, and if you know (or take my word for) the
result that computation are both represented but also emulated by
arithmetical truth, then you should grasp that comp makes Robinson
arithmetic a Realm of Everything (ROE), and that the Lôbian numbers
appearing in that ROE will play the role of observers, and then you
could see how physics has to be retrieved technically from the number
additive-multiplicative structure.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let's take a programming language. When the code says "while(i<5)
then i++;
print "Nose smells rose" end" then this make sense for the user as
he can
read "nose smells rose". But in an abstract context, "nose smells
rose" has
no particular meaning and the while loop is just a loop, which also
has no
particular meaning (though it has a particular function).
This is false, it has a meaning (mainly that if the condition occur
it
has to print some string). What you do with that information is more
complex, as it needs to study your brain, body, context (indeed). But
you illustrate that you agree that "xhile (i<5) ..." has a meaning.
Yes, but only in a limited context. *That is the point*.
I guess you miss the theorem alluded above (which is not mine). But
comp + that theorem makes that limited context unlimited enough. It is
absolutely undecidable, for any machine, to evaluate the cardinal of
reality, and with comp, the infinity of the natural numbers is quite
enough. That's part of the point.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Obviously, it has nothing to do with rose and smell. But both
mechanist cogniticians and reseracher in AI are not *that* naive.
Smell and rose require deeper loops, like the LUMs can manage (but
not
a two line program).
Smell and rose can't arise out of mechanical loops.
Assuming non-comp.
They are objects in
consciousness. If you claim they can arise out of them, just give me a
program that produces a smell of a rose.
Imagine a program which emulate your brain activity when you smell a
rose, and this at the right level of substitution (which existence
*is* the comp assumption).
It's not possible. Even if you
write a detailed simulation, I can't smell it!
So the 'you' being simulated is a zombie. You are assuming non-comp
throughout.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
No matter what the
programming code says, it only makes sense through a user, or an
intelligent
programmer.
Comp entails that self-referential machines (UMs and LUMs) can do
that.
But COMP doesn't make sense. If you think it does, just make any
statement
that has something to do with the actual world we live in. Yes, we are
immaterial, this is the part of the axiom that makes sense.
For you perhaps, but usually mechanist thought that a machine is
typically a material thing.
So I insist, the immaterialism is not assumed. It is even the hardest
thing to swallow for most people.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Are you telling me that a human having got an artificial digital
brain
is a zombie?
There are no humans with artificial digital brains, and I don't
think there
will ever be, so the question is meaningless.
We work in theory, in which the question is meaningful. To say that
successful artificial digital brain are not possible is a very strong
statement for which you need to argue, like Craig tries to do
(unsuccessfully). It means that you have to find in the brain a
process which is both relevant for consciousness to be attributable to
a person with that brain, and which is not Turing emulable. You
already need to grasp well the notion of Turing emulability to find
example of non Turing emulable process. Actually, we don't have found
in nature something not Turing emulable, except except the collapse,
which is a first person indteerminacy notion and so is very well
explainable by comp, despite the non-Turing emulability.
If you are asking if someone who is stupid enough to replace his
brain with
a computer is a zombie? Well he isn't, he is just dead.
Big statement needs serious argument. You are just saying that it is
obvious our bodies (3-I) are not machines, that is, you are saying
that it is obvious that comp is false.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But you remove it from that context also, leaving no meaning
left, except empty symbol manipulation which could mean anything
So a brain in a vat would be unable to make a person feeling like
living a dream?
I believe dreams are more primary than brains,
Me too, but that is part of the non triviality of comp, and it remains
possible to use a brain to manifest a consciousn experience, and it
that sense, the brain in the vat belongs to a dreaming person, and we
can (adding the interface) get entagled with the life of that person.
brains are something
appearing in the more stable "dreams", so this question can't be
answered.
Well, with comp, we have to abandon the physical supervenience thesis,
and when done properly we can answer such kind of question. It is not
always easy, because our natural languages reflect very old,
"programmed or engrammed by nature and culture" prejudices. Here
logical tools helps a lot to make things as unambiguous as possible.
If being a brain in a vat appear as content of consciousness, you are
probably *really* dreaming (in the ordinary sense), or you are
watching a
moive where something like this happens and for a moment identitfy
with the
brain in the vat.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I get more and more the feeling that you are assuming non-comp.
