Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-05, 11:04:53
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:14, meekerdb wrote:
> On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>> On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
>>>
>>> *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up
>>> the entire
>>> thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your
brain
>>> function and that your brain function can be replaced by the
>>> functioning of
>>> non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human
>>> individuality is
>>> a universal commodity.
>> Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the
>> comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
>> explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
>> thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the
consequences
>> of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
>> computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to
>> your
>> worldview.
>
> I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the
> computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an
> outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain
> conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of
> the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even
> the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in
> order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers
> me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed
> universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has
> been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion
> that everything is computable.
That's a good argument for saying that the level of substitution is
not that low. But the reasoning would still go through, and we would
lead to a unique computable universe. That is the only way to make a
digital physics consistent (as I forget to say sometimes). Then you
get a more complex "other mind problem", and something like David
Nyman- Hoyle beam would be needed, and would need to be separate from
the physical reality, making the big physical whole incomplete, etc.
yes this bothers me too. Needless to say, I tend to believe that if
comp is true, the level is much higher.
>
>>
>>> *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of
>>> resources,
>>> supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a
>>> theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from
>>> realism from
>>> the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does
>>> data enter
>>> or exit a computation?
>> It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two
>> questions simply are relevant.
>>
>>> *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self
>>> justifying
>>> independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in
>>> the dark.
>>> Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from
the
>>> beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
>>> constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of
>>> that.
>> AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an
>> ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever
primitive
>> reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the
natural
>> numbers.
>
> ISTM that Bruno rejects any reality behind the natural numbers (or
> other system of computation). If often argues that the natural
> numbers exist, because they satisfy true propositions: There exists
> a prime number between 1 and 3, therefore 2 exists. This assumes a
> Platonist view of mathematical objects, which Peter D. Jones has
> argued against.
? I would say that the contrary is true. It is because natural
numbers
exists, and seems to obeys laws like addition and multiplication that
true propositions can be made on them. 2 exists, and only 1 and 2
divides 2, so 2 is prime, and thus prime numbers exists. 2 itself
exists just because Ex(x = s(s(0))) is true. Indeed take x = s(s(0)),
and the proposition follows from s(s(0)) = s(s(0)).
Bruno
>
> Brent
>
>>
>> In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive
>> reality is
>> sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base
reality
>> because it is more familiar to his correspondents.
>>
>>> Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the
>>> pull toward
>>> arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come
>>> from?
>>>
>> Again, these two questions seem irrelevant.
>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Pc173EEJR4IJ
>>> .
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>> .
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
>>> .
>>> For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
>>> .
>>>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
> .
> For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
> .
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
