On 25 Aug 2012, at 22:56, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can be used as an argument here.

"Normally"?? The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the Bekenstein bound. I don't know in what sense it "should be extracted" from something else, but if you can do so, please do. It would certainly impress me.




UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take 1000^^^^1000 centuries is not relevant.

Oh, OK, you mean assuming the world is generated by the UDA then it follows that the holographic principle (assuming it's true) is also generated by the UDA (along with everything else).

I guess you mean "generated by the UD" (the UD is a program, UDA is just an argument).

More or less OK, but it is not clear if you are not forgetting the first person indeterminacy. The "real" physical world is never generated by the UD, it is only recovered by the machines/programs, from their first person points of view based on the entire (infinite, non computable) domain of indeterminacy.

And this can help to see a sort of hologram at play, as that UD* border has to be a fractal structure with itself embedded "everywhere". But I have never to much dig on that aspect, to be sure.

Unlike Schmidhuber and Tegmark seems to think, comp does not allow to believe that the physical universe is a program among others, at least a priori. It is a richer epistemological invariant, not computable a priori, pertaining to a sum on all computations. Schmidhuber and Tegmark just abstract themselves from the first person indeterminacy, and thus are not really assuming comp, or taking into account the existence of consciousness.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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