I am not assuming non-comp, I am observing that non-comp is the case.
You said yourself that we can only observe consciousness, and now you
assert that you can observe that I am not a machine?
Here you could as well say that "God told me that comp is false".
Consciousness doesn't arise out of anything (it doesn't arise at
all, except
out of it self, if you want to say it this way), it is just there,
therefore
metaphysical COMP&C is false.
No comment.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
All the (formal) universal systems you can name have the exact same
flaw as
numbers.
They only make sense in a context, otherwise they just function as
symbols making them as useful as saying
"ÜGFDÖÜGÖGÜÖFGÜFGÄFÄFÄFGÄFG--#-äsd#-ds#-d##" and then
explaining that this
means "earth".
If that is a flaw, do you agree that you can say the same thing about
brains? (even without comp, actually).
No, because brains make sense to us, directly (we can even touch
them under
some circumstances and they reflect many of our inner processes if we
observe them), while "ÜGFDÖÜGÖGÜÖFGÜFGÄFÄFÄFGÄFG--#-äsd#-ds#-d##"
does not
(unless you know some secret code or something).
If you mean whether brains make only sense in a context, well,
obviously
yes.
You confuse mathematical theories with "chinese", and worst, frankly,
you are confusing mathematical theories with mathematical realities.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is what COMP&C (this means comp and conlusion) does. It makes a
lot of
complicated assumption and long-winded explantions and
interpretation of
symbols, just to conclude that the 1-p (which is practically the
only
perspective there is) cannot be captured by any rational means
anyway.
But it get good formal approximation at the metalevel. Indeed, it can
even explain why it has to jump from a level to another to understand
its non formal nature.
Not really. The explanation is just intelligible with a lot of words
additional words to explain the explanation, so the actual
explanation uses
something beyond numbers, which can't even be formalized (natural
language).
Where? It is so vague that it seems like any theory is impossible. I
would prefer more specific critics, but I am not sure you have any
one. You just believe that computationalist are mad, because
apparently you know the truth.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then
it claims to be a refutable theory, but without making any
particular
prediction that is not obvious already.
This is a gratuitous false assumption showing you don't take the time
to study the work, as you have already confess.
Instead of making these assertions, just give a concrete prediction
of some
physical measurement,
The Z1* logic is a machine producing a countable of experiment capable
of refuting comp. Of course, comp is recent, and up to know the one
having been verify are the usual quantum theorem of the usual quantum
logic. Science is slow, and contingencies don't always accelerate the
research.
or predict the contents of my dreams, or something.
You have to understand that the theory of everything (Robinson
arithmetic) is a TOE as an unavoidable consequence of saying yes to
the doctor (to put it very succinctly). Then you might understand how
to use math to derive physics. The only advantage on physics is that
it explains simultaneously the quanta and the qualia. Physicists are
stuck on this by carrying the primitive matter bullet.
Maybe I have missed these in your work, in this case I am apologizing,
It is in the *second part* of sane. The material hypostases gives the
logic of "measure one" for the observable.
and I
will begin to take COMP seriously, but please point to them to make it
easier for me.
If you understand the UDA, you understand that a physical laws must be
given by a relative measure on the computations extending your current
3-computational states. The measure one will be given by Bp & ~B~t &
p, for each sigma_1 arithmetical proposition. The sigma_1 proposition
correspond to accessible states by a UD written in the arithmetical
language (using only "s", "0", "+" and "*", obeying the axiom I gave
in the preceding posts.
If comp is true the first order extension of those logic leads to a
"von Neuman" quantum logic reich enough to have dimension, the right
tensor product, and a unique probability measure defining the whole
physics: that is rules for predicting the result of any observable.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You seem to just have
a prejudice against machine. You believe that you are different. It
is
your right, but you might try an argument.
I have no prejudice whatsoever against machines. Of course I am
different, I
am not a machine.
The theory explains why, if the 3-I is a machine (if we can emulate by
brain/body on a computer), then the 1-I cannot be a machine from its
point of view (and that 1-I is correct: he is not a machine from the
consciousness point of view, it is not nameable, it is not
descriptible in any thrid person way, except by going at a higher
level, and that all Löbian machine can do for simpler machine than
themselves.
