On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one
Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to
Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a
Washington experience.
> No problem with that.
I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious
that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion.
When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your
brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but "you", the
first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there
is something in the environment in Washington that makes a change
to one of your sense organs that is missing in the environment of
Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between the two, is
your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask
which one is "really" you.
There is no sense to ask who is "really" me, but this has never
been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of the
specific events "seeing Washington ", or seeing "Moscow".
Both are 'seen'. The question is by whom.
Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the
answer is "the inner god", alias the knower, alias Bp & p, alias
S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT arithmetical. Unlike the
machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical.
It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one
person who does the seeing.
But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are
two of them. There is one person in Moscow, and one person in
Washington, and those are the one we interview. We just continue to
use the "you" and "me", if they are used in the first person indexical
sense, in the usual way.
It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and
Washington was seen by Obama.
And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies both
Brent will see one city, that they could not have predicted to live
that one in particular. For each of them subjectively the experience
is the same as having one in either city by throwing a coin. You can
replace "Brent" by machine having enough ability to be able to
distinguish Moscow from Washington, and you can prove easily that such
machine has no technic to predict which location she (in the usual
sense) will observe in his immediate future.
I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future
first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as
your own " "1)" and "2)" prediction illustrates.
But then there is not probability interpretation.
? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the "and"
is an 1-pov "or". It is the same as "head or tail".
You write, "The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and
refutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli
experience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and non
iterated cases."
But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption
that there is some X such that "X is in Washington" or "X is in
Moscow".
That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7.
And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8.
(assuming comp)
If W="X1 is in Washington" and M="X2 is in Moscow", then there is no
probability interpretation of where X0 is.
Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I
cannot know if the guy who looks at the result is still me. But with
comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication)
teleportation. So we accept some local comp type of identity, and that
it can be duplicated. So although you will be in Washington and
Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any of you,
will feel as having been randomly selected (as the iteration makes
clearer) among Washington and Moscow.
Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be, as
that would contradict the survival of the other. If you predict
Moscow, you make the Brent in Washington into a zombie, or a non-
Brent. Comp says both are Brent.
you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take it
with you, before accepting a duplication experience.
This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation
of QM. If everything happens then what does it mean to say an event
has a certain probability?
But once you make the machine-observer relativization the theory
explains why events have relative probabilities. For the same reason
not all arithmetical propositions are true, not all physical
propositions are true, and most factual truth are relative to context
and self-reference.
Everything does not happen, neither with comp, nor with Everett.
Gleason theorem justifies the Born rules, and this independently of
any base. On the contrary, you need Everett to predict the Brout-
Englert Higgs Boson as I said to François Englert. He agreed.
I am not saying that comp or Everett is true, but up to now, they fit
remarkably with the facts. The collapse theory collapsed day one, from
unclarity, as EPR made rather clear, and Bell made enough precise.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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