Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads.
Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the "intellect" of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the "fictional" construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/30/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-29, 10:29:23 Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge On 29 Sep 2012, at 14:43, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > On 24.09.2012 18:23 meekerdb said the following: >> On 9/24/2012 2:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> On 23 Sep 2012, at 18:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >>> >>>> On 23.09.2012 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following: >>>>> >>>>> On 23 Sep 2012, at 09:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 22.09.2012 22:49 meekerdb said the following: >>>> >>>> ... >>>> >>>>>>> In the past, Bruno has said that a machine that >>>>>>> understands transfinite induction will be conscious. But >>>>>>> being conscious and intelligent are not the same thing. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In my view this is the same as epiphenomenalism. Engineers >>>>>> develop a robot to achieve a prescribed function. They do not >>>>>> care about consciousness in this respect. Then consciousness >>>>>> will appear automatically but the function developed by >>>>>> engineers does not depend on it. Hence epiphenomenalism seems >>>>>> to apply. >>>>> >>>>> Not at all. Study UDA to see why exactly, but if comp is >>>>> correct, consciousness is somehow what defines the physical >>>>> realities, making possible for engineers to build the machines, >>>>> and then consciousness, despite not being programmable per se, >>>>> does have a role, like relatively speeding up the computations. >>>>> Like "non free will", the "epiphenomenalism" is only >>>>> "apparent" because you take the "outer god's eyes view", but >>>>> with comp, there is no matter, nor consciousness, at that >>>>> level, and we have no access at all at that level (without >>>>> assuming comp, and accessing it intellectually, that is only >>>>> arithmetic). >>>>> >>>>> This is hard to explain if you fail to see the >>>>> physics/machine's psychology/theology reversal. You are still >>>>> (consciously or not) maintaining the physical supervenience >>>>> thesis, or an aristotelian ontology, but comp prevents this to >>>>> be possible. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno, >>>> >>>> I have considered a concrete case, when engineers develop a >>>> robot, not a general one. For such a concrete case, I do not >>>> understand your answer. >>>> >>>> I have understood Brent in such a way that when engineers develop >>>> a robot they must just care about functionality to achieve and >>>> they can ignore consciousness at all. Whether it appears in the >>>> robot or not, it is not a business of engineers. Do you agree >>>> with such a statement or not? >> >> In my defense, I only said that the engineers could develop >> artificial intelligences without considering consciousnees. I didn't >> say they *must* do so, and in fact I think they are ethically bound >> to consider it. John McCarthy has already written on this years ago. >> And it has nothing to do with whether supervenience or comp is true. >> In either case an intelligent robot is likely to be a conscious being >> and ethical considerations arise. >> > > > Dear Bruno and Brent, > > Frankly speaking I do not quite understand you answers. When I try > to convert your thoughts to some guidelines for engineers developing > robots, I get only something like as follows. > > 1) When you make your design, do not care about consciousness, just > implement functions required. > > 2) When a robot is ready, it may have consciousness. We have not a > clue how to check if it has it but you must consider ethical > implications (say shutting a robot down may be equivalent to a > murder). > > Evgenii > > P.S. In my view 1) and 2) implies epiphenomenolism for consciousness. If consciousness is epiphenomenal, how could matter be explained through a theory of consciousness/first person, as this is made obligatory when we assume that we are machines? I remind you that things go in this way, if we are machine: number ===> consciousness ===> matter (and only then: matter ===> human consciousness ===> human notion of number. That might explains the confusion) I assume some basic understanding of the FPI and the UDA here. (FPI = first person indeterminacy). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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