ZF can study the theology of PA, and ZF can prove that all correct
machines have the same abstract theology, with different
concretization (I mean the content of Bp changes, but it obeys the
same logic, and this for all "hypostases"). So ZF can bet on its own
correctness and lift PA's theology on itself, but this comp can warn
is only done at its own risk and peril.
Comp can explain why it is sane to never take comp for granted. It is
a modest theology which almost explains why you can hope for its
truth, but can never be sure of it.
So if you meant "1-I is not a machine" you are right, in the comp
theory.
I just take a unbiased look at reality,
The word reality is like the word "God", you cannot talk publicly like
if, beyond mere consciousness, you know anything about it.
there is not much need to argue for
it. If you want this is the argument: If one just looks at what is
obviously
here,
Here I laugh :)
one doesn't find any machines in ones consciousness that somehow give
rise to it. The only place I find machines are when I use my
rational mind
and apply it to this quite abstract concept.
?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you just have a bunch of words without being able to make sense
of them,
everything you "derive" from it will just be whatever you happen
to
interpret in a bunch of non-sensical words.
The axioms above are used by all scientists everyday, implicitly or
explicitly.
Of course they are! I say nothing to the contrary. The axioms are
used as
*tools* because they reflect some aspect of reality.
This contradicts what you said above.
What exactly?
That out of context the axioms and theorems are meaningless. If you
can recognize just one situation where they can be used as tool, you
give them at least one meaning, that situation. You can take that
situation as a meaning, even if later you realize that there are other
situation, well described by that theory, and this add just more
meaning. But you said there are meaningless, and interpreted them in
arbitrary nonsensical way. If not, I misunderstand you, and fail to
see the relevance with the truth/falsity of comp.
May be you meant that we cannot capture some full truth with symbols
and rules. But neither can brain with physical laws, etc.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then the point is that by assuming comp ("yes doctor"), the
observable
feature of reality are explainable from that aspect of reality, and
we
don't need to make anything else explicit. We get also the
communicable and non communicable part of that (epistemological)
reality.
If this is true, just communicate the communicable part and make
concrete
predictions.
That is basically what human science do. And this is retrieved with
the "man" hypostases, which for the case of the ideally correct
platonican machine is given by mainly its arithmetical theorem (modulo
some recursive equivalence). Exemple of communicable proposition are
"17 is prime", or even "Obama is president" if that is part of the
machine's belief.
And then the laws of physics that we can extract in the way I
describe. I wrote theorem prover for all those logic at their
propositional level, which are already non trivial.
Saying physics is non-boolean and follows quantum logic is not
a concrete prediction, it is neither concrete, nor a prediction.
Of course it is concrete. If QM did not violate Bell's inequality, and
if nature could not doing that, comp would be refuted.
We get the measure one for the observable, so we can test them and
compare with nature.
To be honest I would be astonished if comp/Theaetetus is not quickly
refuted. It would be astinishing that the first guy listen to the
machine got the right physics in one strike. But I have illustrate the
technics and we might use different theory of knowledge, beliefs, or
translate the classical theory of knowledge in some other ways. It is
already formidable to find such an arithmetical quantization where the
UD argument predicts it should be. I just open a door. Church thesis
and computer science do rehabilitate Pythagorism. The real astonishing
thing is Church thesis, really. The real astonishing thing which makes
AUDA senseful, and also UDA by the step seven, is the closure of the
computable for the diagonalization. I have explained this, includig in
this list.
I tend to think that the discovery/apparition of universal machines is
similar to the big bangs, the apparition of life, the apparition of
brains, the apparition of thought, the apparition of languages, the
apparition of written language, the apparition of computers, etc.
Those, when seen in geological times are explosion, but creative one.
Now, all that already appears with variants and also a super
structured redundancy (like in many-realties theories) in the tiny
sigma_1 part of arithmetical truth. And what we see is not exactly
that, but a limit projection of that, which makes both physics and
consciousness escaping the Turing emulable and climbing the scale of
insolubilties.
For example a result in theoretical inductive inference is that there
is something uncomputably more competent than any inference inductive
machine, in recognizing functions (synthesizing programs from input/
output samples). What? Two inference inductive machines. That's a
rough description of the non union theorem of Blum and Blum. This
illustrates tha the UMs and LUMs and very complex behavior whose
escape the computable, despite or because, the base phenomena is
computable.
