On 02 Jul 2012, at 18:41, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote

 >> silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno Marchal

> That is not a silly assumptions. It is a consequence of computationalism.

So you've proved that if "computationalism" is true then there can be only one Bruno Marchal,

I will ask you not to use "bruno marchal" for that can be confusing.

You only forget that the question bears on the first person point of view, which, by the given definition and protocols is obviously unique, from their own pov, as your own description "1) and 2)" already recognizes.



but for the proof to work you've got to start with the assumption that there can be only one Bruno Marchal. Seems like a lot of wasted effort to me.

> After the duplication and differentiation, there is only one Bruno Marchal from the points of view of all Bruno Marchal.

And assuming they are logical all the Bruno Marchals would agree with each other on that point, and I the third party observer agree too.

So they will all agree having different views, and that the question was thus meaningful. They all agree that they could not have predicted the particular experience they are living. Such an a prediction algorithm is simply nonsensical.



> You don't give a prediction. You gave two predictions.

And that's twice as good if both predictions turn out to be true, and they do.

Of course not. The one in M and the one in W have different incompatible experience. In one diary we see "Well I am in Moscow now", and in the other diary "well I am in Washington now", and the question was bearing on that. Not on where the copies are, but where the copies feel to be individually.





> If "1) + 2)" means "1) AND 2)": both will know the prediction was wrong.

How on earth will they know it was wrong when every word that was predicted to be written in those diaries was in fact written? It's interesting, you're the one who introduced the idea of the people in the experiment using diaries so it could be a real scientific experiment, but now you don't like that idea.

If you predicted 1)and 2), you are wrong at the start, because the question was on the 1-pov, and 1)-and-2) is not a possible 1-pov. Or it means that you predicted the 3-view on the 1-view. In that case your prediction is correct but does not address the question asked.

Now you are only in W (resp. M), and your prediction fails to predict that special happening, which is obvious for you can't experience, in the usual cognitive sense of experience, both happening at once.





>> You, Bruno Marchal, are now in Washington and you write in your diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington".

> Yes. And I know I am not the one in Moscow.

For God's sake, you know you're not the one in Moscow because you're not the one in Moscow! X is not Y because if it were Y would be X; Where is the cosmic significance in that?

The question is asked in Helsinki. Here you seem to be be deliberately rhetorically oversimplifying a sentence taken out of the context.




> 1) "I find myself in Washington, and realize that I could not have predicted that particular outcome,

And yet by looking in the diary that you had written you find rock solid proof that you DID predict that outcome.

Then I can predict the winning lotery ticket. It is enough to write
1) ticket 000000
2) ticket 000001
3) ticket 000002
...
1000000) ticket 999999.

Wow. You are quite clairvoyant!



Maybe you made other predictions too, one about some fellow in Moscow, and maybe you made a prediction about the rain probability in Duluth Minnesota too, but all that's irrelevant, it doesn't effect you because you're in Washington.

> 2) "I find myself in Moscow, and realize that I could not have predicted that particular outcome,

And yet by looking in the diary that you had written you find rock solid proof that you DID predict that outcome.

Not if I find both "1)" and "2), given that here I am living only "2)" and not "1)". So if this means that your prediction is successful, it means that you believe you have a mean to predict the winning lottery ticket.



Maybe you made other predictions too, one about some fellow in Washington, and maybe you made a prediction about the rain probability in Duluth Minnesota too, but all that's irrelevant, it doesn't effect you because you're in Moscow.

> you keep describing the 3-view on the 1-views, instead of listening to each reconstituted person

I am listening to them, and introducing the diaries into this was your idea not mine.

To give two outcomes when you see only one is not what is called prediction.

There is one outcome, not because there is only one John Clark, but because for all possible John Clarks, there is only one 1-pov, from their 1-pov view, and that the question was bearing on which one you can predict to be living. Comp makes you survive so you know there is one, and comp makes it impossible for them to be one double telepathic subject, so the 1-pov will stay unique from the 1-pov view, so both will feel to be selected among the two possibilities. If you don't see this, I don't know how I can help.

Try to use the diaries with respect to the question asked, and with the definition given. The question is not about the 3-view on the copies, but on the views of each copies.

You seem to evade that simple precise question at all price.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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