On 07 Mar 2012, at 18:40, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other
city? You told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance.
He will tell you that you were wrong.
I was not wrong. When discussing the nature of identity care must be
taken when using personal pronouns or confusion will run riot; I did
not tell "him" that "he" will find "himself" in Moscow with a 100%
chance, I said there is a 100% chance Bruno Marchal will be in
Moscow and events proved I was 100% correct.
The experiment proves nothing about the 1-views. It proves (confirmed,
actually) only the presence of Bruno Marchal's body.
The fact that Bruno Marchal is in Washington and knows nothing about
Moscow is irrelevant and makes no difference to Bruno in Moscow
whatsoever. Why do I say this? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
You persist in ignoring the difference between the 1-view from the 1-
view pov, which is what I usually mean by 1-views, and the 1-views
that an outsider can attribute to other people.
> Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has
been duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1-
view perspective has not been duplicated.
Then when I said "you have been duplicated" there is something very
important about "you", the most important part in fact, that is
missing because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated.
Indeed.
What can it be, what is lacking in the copy that the original has?
let's think, it can't be information because that can certainly be
duplicated and it can't be matter because atoms are generic and we
constantly replace our atoms with new ones anyway; so I think we
both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm not yet ready
to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace irrationality.
Why? What is lacking is simply the first person personal subjective
perspective. But I am OK to call that a soul. Good idea. It fits with
the arithmetical lexicon I gave for arithmetical interpretation of
Plotinus. The soul's logic is given by "Bp & p" and obeys a logic of
knowledge (S4).
You confirm my feeling that you are confusing science (G) and
knowledge (S4Grz).
I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue:
You are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's
law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a
symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical
sensory input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand
transporter to instantly exchange your position with the original,
or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two
brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original Bruno
Marchal would notice that anything had happened, and objective
outside observers would not notice anything had happened either.
There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually
working, I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows
who cares?
OK. And?
Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or
there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people
different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the
instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if
subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no
difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch
had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable
assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are
two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one
intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view.
OK. And?
That would be like aa duplication W W, or M M, not W, M.
Do you agree with this principle: if today I can be sure that tomorrow
I will be uncertain about the outcome of some experience, then I am
today uncertain about the outcome of that future experience.
Let consider again the guy in Helsinki. He will be read and
annihilate. the information will be sent in W and M, but here, I make
precise that they will be reconstituted in exactly similar
environment, so as to match your test. So in the boxes, they behave
identically. They know that they have been reconstituted, because this
is information is given by the style of the reconstitution boxes. Of
course they don't know yet if it is in W and M. They can muse that
they are at the two places at once, and there is certainly only "one
consciousness",. But they know they will differentiate when opening
the door and getting outside the boxes. They don't know what will be
the outcome of the experience "opening the door". The guy in Helsinky
knew this in advance, and can apply the principle above to say that he
is uncertain today, before the split, what he will see when opening,
whoever he might be.
> Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split.
It's against my better judgment but I know you like the word so yes,
subjectively you do not feel a Everett style split, but God sees it;
but in my example above if the 2 are really identical and if the
exchange is really instantaneous then even God Himself doesn't know
(or care) if things really got swapped or not.
God can not even predict the comp undeterminacy. If God predicts you
will see the movie "Flying Circus", then he will made 1 believer and
2^(16180 x 10000 x 90 x 60 x 24) - 1 skeptical.
> You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on
which the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an
outsider can attribute to each reconstituted person.
And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus
"the 1-view from its own perspective" is no longer singular but has
become plural.
But this we "know" since we, the first amoeba, split in tow amoebas.
We have never cease to multiply ourselves on the planet. In that sense
Bruno Marchal *is* John Clark, already.
But the 1-view on themselves remains singular. That's why we get some
fun from conversing.
>In Helsinki he does not know where he will feel to be after
pushing the reading/annihilating button.
So after pushing the button the Helsinki man knows his sensory
information will no longer come from Helsinki, fine I have no
trouble with that, and for the sake of argument let's say that after
he pushes that button the Helsinki man does not know if his external
stimuli will now come from Washington or Moscow (he does know of
course, he always knows but never mind).
In the version above, when both realize that there are in the
reconstitution boxes, they can't know yet if they are in W or in M.
And now what? There are after all lots of things about our
environment we can't predict so even if what you say were true (it's
not) how can you derive any profound philosophical insight from this
trivial mundane observation?
By going to the next UDA step, and then the next one. At step seven
you can already understand the epistemological reduction of physics to
computer science/number theory, from the hypothesis that the physical
universe, assumed to exist, run a universal dovetailer.
Then step 8 shows that such "concrete UD" is a red herring, and the
reversal occur no matter what. In that case we can apply the usual
weak Occam razor, and the physical universe hypothesis is hown to
necessarily fail, even for the account of the behavior of matter.
> Let us take again the "multiplication-movie" experience. But
instead of multiplying only John Clark, into the 2^((16180 x 10000)
x (60 x 90) x 24, we have to multiply the couple [John Clark + a
banker], and John, at the start, when still unique, is asked to
choose the between the following bet:
"I bet a billion$ that I will see the movie "Monty Python Flying
circus" " or "I bet a billion$ that I will see white noise." The bet
is done with the banker, which is multiplied together with John. (it
is the comp first person plural case).
You should rephrase that without using so many personal pronouns
because as stated it isn't clear who gets the money if the bet is won.