The UMs and LUMs live at the frontier between the computable and the
non computable.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But they can only be
used where this is the case, namely comparable measurements and
countable
things.
On the contrary. It explains why machines, even if they desire to
grasp their countable bahaviors only, HAVE to believe in the
uncountable, big infinities, etc.
Then show what the axioms mean apart from comparable measurements and
countable things. It does not count to just interpret whatever you
want into
them, because this has nothing to do with numbers (or any thing
computable
for that matter) in particular.
It has to do with numbers because I have chosen the numbers as initial
programming language, and initial (and final) ontic reality to
describe the block-mindscape of the UMs and LUMs.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
COMP claims to explain quanta and qualia, which as such are not
measurable and countable (of course particular quanta can be
measured, but
not quanta as such), therefore it uses a tool that is useless in
this
endavour (and useless here means meaningless).
Hmm... What can I say. from this I can only encourage you to study
the
theory.
This is just not possible if you can't explain what even only the
axioms
mean, except giving definitions that explain nothing at all, or
refer to
numbers in their usual sense, that makes no sense, as you don't
refer to
anything in particular that is countable or measurable.
I refer to the computational state captured by the doctor when you
have accept the digital brain substitution.
OK?
Now study the theory, and ask when you don't understand. Better to get
well UDA before AUDA (unless you have already study Mendelson and
Boolos' books in logic and self-reference).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The result is the same as
just using the axioms p and ~p. You get whatever you manage to
interpret
into the axioms, which doesn't mainly depend on the axiom, but
rather your
compassity to be creative with your ability of interpretation.
I just assume we can survive with digital brain, and then I explain
that Aristotle naturalism must be replaced by Platonian form of
reality view.
This argument just goes through if a digital brain is purely
digital, which
is just not the case in practice. There are no "pure" digital
machines. If
the digital machines are not actually digital, but just
approximately, and
fundamentally are material, or made of spririt, no conlusion can be
drawn
that rests on the basis that there are actual pure digital machines
and a
correct substitution level.
That difficulty is handled by the notion of digital substitution
level. The non digital material difference is by definition not
relevant, or it would mean we have to take a lower level. Then the
reasoning works, or tell me where you remark applies precisely.
If you insists that they are, then you just have the conlusion in
the axiom,
That is the case in *all* theory.
since pure digital machine would necessarily be immaterial, making
them
independent of material reality, and as you assume we are them, they
have to
be the actual reality.
I don't assume we are "pure digital machine". I assume that I can
survive with a physical substitution by virtue of preserving the
relevant physical (non digital indeed) implementation of a
computation. Many materialists, if not all believes this, but for very
different level. Even Searles betrayes is mechanism in some place. The
only explicitly non-mechanist scientist I know is Penrose.
I agree with you that comp entails quickly that "I am immaterial"
relatively to a material world. It is less obvious to get the point
that the "material worlds" is only an appearance growing from a non
material reality. The dreaming ability of the LUMs numbers relatively
to the infinities of UM numbers.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
What you say does not make sense.
Then just explain what numbers mean.
The numbers are the object of discussion. They *are* the meaning,
when
I talk about them.
If they are the meaning, what is the meaning?
They are discrete finite quantity that you can add and multiplies, and
have many possible properties.
Or do you mean numbers are
meaning itself? If this is the case, what's the evidence for that?
?
You lost me completely here. You are still confusing symbols and what
they are used to refer to. If I talk to you about the sun, you might
as well ask me "and what are the evidence that you are not talking
about Saturn".
The numbers are not so important. I can take the combinators, or the
java programs.
What is important are the relations that the number can have. If you
understand a proposition like
"all the positive integers can be written as the sum of four squares
of integers", you know enough. This is actually true but not so easy
to prove.
May be you could read the book by Conway to get familiar with the
richness of the natural numbers (alias the non negative integers).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you have forget what they mean, just buy a book
on arithmetic.
They just provide definitions, or explain numbers as measurement
devices of
(relatively) concrete things (for example lines on paper, in the
case of
graphs or geometry).
I mean book *on* numbers. Buy this one:
http://www.amazon.com/Book-Numbers-John-H-Conway/dp/038797993X
Read book on prime numbers, there has been nice popular book.
