On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense
to say that
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some "time",
and can
only be used as a metaphor.
I agree with almost everything you say. I would say also that the
moments of experience, considered as a class, are themselves out of
time. What it takes to "create (experiential) time" - the notorious
"illusion" - is whatever is held to be responsible for the
irreducible
mutual-exclusivity of such moments, from the perspective of the
(universal) knower. Hoyle does us the service of making this
mutual-exclusivity explicit by invoking his "light beam" to
illuminate
the pigeon holes at hazard; those who conclude that this function is
redundant, and that the structure of pigeon holes itself somehow
does
the work of "creating personal history", owe us an alternative
explanation of the role of Hoyle's beam.
I understand, of course, that these are just ways of thinking
about a
state of affairs that is ultimately not finitely conceivable, but
all
the same, I think there is something that cries out for explanation
here and Hoyle is one of the few to have explicitly attempted to
address it.
David, I can't see the role of Hoyles' beam. The reason of the
mutual exclusivity of moments seems to me to be explained (in comp)
by the fact that a machine cannot address the memory of another
machine, or of itself at another moment (except trough memory).
Hoyles' beam seem to reintroduce a sort of external reality, which
does not solve anything, it seems to me, and introduces more
complex events in the picture.
Dear Bruno,
Here we seem to be synchronized in our ideas!
This "cannot access the memory of another machine" and "(cannot
access memory ) of itself at another moment" is exactly the way that
the concurrency problem of computer science is related to space and
time!
I don't think so. With comp you have to distinguish completely the
easy "concurrency" problem, from the harder "physical concurrency
problem". It is easy to emulate interacting program in the sense I
have to use to explain that a machine cannot access the meory of
another machine. And obviously the UD or arithmetic implements ad
nauseam such kind of interactions. But then the physical laws emerge
from the statistics on *all* computation, and all such interaction,
and from this we must justify physics, including the physical logic of
interaction. But that is a separate problem, and the Z and X logic
suggest how to proceed by already given a reasonable arithmetical
quantization (it shows also that it is technically difficult to
progress).
But now I am confused as you seem to recognize that a machine has
and needs the resource of memory;
This is quite typical in computer science. Most machines have
memories. Like they have often read and write intructions to handle
those memories.
it was my (mis)understanding that machines are purely immaterial,
existing a a priori given strings of integers.
You were right. This has nothing to do that the program i in the list
of the phi_i, can have memories. A large part of computer science can
be entirely arithmetized.
You might think to study a good book on theoretical computer science
to swallow definitely that fact. All proposition on machine are either
arithmetical statements, or arithmetically related statements. I work
both in comp, and in arithmetic.
How does memory non-access become encoded in a string?
Why would we need to encode the non access. It is enough that the
numbers involved have no access.
The computation phi_i(j)^k has no access to the computation
phi'(j')^k, if i ≠ i' and j ≠ j', for example.
But non-access can be implemented in various ways. It is just not
relevant.
Is it the non-existence of a particular Godelization within a
particular string that would relate to some other portion of a string?
It is more simple. See above.
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not
enough? It seems clear to me that from the current state of any
universal machine, it will look like a special moment is chosen out
of the others, for the elementary reason that such a state
individuates the "present moment here and now" from her point of
view.
How is the index establish a form of sameness? It seems to me
that one needs at least bisimilarity to establish the connectivity.
Of course, the idea that some time exists is very deep in us, and I
understand that the big comp picture is very counter-intuitive, but
in this case, it is a kind of difficulty already present in any
atemporal "static" view of everything, which already appears with
general relativity for example.
It is a bit subtle. "To be conscious here and now" is not an
illusion. "To be conscious of "here and now" " is an illusion. The
"here and now" is part of the brain (actually the infinities of
arithmetical relations) construction.
The content of "to be conscious here and now" is exactly what
Craig is discussing with "sense"! I see it as a form of fixed point
considered in a computational sense, similar to what Wolfram pointed
out in his Computational Intractibility in physics: the best
possible simulation of a physical system is the system itself.
Wolfram miss the first person person indeterminacy and thus the comp
mind body problem.
You seem to say that this is a relation between an infinite number
of arithmetical relations. Could you elaborate more on this?
UDA1-8 explains that. Tell me where you have a problem. Tell me if it
is before or after step seven, without doing any philosophy, because
that would be very confusing here. We can discuss philosophy after,
when you grasp why physics has to emerge from arithmetic, once we
assume comp, which is the whole purpose of UDA to explain.
If not, like Craig, you will just describe your correct first person
intuition that comp is false, shared by all ideally correct machines.
If I (3p) is a machine, then I (1p) is not a machine from its 1p view,
even if G* "knows" that it is a correct *machine*.
Bruno
Feel free to criticize my perhaps too much simple mind view on
this, I might miss your point,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
Onward!
Stephen
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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