I use them in precise sense. In AUDA they are played by distinct
variant of self-reference.
You tell me "you are duplicated" without precising if you talk on the
1-view, 3-view, 3-view of 1-view".
If John K Clark thought the banker really had enough money to pay
off a colossal losing bet, that is to say if the banker had
2^((16180 x 10000) x (60 x 90) x 24 x (a billion dollars)
Bankers have money, already in reality. So you can imagine, in thought
experiences!
Might be black money, though.
then the following bet would be instantly accepted: "if John K Clark
sees Monty Python Flying circus then John K Clark will receive one
billion dollars" and I (personal pronoun is OK in this case) would
know with certainty that in just 90 minutes I (personal pronoun also
OK in this case) would be very rich. On the other hand if the bet
was "only the fellow who saw Monty Python Flying circus will get the
money" then John K Clark would not bother planning how John K Clark
was going to spend John K Clark's newfound riches because it is very
unlikely that the screen in John K Clark's environment would produce
that particular pattern of pixels, although that pattern is as
likely a pattern as any other pattern; and as always there is much
in John K Clark's environment that John K Clark cannot predict, but
that has nothing to do with the nature of personal identity that we
were discussing.
I use teleportation and duplication for avoiding the personal identity
issue, at this stage. I talk only about the task of reasonably predict
a personal experience in a duplicating set up. You can always get the
whole discourse of the average machine by sampling on their memories/
diaries. In this case, betting with the banker that they will see
"Flying Circus" makes the vast majority of diary containing the
sentence "shit I lost the bet". Betting on "white noise" gives a a lot
of diaries with "I won!".
I know the above prose was clunky and may even have sounded
narcissistic but it's very easy to write gibberish if extreme care
is not taken and personal pronouns are a minefield in philosophy.
That's why I develop expertise in self-reference logic, to be sure to
be able to formalize UDA, in pure 3p form, despite the reference to 1-
notion. It is *highly* counterintuitive. But you don't need that to
understand the conceptual "reversal".
> But the one in W cannot explains why he is the one in W.
Certainly the Washington guy can explain it, he's the Washington guy
because he received sensory information from Washington not Moscow,
if he had not he would not be the Washington guy.
The fact that he is in Washington explains this. But his astonishment
is that he is the one in Washington, given that it seems to him, that
he could have been the one in Moscow. Clearly, opening the door has
break some symmetry, from his person view.
>> the one and only one place you will feel to be after the
experiment is Moscow and Washington and there is nothing paradoxical
about that.
> This is plainly false. I will not FEEL to be in M and W. I will
feel to be in M or W.
This is plainly false because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED,
Bruno Marchal's perspective has been duplicated his memory has been
duplicated his personality has been duplicated his intelligence has
been duplicated his consciousness has been duplicated, EVERYTHING
about Bruno Marchal has been duplicated, and yet you continue to
insist that "I" is singular when very clearly it is not.
The guy in washington is singular. he is not even sure the guy in
Moscow has been reconstituted. If he met him, it will look like a twin
brother falling from the sky. It will look like a stranger, which just
look like him.
After the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like
Bruno Marchal is in Washington and only Washington and after the
experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like Bruno
Marchal is in Moscow and only Moscow, and Bruno Marchal is correct
because Bruno Marchal has been duplicated.
OK. And in the iterated duplication Bruno Marchal will say Bruno
Marchal feels like having lived the history "WWMMMWMMMMWMWWMWW" and
being unable to predict that he would have lived that experience. The
vast majority of Bruno Marchal will agree with him, except for perhaps
mystical Bruno Marchal, who have special histories like the binary
developpement of Pi, and will feel to be something like the Pi-guy,
but they are negligible, and if they keep faith in comp, they might
overcome that wrong inference.
> In fact my body has been duplicated, and for an outsider my 1-view
have been duplicated, but the Nagel-Everett subjective view on the 1-
view are not. You confuse 3p discourses on 1-views with 1-p
discourse on its 1-view.
I believe it is you that is confused and that is not surprising
considering that your implicit or explicit assumption at the start
of all your thought experiments is "everything about you is
duplicated and something about you has not been duplicated",
What is not duplicated in Washington, and Moscow, that's why the
differentiate, and the question beared on the 1-view on the 1-view
after the differentiation. You seem to deny the very experience of
each of the duplicates, when walking in their new environment.
it's no wonder you end up with confusing self contradictory nonsense.
Which self-contradictory nonsense? You betray that you are not willing
to change your opinion, before reading the argument, apparently. If I
get nonsense, which remains an open problem, then I would be proud of
having refuted comp, but that's quite premature. I got only
"weirdness", and it looks like quantum weirdness exactly at the place
it should give the physical picture, so you seem quite quick here. If
you have seen a contradictory statement, show it.
If you can predict the personally felt outcome of a duplication
experience, give me the algorithm.
By the precise definition of 1-p I gave, this is impossible. It looks
like you don't see the difference between the 1-view on themselves and
the 1-view you can intellectually attribute to all the copies. That's
a big difference, because comp makes all the experiences of the copies
singular. Their own personal consciousness flux is not duplicated (=
does not seem to be duplicated from their 1p views, = no personal
duplication is lived or mentioned in the diary.
My thought experiments start with "if something is identical then
it's identical" and my starting point causes much less confusion
than yours.
?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