I fear the number theorists discovering the laws of physics before the
number theologians, that could mean one milleniaum more of elimination
of person and qualia ... But the natural numbers, the primes notably,
are already close to a quantum universal machines;
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then computer science explain how numbers can develop
themselves and becomes conscious (together with the whole context of
arithmetic), etc.
No, it doesn't. If it does, give an explanation, or link to an
explantion,
how consciousness can rise out of anything other than consciousness.
Just
interpreting consciousness into numbers doesn't count. I can just as
well
interpret consciounsess into apples.
This is what UDA explains, and you need enough knowledge of how a
computer really functions to get the point that some true number
relation emulates the computations. Especially that some nuances have
to be added for being precise.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You could have asked me what is the meaning of "brain", or of "neural
firing".
That would be entirely justified if you wanted to make a TOE based
on brains
or neuronal firing.
Yeah! TOE are given by any UMs. But a human adult brain contains also
many non relevant information, and also prejudice. but in principle,
it could work (in practice you will need to be patient because the
first order specification will be very long, as I said).
Numbers are just shorter to describe. The theory of matter and mind in
comp admit any ontological initial theory. It can be seen as a choice
of coordinate for computable functions, or for computations.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
And no, repeating the axioms does not
constitute an explantion. They just make (obvious) sense with
regards to
countable things. Please explain the sense beyond that.
Once you are willing to suppose that your physical brain is a finite
machine, then many things I am saying are rather easy to figure out.
Obviously they are not. Many people here expressed problems with
what you
say, and this probably doesn't mean that all of them are terribly
ignorant.
Of course. I am saying something which, with the exception of the
platonists and mystics, contradict the most common paradigm, which
makes reality WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get). All animals like
that. The greeks, and Indians, and well many thinkers took distance
with that idea, with the feeling that what you see is only the tip of
the iceberg.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If not, then you are obliged to study computer science to get the
point that numbers can at least behave (relatively to other numbers)
in an intelligent way.
As it happens, I do study computer science full-time (well, full-
time in
theory at least :D). There is nothing at all there that explains that
numbers behave in an intelligent way, except in the usual sense that
they
are a useful structure, and in that sense "behave" "intelligently".
Good news. It is not the numbers who think, nor the brain, but the
person. If you read enough theoretical computer science, you know that
machine can prove proposition on themselves at different levels. And
you will know that all this talks and behavior of machine can be
tranlated in arithmetic (which is Turing universal). I insist, if you
don't like the numbers take the combinators or the lambda terms, or
take my word for it. For the understanding of the reasoning, including
that it is not so trivial, you don't need much. To really prove of
addition and multiplication is enough for Turing universality needs
mainly the fundamental theorem in arithmetic that each numbers have a
unique multiplicative decomposition in prime factors (that is not
trivial at all to prove, but i well known).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
What axioms are you disagreeing with?
All. They make little to no sense in the context you use them.
You could say: Einstein theory of gravitation makes no sense at all.
Right, in the context of explaining the fundamental reality it
doesn't. It
is just a useful theory, because it predicts useful, concrete
things. COMP
doesn't, or if it does, I haven't yet seen it (then please mention
it, with
precise numbers).
Comp forces us to reduce the mind-body problem into a body problem.
That's the main result 1. (including first person indeterminacy).
And the LUMs interview shows some pictures on the body apparition.
But if you have better, please explain.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The guy does not explain why 1+1=2, but is using all the time that
idea.
Yes and this makes perfect sense, as he deals with things that are
actually
measurable, like time and space. In this context I know what 1+1=2
means, as
I am not complete moron. ;)
OK. So you can see that a number like 754 just measure the numlber of
time you have to iterate the successor operation to get it from zero.
And if you like concreteness, let us define zero by the number of
french which are exactly 42 km high, in the year 1998.
OK. I have many concrete definition like that, but you have to be
careful by chosing not something too much instable. Good idea to use
past events, which are stable (modulo revisionism). You can define 0
by the amount of money in your bank account at this year and hour.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If for you something like " different natural numbers have different
successors" makes no sense, I can hardly help you.
Of course it does make sense. I never pretended the opposite. It
seems you
are just ignoring what I say. I am saying it makes no sense to use
them out
of the context that they are describing, namely measurable or
countable
things.
No, they are use also as addresses, like with phone numbers. And they
can be used on themselves at many different level. You can ask how
many divisors has a number, and thinks like that. All this can be
understood without mentioning "concrete things".
But COMP wants to explain quanta and qualia as such
This is your main misunderstanding. I think. Comp asks for nothing. It
gives no choice. To relate first person and thrid person in a coherent
way, matter becomes the study of coherent brain.
If you want, if comp is true, we are already in a matrix, which is
defined in arithmetic.
(of course *a
part of them in concrete instances* is measurable, I am not denying
that),
which is just nonsense, as numbers don't relate to these things in a
precise
way (as far as I can see). So I am asking you to make sense of the
axioms of
numbers *with respect to this*.
Take any of your concrete example, and verify the axioms by yourself.
The axioms are supposed to not depend on *their* interpretation, so if
you make sense of the axioms, for any of your own intuitive
understanding of 0 and the positive integers, then that is enough to
use them as a programming languages, and the whole first and second
order arithmetical language (no more necessarily computable) is
suitable to talk about the machine and their dreams, etc (assuming
comp, a local implemetation of a dream is just a computation done by a
local universal machine. The modalities (defined in or with respect to
arithmetic) distinguish the dream "computation", from the private
experience of the dreamer, etc.
I assume comp (which is a priori neutral on materiality, and all
that). The reversal occurs in all big physical universe.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact
does
not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say
that
concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that
naive
materialism might be false, so why would little "concrete"
pieces
on
stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what:
there
are
no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the
simple
equation x^2 = 2y^2.
This is just a consequence of using our definitions
consistently.
Not really. In this case, we can indeed derived this from our
definitions and axioms, but this is contingent to us. The very
idea
of
being realist about the additive and multiplicative structure of
numbers, is that such a fact might be true independently of our
cognitive abilities.
Yeah, so I ask what is the meaning of being realist about it? I
can't see
any. The only meaning is when we work with countable objects, or
measurements, which indeed follow some rules that mathematics
describe.
Mathematics is born from the fact that abstract things can have
meaning.
Obviously. So what? I am not denying that.
OK. Then it is just a question of patience and technic to grasp
that I
am not using anything more than that.
You have to. The fact that abstract things can have meaning is not
an axiom
you derive anything from in a precise way.
I bet I survive a digital substitution. This is what relate
consciousness with computation, and the phi_i, and the numbers.
If you admit that you just
interpret something into that, this is another thing. That's OK, but
that's
just what everyone does when we speculate about metaphysical things,
so you
can have no claim to rigor in this case.
Which I do, indeed. The simple trick here, is that I *assume*
mechanism, computationalism. That makes a link between consciousness
and physical computations. And the reasoning shows that if that is the
case, the physical computations arise from gluing number's dream. That
it the result of a reasoning, not a possibility on which we can
speculate. We speculate only on the idea that there is no magic, and
Church thesis is true (so that we do have the correct notion of
computability).
Materialism and mechanism does no more fit together, and mechanism
invites us to listen already to machine to see how they figure out the
difficulty (with Gödel, Löb and Solovay having done the hard work).
I will have to go. I will answer Stephen. I comment the rest tomorrow
or later.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Having meaning does not mean
"being realist about".
The idea is that the meaning is independent of the machine which
handle that meaning.
This could well be the case, yet this still does not entail "being
realist
about".
It could be true that Harry Potter is an idea of a person that exists
independent of the book Harry Potter, I actually bet he does, as the
same
idea is probably manifested in countless other books in parallel
universes.
Still I don't have to be realist about Harry Potter, except in the
trivial
sense that it is a real idea. I am not even sure there is such a
thing as an
unreal idea. Maybe an idea that has hardly any meaning in it, like
"blue
cloudlike triangle squares with i-sides".
Bruno Marchal wrote:
They are real as epistemological constructs, and what
they describe is a part of reality. But real in an ultimate sense is
only
reality itself (awareness).
I am not again the idea that reality is awareness, and I show comp go
in that direction. But comp makes it possible to explain this from
simpler third person communicable proposition (like "the prime
numbers
behave randomly", etc.).
No, it doesn't. It doesn't for the simple reason that you can
explain ideas,
concepts, things, objects from something, but you can't explain
awareness
from something, since it is the thing that is required for any
explanation
at all to arise in the first place. Just like you can't explain
wheels from
bikes (you don't get what a bike is if you have no clue whatsoever
what a
wheel is) you can't explain awareness from anything (you don't get
anything
at all if you don't already have a faint clue what consciousness is).
Another way to state it: Everthing comes from awareness, therefore
awareness
comes from nothing.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just
awareness does, and these things are expressions of it (the more
concrete
things just temporary expressions, like my body).
OK, but if you say "yes" to the doctor (and agree that you survived)
then you can understand where awareness come from (as amazing as it
might seem: I agree it is not obvious at all).
This statement just doesn't make sense, as awareness doesn't "come
from". It
is simply is already here. And don't say that that is a dogma, it
simply the
case as you can see for yourself.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Got the feeling that you want awareness to be more primitive than the
numbers. You might try a theory going in that direction, and then we
will see if your theory forces you to say "no" to the doctor. That
would be interesting.
There is no theory needed for that, as it is already the case that
awareness
is primitive, and is the thing everything arises in, and out of.
Without awareness nothing at all can arise, therefore it is primitive.
It is nonsense to want a theory for that. It is like asking for a
theory to
show that existence exists (awareness is existence itself). You
can't ask
for as theory for something which by its very nature is primary to any
theory, and beyond any theory. The only theory I can give about that
is
"What is obvious is obvious, and this is required for anything to make
sense, therefore it is primary. The only thing that can be obvious is
consciousness, since without it nothing whatsoever can be obvious.
This
theory is refuted if you show that something cannot be obvious." or
"!" or
"Axiom 1: Axiom 1". Really every theory is just as good if it only
really
explains that no theory suffices, or can even touch awareness. But
we should
be honest about that, and not claim that it explains "99%" or some
BS like
that.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
We don't know if there is an infinity of twin primes, but we can
still
believe that "God" has a definite idea on that question.
We could as well say that our definitions make the answer to that
question
well-defined, even if we haven't yet figured out what the answer
is.
So the answer does no more depend on us. That is what I mean by
being
realist.
The answer depends on us as we invented the numbers (we = rationally
intelligent beings., including all forms of aliens that might
exists, I
guess that they are probably humanoid as well). There is no
requirement that
we know all the consequences of everything we invent.
Numbers have been discovered by humans, not invented. You put too
much, or not enough, credits in the humans.
It depends on what you mean by invented. Ultimately nothing can be
invented
if you require invention to be something fundamentally else than
discovery.
Every invention is a discovery of some kind.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This
doesn't mean that the answer describes an independently existent
entity.
It implies that the truth of existential arithmetical proposition
does
not depend on us.
It doesn't in the way that when the humans on this earth die there
will most
probably still be other intelligent beings left that can assert the
proposition.
But even if they do not depend on us as humans, they may not be true
independently of the context, that is, they only make sense with
respect to
some aspects of reality, not all of it (which would be required
for a
meaningful TOE).
That's the case for all theories.
Right. That's why a TOE is nonsense, as it has no (fixed) context,
since
"everything" is not a fixed context.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
but this doesn't mean they have any
independent aspect.
You said yourself that the question is well defined.
So? Why does that entail that they are independent?
It means that once we agree *enough* on what are the natural numbers,
the truth on the twin prime numbers is independent of us. It is the
same with the electron or any stable patterns we can approximate.
Then with comp even a proposition like "Mister X suffer from headache
during a major part of its life" will be independent of you (and of
the big bang, electron, etc.).
So? Even when they are not dependent on us, it doesn't mean they are
real in
any sense other than everything else you can think of is real.
Without comp
a proposition like "Mister X suffer from headache during a major
part of its
life" will also be independent of you (and of the big bang,
electron, etc.)
(if you think of big bang and electron as independent material
entities, if
you don't then the statement doesn't make sense as Mister X requires
electrons and the big bang to exist, as he can think of electrons
and the
big bang if he couldn't he wouldn't be himself anymore).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
but let's just call the regularities laws, even if they can't be
written down). This choice can be an abitrary thing whatsoever. If I
decide
to explain everything with the word "Kartoffelbrei" the universe
will still
be the same.
Not exactly. If the commandant of a plane you are in asks an
explanation on the climate, an justification like "Kartoffelbrei"
might just end your terrestrial life, making in change in that
universe. Explantion have to be as much as possible referentially
correct for species to develop (instead of disappearing).
Yes, but COMP explains not much more than "Kartoffelbrei". At least
Kartoffelbrei is a concrete thing that we can eat (mashed potatoes),
while
COMP is just an insanely complicated way of stating the obvious fact
that we
are non-material, and includes the unfounded assumption that we are
machines. It obfuscates more than it explains.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course you can use numbers (or other computations), the point is
rather
that this is pointless, even if "theoretically possible". Using some
convoluted way of reprenting things beyond numbers with numbers is
just
useless, as we can more easily represent these things with
concepts in
language (you have to resort to that anyway, as examplified by your
heavy
use of words in critical points).
The question is not can we think. The question is can a machine
think?
Can we continue to think when we got a digital body? is there a
physical primary universe or are we in a video game, etc.
There is no such thing as a digital body. Bodies by their very
nature are
anolog.
We are not in a video game, since video games are something we
invented to
play.
If a machine can think or not depends on what you mean with
thinking. Of
course it can think if you count mechanistic thought, it can't if
you mean
truly creative thought. Machines can't be truly creative, because
they can't
handle direct, infinite self-reference, which is required for
creativity (if
you give a computer an infinite loop or an infinite recursion he
won't be
very creative, he will just give you an error massage).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some universal system can play some more important role to figure
out
some aspect of reality, but that has to be deduced from a theory
independent approach to computation if we want to extract and
distinguish the quanta and the qualia (like trough the logics of
self-
reference).
Why make it so complicated?
We have no choice, when we tackle a complex question.
But it isn't a complex question. Qualia are obviously here already,
and they
don't need a theory, as they are self-explanatory and quanta are
content of
qualia, which science has made sense of pretty well already (and
explained
as far as it can).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Ulitamtely, logic can't capture self-reference
anyway,
That is what logic handles the better. That's "Cantor Post Gödel
Turing revolution".
It isn't much use to say "I can't capture that". It is precisely a
statement
of the fact that it can't handle it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
so why not skip that stage and just go to the source of
self-reference, the self itself (yourself).
I agree the main point relies there. But then it is fun to see that
the numbers can go there too.
Numbers can go nowhere. They are tools to express measurements. Or
weird
symbols that weird people use to express obvious things in a terrible
complex way.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is deep also, and it makes us more
modest, and it changes the world around us.
Thinking that numbers can be conscious is very immodest. The only
thing that
is conscious s consciousness and it is modest to accept that. It is
immodest
to want something more than everything, or something more than the
unlimited
freedom of existence. Or more accurately, is is just stupid to want
more
(not to say the people that want more are necessarily stupid), as
there is
nothing more.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My deepest goal is humanitarian. I sincerely believe that the more we
will be rigorous (and thus modest to begin with) in theology (as
opposed to centuries of dogma), the most we will be happy and
peaceful.
I like very much that you want all of us to be happy and peaceful
(indeed I
think if you truly sincerely want this as your *highest priority*,
and see
that this depends on your own happiness and peace, you are on the
best way
to your own peace), and I like that you want to be modest.
What I don't like so much is that you want to be rigorous with
something
that is completely beyond rigor, namely consciousness itself. You
will just
fail in that endavour, I am sorry.
Rigor is just another dogma when it comes to this. Are you dogmatic
about
rigor? If yes, why is this better than other dogma, if no, why
should we be
rigorous when it comes to this?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Possible truth might be a bit frightening, for the
unprepared, but hiding them is worst in the mid run, and fatal in the
long run.
Hm, I think hiding is impossible, but the attempt is inevitable, and
indeed
fatal in the long run. It will lead to the death of "I", since at
some point
you just can't stand to hide anymore from the fact that there is no
"I" that
is somehow not equal to God, and at some point God will just awaken
and thus
dismantle the "I".
But there is nothing bad about that honestly. Yes, it leads to
suffering,
but suffering also plays a part in realizing enlightenment. It is just
temporary, and honestly no big deal for God. It just appears to be a
big
deal because we think we are the sufferer, and we think we are
somethin that
can be hurt. Suffering is finite (and based on an illusion), so it is
basically nothing at all for the infinite being. It is so strong that
bearing all the suffering in the world is its easiest task. Of
course, it
has no choice but to bear whatever comes up.
benjayk
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